Dvorak v. City of Bloomington

• Decision Date: 23 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 53S01-0209-CV-472.,53S01-0209-CV-472.
• Citation: 796 N.E.2d 236
• Parties: Peter DVORAK, Imram Aziz, Brian Gach, Eric Himes, Scott Albright, and Alan Lutz, Appellants (Defendants below), v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

796 N.E.2d 236

Peter DVORAK, Imram Aziz, Brian Gach, Eric Himes, Scott Albright, and Alan Lutz, Appellants (Defendants below), v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 53S01-0209-CV-472.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

September 23, 2003.

Michael L. Carmin, Andrews Harrell Mann Carmin & Parker, Julia Blackwell Gelinas, Nelson D. Alexander, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.

Linda Runkle, Corporation Counsel, Patricia S. Bernens, City Attorney, R. Michael Flory, Asst. City Attorney, Bloomington, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. J. Alexander Tanford, Bloomington, IN, Kenneth J. Falk, Michael J. Lewinski, Timothy E. Ochs, Tanya D. Marsh, Ice Miller, Indianapolis, IN, Robert L. Bauman, West Lafayette City Attorney, Pamela J. Hermes, West Lafayette Assistant City Attorney, Gambs, Mucker & Bauman, Lafayette, IN, for Amici Curiae Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indiana Association of Cities and Towns, City of West Lafayette, Indiana.

DICKSON, Justice.

This appeal challenges the trial court's determination that a local zoning ordinance restricting the number of unrelated adult persons per dwelling in a single-family residential zone does not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution and was not an ultra vires act. We affirm.

Peter Dvorak is the owner of a residential property located at 107 S. Bryan Avenue in Bloomington. On April 23, 1996, the City filed a complaint against Dvorak and the other defendants-appellants, tenants of Dvorak (hereinafter collectively "Dvorak"), claiming that they violated a zoning ordinance in the Bloomington Municipal Code which prohibits the property from being occupied by more than four adults unrelated by blood, marriage, or adoption.¹ The City's complaint sought to enjoin future use of the property inconsistent with the ordinance and to impose a fine of $2,500 per day from the time the violation began until the time it ceased. Dvorak filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the ordinance was void as an ultra vires act and that it violated Article 1, Section 23, the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, of the Indiana Constitution. After a hearing and the submission of briefs by the parties, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the ordinance was neither ultra vires nor unconstitutional. At Dvorak's request, the trial court certified the ruling for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals accepted the appeal, vacated the decision of the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings, noting that the trial court had relieved the City of its duty to answer an interrogatory seeking "the City's justification(s) and rationale(s)" for the ordinance, and holding that Dvorak "should be given a reasonable opportunity for discovery in order to determine what goals the Ordinance was designed to promote." Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 702 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Thereafter, in a bifurcated bench trial on the issues of constitutionality and whether its adoption was an ultra vires act, the trial court entered judgment upholding the ordinance. Upon review of this judgment, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the zoning ordinance unconstitutional under Section 23. Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 768 N.E.2d 490 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). We granted the City's petition for transfer. Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 783 N.E.2d 695 (Ind.2002) (table).

Dvorak contends on appeal that the zoning ordinance violates Section 23 and that its adoption was an ultra vires act.

Article 1, § 23

When an enactment is challenged under the Indiana Constitution, it stands before this Court "clothed with the presumption of constitutionality until clearly overcome by a contrary showing." Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996)(citing Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.1992)

; State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ind.1992); Eddy v. McGinnis, 523 N.E.2d 737, 738 (Ind. 1988)). The party challenging the constitutionality of the enactment bears the burden of proof, and all doubts are resolved against that party. Id.

The requirements of Article 1, § 23 govern not only state statutes, but also the enactments and actions of county, municipal, and other governmental agencies and their equivalents. See, e.g., IHSAA, Inc. v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 231 (Ind. 1997)

; Haas v. South Bend Comm. Sch. Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972); Phillips v. Officials of Valparaiso, 233 Ind. 414, 120 N.E.2d 398 (1954); Kersey v. City of Terre Haute, 161 Ind. 471, 68 N.E. 1027 (1903); Graffty v. City of Rushville, 107 Ind. 502, 509, 8 N.E. 609, 612 (1886); Indianapolis v. Clint's Wrecker Serv., Inc., 440 N.E.2d 737, 744 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). But see Bd. of Comm'rs of the County of Howard v. Kokomo City Plan Comm'n, 263 Ind. 282, 294, 330 N.E.2d 92, 100 (1975).

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution states, "[t]he General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." Ind. Const. art. I, § 23. In Collins v. Day, we analyzed the common understanding of the framers and ratifiers of Section 23 and early cases implementing that section, concluding as follows:

To summarize, we hold that Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion.

644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994).

Directing their first two claims to the first requirement in Collins, Dvorak contends:

No inherent distinctions exist between equal numbers of related and unrelated adults that are reasonably connected to the accomplishment of the Ordinance's objectives of reducing trash, noise, and traffic and maintaining core neighborhoods by reducing adult population density.

....

No inherent distinctions exist between equal numbers of related and unrelated adults that are reasonably connected to family values or providing healthful surroundings for family life.

Br. of Appellants at 12, 18. Dvorak's third claim involves the second Collins requirement: "[t]he Ordinance permits some non-family groups to live in single-family zones but denies this privilege to other similarly situated groups." Id. at 20.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Dvorak's constitutional arguments place considerable emphasis upon the alleged failures of the City to establish or demonstrate that disparate treatment of different classifications under the ordinance was reasonably connected to the City's legislative goals. Because it is Dvorak, not the City, who asserts this constitutional challenge, however, there is no burden upon the City to demonstrate that the ordinance is constitutional. Rather, the burden is entirely upon Dvorak to overcome the presumption of constitutionality and to establish a constitutional violation. Sims v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind.2003); Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d at 321; Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 81.

Dvorak asserts that the ordinance, Bloomington Municipal Code § 20.02.01.00, excludes from single-family residential districts households consisting of more than three adults not related by blood, marriage or legal adoption. Br. of Appellants at 4. The Bryan Avenue property was "grandfathered" to permit four unrelated adults to occupy the property. Appellants' App. at 143. Dvorak does not challenge the propriety of the City's creation of single-family residential districts, but claims a constitutional violation contending that the ordinance unequally treats two different classes: households comprised of four or more related adults and those comprised of four or more unrelated adults. Dvorak argues that the City's purposes in enacting the ordinance are not reasonably related to any inherent characteristics that distinguish these two classes.

This argument places a strained construction on Collins, which requires only that the "the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation," not the purposes of the legislation, "be reasonably related to the inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes." Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 79; Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ind. 2000) (considering whether special medical malpractice statute of limitations was reasonably related to the inherent characteristics distinguishing medical malpractice victims from other tort victims); McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972, 981 (Ind. 2000) (deciding whether the products liability statute of repose is reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that define the distinction); IHSAA, Inc., 694 N.E.2d at 240 (determining whether limited athletic eligibility is reasonably related to inherent distinctions distinguishing transfer students from other students). While it is the treatment, not the legislative purpose, which must be reasonably related to the inherent distinctions between the classes, the legislative purposes may be a factor considered in making this determination. See, e.g., Sims, 782 N.E.2d at 353-54

.

We therefore find this appeal to present the following appellate issue: whether Dvorak has demonstrated either (1) that the ordinance's disparate treatment of two classes of persons is not reasonably related to their distinguishing inherent characteristics, or (2) that the preferential treatment accorded one of the classes is not uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons...