Easterline v. Bean

• Decision Date: 21 April 1932
• Docket Number: No. 5467.,5467.
• Citation: 49 S.W.2d 427
• Parties: EASTERLINE et al. v. BEAN.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 427

49 S.W.2d 427

EASTERLINE et al. v. BEAN.

No. 5467.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 21, 1932.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Ninth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by J. J. Easterline and others against B. F. Bean. Judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals [15 S.W.(2d) 734], and plaintiffs bring error.

Reversed and remanded to district court.

Adams & Hamilton, of Jasper, Townsend & Collins, R. C. Musslewhite, and J. J. Collins, all of Lufkin, and Ben H. Powell and J. A. Rauhut, both of Austin, for plaintiffs in error.

John B. Warren, of Houston, and John B. Forse, of Newton, and Smith & Lanier, of Jasper, for defendant in error.

SHARP, C.

For a statement of the nature and result of the case we adopt the following from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals:

"This was a trespass to try title suit by appellants, two of the heirs of Benjamin F. Easterline, against appellee, Dr. B. F. Bean, to recover 364 2/3 acres of land, a part of the Owens Taylor survey in Jasper county. Upon an instructed verdict judgment was entered in appellee's favor. On the 29th of January, 1909, Easterline was adjudged insane. On the 15th of the following February, Minerva Ann Bayles was appointed guardian of his person and estate by the probate court of Jasper county. On the 20th day of that month she duly qualified as such guardian. On the 9th of the following March, as guardian, she made application to the probate court of Jasper county to sell the land in controversy. The application to sell was duly granted and sale ordered on the 15th of March, as prayed for in the application. On the 17th of March, as guardian, she made report of sale to the probate court, showing that she had sold at private sale, as ordered by the court, the land in controversy, to appellee, Dr. B. F. Bean. On the 23d of March the probate court entered its order duly confirming the sale as reported. On the 25th of March, the guardian executed her deed as directed by the order of confirmation, conveying the land in controversy to Dr. Bean. Without quoting from these various orders, we say of them that they are in all things regular, and on their face recite full compliance with the statutory regulations for the sale of the ward's real estate by his guardian.

"On the trial appellant attacked the guardian's sale of the land by offering evidence to the effect that the ward died on the 20th of March, prior to confirmation of the order of sale on the 23d of March. Appellee offered evidence to the effect that Easterline died on the 28th of March, subsequent to the order of confirmation and the execution and delivery to him of the deed in question. The verdict was instructed in appellee's favor on the trial court's conclusion that the guardian's deed and the orders supporting it were not subject to collateral attack. Though appellee pleaded the several statutes of limitation, and in support of the instructed verdict insists before us that the evidence as a matter of law supported these pleas, a review of this evidence is not necessary, since in our judgment the trial court's theory is the law of the case."

An appeal was made by plaintiffs in error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Ninth judicial district at Beaumont, and that court held that the evidence offered to the effect that the ward died on the 20th of March prior to confirmation of the order of sale on the 23d day of March was inadmissible, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 15 S.W.(2d) 734.

Plaintiffs in error applied for a writ of error to the Supreme Court, which was granted.

The sole question for decision in this case is: Can the heirs of the deceased ward, Benjamin F. Easterline, attack a sale of the ward's land under the orders of the probate court of Jasper county in a guardianship proceeding by showing that the order of confirmation of the sale was made after the ward's death?

A brief review of the policy of this state upon this and kindred questions will be helpful in reaching a correct answer to the foregoing question. It has long been the public policy of this state, as expressed through legislative acts, that no administration shall ever be had upon a living person's estate. Article 3292, R. S. 1925, in part, reads: "The probate of a will, or administration of an estate of a living person shall be void. * * *"

The courts of this state, in an unbroken line of decisions, have held that a grant of administration on the estate of a living person is void. It may be proved in a collateral proceeding that the person whose estate is attempted to be administered is not dead, and that the probate court had no jurisdiction thereof, and any act done is totally void. Fisk v. Norvel, 9 Tex. 13, 58 Am. Dec. 128; Withers v. Patterson, 27 Tex. 491, 86 Am. Dec. 643; Templeton v. Ferguson, 89 Tex. 47, 33 S. W. 329.

Furthermore, it has long been the public policy of this state that, when a ward dies, the probate court loses jurisdiction of the guardianship matter, save and except that the guardianship shall be immediately settled and closed, and the guardian discharged as provided for by law. Articles 4128 and 4296, R. S.; Timmins v. Bonner & Long, 58 Tex. 554, 561; Fortson v. Alford, 62 Tex. 576; Alford v. Halbert, 74 Tex. 346, 12 S. W. 75; Young v. Gray, 60 Tex. 543; Marlow v. Lacy, 68 Tex. 154, 2 S. W. 52; see also In re Estate of Livermore, 132 Cal. 99, 64 P. 113, 84 Am. St. Rep. 37; Martin v. Caldwell, 49 Ind. App. 1, 96 N. E. 660, 661; State Fair Ass'n v. Terry, 74 Ark. 149, 85 S. W. 87, 89; Price v. Peterson, 38 Ark. 494; Whittemore v. Coleman, 239 Ill. 450, 88 N. E. 228; Rodgers on Domestic Relations, § 942; 28 C. J. 1096.

Article 4128, in part, reads as follows: "The guardian of a minor continues in office, unless sooner discharged according to law, until the minor dies or becomes twenty-one years of age, or being a female, marries. * * *" (Italics ours.)

Article 4296 reads: "When the ward dies, or if a minor, arrives at the age of twenty-one years, or if a female, marries, or, if a person of unsound mind or habitual drunkard, is restored and discharged from guardianship, the guardianship shall be immediately settled and closed and the guardian discharged, as provided in this chapter." (Italics ours.)

The decisions construing these articles of the statutes are uniform, and have never been challenged by the decisions of our Supreme Court. We will review some of the cases bearing upon this question.

In the case of Timmins v. Bonner & Long, 58 Tex. 554, 561, Judge Stayton says: "Mrs. Timmins was married on September 26, 1876, and from that time forward Reed ceased to be either the guardian of her person or estate as fully as though upon final settlement he had been discharged, had been removed for cause, or had died. Pasch. Dig. 6929; Act of August, 1876, General Laws, p. 178."

In the case of Fortson v. Alford, 62 Tex. 576, it is said:

"Our statute provides that `the guardian of a minor continues in office, unless sooner discharged according to law, until the minor arrives at the age of twenty-one years, or, being a female, marries, or until such minor shall die.' R. S., art. 2512.

"The statute also provides for the settlement of the guardianship in case of the death of the ward. Title 47, chap. 18, R. S.

"Mr. Schouler in his work on Domestic Relations, page 424, says: `Death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship. And after the ward's death the guardian's only duty is to settle up his accounts and pay the balance in his hands to the ward's personal representatives, whereupon his trust is completely fulfilled.'"

The case of Fortson v. Alford was again appealed to the Supreme Court. Alford v. Halbert, 74 Tex. 346, 12 S. W. 75, 76. It was contended in that case that the Anderson county court after the death of the ward still had control of her estate for the purpose of settlement with the guardian. Again it was said: "* * * There is no authority under our law, in a guardianship proceeding, giving the probate court jurisdiction to order a sale of land to pay debts after the death of the ward. `Death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship.'"

In the case of Young v. Gray, supra, the Supreme Court, in passing upon probate proceedings, after the death of the ward, held: "* * * The proper conclusion in such cases, under the statute, seems to be that, when the ward dies, the duties of the guardian are at an end, except, alone, for the purposes of paying claims theretofore approved, or making his final account, and obtaining as soon as he can, for his protection in the future, an order of final settlement and discharge. Timmins v. Bonner, 58 Tex. 554. The estate of the deceased ward should, like the estate of any other deceased person, be turned over as soon as possible, by the guardian, to the administrator or such other person or persons as by law may be determined to be entitled to it."

In 28 Corpus Juris, at page 1096, the rule is stated in the following language: "The death of the ward necessarily terminates the guardianship, and thereupon all power and duties of the guardian cease, except the duty, which remains, to make a proper accounting and settlement in the probate court."

In the case of State Fair Association v. Terry, supra, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in an opinion involving a similar question, says: "* * * Terry, as guardian of a deceased person, represented no one. The guardianship terminated upon the death of Joseph Townsend, and Terry's sole duty, as such guardian, then consisted in making proper settlement of his trust in the probate court. Price v. Peterson, 38 Ark. 494; Rodgers on Domestic Relations, § 942."

In the case of In re Estate of Livermore, supra, the Supreme Court of California, in passing upon a similar question, held as follows: "This appeal is taken from an order allowing a guardian to sell the real estate which formerly belonged to the ward. Prior to the application for the...