Duval County v. Jennings

• Decision Date: 26 November 1935
• Parties: DUVAL COUNTY et al. v. JENNINGS et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

164 So. 356

121 Fla. 584

DUVAL COUNTY et al. v. JENNINGS et al.

Florida Supreme Court

November 26, 1935

En Banc.

Suit by James Jennings and others against Duval County and others. From an interlocutory order or decree granting an injunction defendants appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Miles W. Lewis, judge.

COUNSEL

Fant &amp Stanley, of Jacksonville, for appellants.

R. R Axtell and W. Gregory Smith, both of Jacksonville, for appellees.

OPINION

DAVIS Justice.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order granting an injunction. The substance of the complaint was that the board of county commissioners of Duval county, Fla., acting in pursuance of chapter 17534, Sp. Acts 1935, Laws of Florida, had adopted a resolution calling a special election on October 8, 1935, to determine whether the Duval county St. Johns River Bridge constructed under chapter 7462, Sp. Acts 1917, Laws of Florida, should be operated from and after January 1, 1936, as a free bridge, and that to hold such special election in accordance with the resolution thus adopted would be violative of the vested constitutional rights of complainants in the tolls so attempted to be lifted from the affected bridge. On an earlier application, supersedeas of the injunctive order was denied, and the case submitted for determination on its merits without further oral argument.

It is first argued by appellants that appellee Carran, although shown by the bill of complaint to be the holder of a $1,000 Duval county St. Johns River bond in the amount of $1,000, was without any equitable interest to have granted the relief he sought, because the object of his injunction bill was to prevent the calling and holding of an election, which, ex proprio vigore, could not effectually impair complainant's said bond; that the calling and holding of an election, being a political matter, should not be interfered with by a court of equity, but that the election should be allowed to proceed and complainant awarded relief against its adverse result, should that contingency occur to his detriment.

We think the aforementioned objection not well founded. The election here sought to be enjoined was not an ordinary political election relating to the people's right to choose elective officials to govern them, but was special and extraordinary statutory election, the mere holding of which was shown by the bill of complaint to involve the expenditure of alleged trust funds in which complainant asserted and claimed a direct interest, by seeking to have them conserved for his benefit.

The rule in such cases is that in elections not involving the right to public office, where asserted vested contract or property rights can be more effectually protected by restraining in advance a threatened unlawful election tending toward their encroachment, a court of equity is not bound to speculate upon the likely or probable result of the election if held, but may enjoin the holding of it in a clear case. See 9 R.C.L. 1001, § 22, Compare Joughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 143 So. 145, 306, 147 So. 273, and State ex rel. Landis v. Tedder, 106 Fla. 140, 143 So. 148. So the complainants' bill in this case was well founded if threatened violation of complainants' equitable rights was otherwise clearly shown.

In 1917 the Legislature enacted chapter 7462, Sp. Acts 1917, whereby the board of county commissioners of Duval county were authorized to issue the series of bonds of which complainant below was one of the holders. Under the statute, the voters of Duval county were given their choice of a free bridge or a toll bridge at the time the bonds were voted, and their choice was for a toll bridge. Under section 6 of the act, it was expressly provided that: 'All tolls and charges collected for the use of said bridge shall be expended as follows: 1. In the operation, maintenance and repair of said bridge, and the approaches thereto. 2. In the payment of the interest on said bonds. 3. In providing a sinking fund for said bonds.' Under section 5 of the act, the schedule of tolls collectible was expressly committed to the decision of the circuit court of Duval county. Contained in this section is an express provision to the effect that 'When tolls and charges are approved or fixed by the Circuit Judge, they shall not be changed or altered for a period of two years without first obtaining leave of the Court to submit a new schedule of tolls and charges,' as well as a provision that all tolls and charges on the bridge shall be approved by the circuit court before being made effective.

Under the settled law of this state, all provisions of chapter 7462, supra, relating to the imposition and collection of tolls, became a part of the contract security given by that Act to all takers and holders of Duval county St. Johns River Bridge bonds. And such provisions cannot be subsequently changed or diminished by the Legislature to the prejudice or likely impairment of the obligation of contract thus brought into existence when the bonds were sold pursuant to a statutory requirement for the imposition and collection of 'reasonable' tolls as their security. ^[1]

Comprehended in that contract also was the statutory provision that the circuit court of Duval county, not the Legislature, nor the voters of Duval county, should have power to decide whether substantial or merely nominal tolls shall be collectible at any given time in order to make the performance of the bond obligation at maturity safe for the investors. And such special statutory provision of chapter 7462, supra, has been heretofore brought into controversy and has been expressly upheld as a valid one by this court. See State ex rel. Young v. Duval County, 76 Fla. 180, 79 So. 692.

Appellees in their bill have taken the position that the provisions of chapter 7462, Sp. Acts 1917, under which the bridge bonds were issued, and especially the provisions of that act to the effect that the county commissioners of Duval county shall charge and collect reasonable tolls to be confirmed by the Duval county circuit court and altered from time to time by the court and by no other authority, and that such tolls shall be collected, charged with a statutory trust that permits them to be used only for the maintenance and operation of the bridge and afterward to pay interest on and the principal...