Eastwood v. City of Seattle, 23702.

• Citation: 169 Wash. 680,14 P.2d 1116
• Decision Date: 13 October 1932
• Docket Number: 23702.
• Parties: EASTWOOD v. CITY OF SEATTLE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

14 P.2d 1116

169 Wash. 680

EASTWOOD v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

No. 23702.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

October 13, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; E. D. Hodge, Judge.

Action by Emily Louise Eastwood against the City of Seattle. Verdict for defendant, and from an order granting a new trial defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

A. C. Van Soelen and C. C. McCullough, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Padden & Moriarty, of Seattle, for respondent.

PARKER J.

The plaintiff, Miss Eastwood, seeks recovery of damages from the city of Seattle, alleged as the result of the negligence of the city in the operation of one of its street cars, causing her personal injuries. Trial in the superior court for King county, sitting with a jury, resulted in a verdict in favor of the city. Miss Eastwood, by her counsel, moved for a new trial, which motion was by the court granted. An order was entered accordingly, from which the city has appealed to this court.

It is first contended in behalf of the city that the claim for damages presented by Miss Eastwood to the city council prior to the commencement of her action does not comply with our statutory requirements relating to the stating of the residence of such a claimant. This contention was made in the trial court by demurrer to the complaint, the presented claim being made a part of the complaint; and also by objection to the introduction of the presented claim in evidence during the trial. The statutory requirements of such a claim touching the residence of the claimant are found in section 9478, Rem. Comp. Stat. reading as follows: 'Whenever a claim for damages sounding in tort against any city of the first class shall be presented to and filed with the city clerk or other proper officer of such city, in compliance with valid charter provisions of such city, such claim must contain, in addition to the valid requirements of such city charter relating thereto, a statement of the actual residence of such claimant, by street and number, at the date of presenting and filing such claim; and also a statement of the actual residence of such claimant for six months immediately prior to the time such claim for damages accrued.'

The language of the presented claim, with which we are here concerned, is as follows:

'That on this date of presenting and filing this claim, namely on the 20th day of November, 1930, the actual residence of Emily Louise Eastwood, the claimant, is 4702 Twelfth Avenue N. E., in the City of Seattle, King County, Washington; * * *

'That the said claimant is a resident of Seattle, King County Washington, and has been for more than one year last past * * *.' It is argued that the claim is deficient in that it fails to state, with sufficient definiteness, the residence of Miss Eastwood during the period of six months immediately prior to the time her claim for damages accrued. It is to be noticed that the residence of the claimant at the time of the presentation of the claim must be stated specifically 'by street and number'; but it is not required, in terms, that such a specific statement of the residence of the claimant during the six months' period preceding the accrual of the claim for damages be made. Miss Eastwood's injury occurred, which, of course, was the accrual of her claim, on October 24, 1930. Her claim was presented to the city council on November 20, 1930, so it is plain that she, in effect, by her claim, stated her residence to be in Seattle for a period of more than six months prior to the accrual of her claim. So, our problem is as to whether or not the mere statement of her residence in Seattle for that period preceding the accrual of her claim is sufficiently specific to comply with the above-qhoted statutory requirement. In view of our repeated holdings that damage claims of this nature are to be liberally construed, we are of the opinion that the statement of this claim that Miss Eastwood was a resident of Seattle 'for more than a year last past' constitutes a substantial compliance with the statute. See Lindquist v. Seattle, 67 Wash. 230, 121 P. 449; Frasier v. Cowlitz County, 67 Wash. 312, 121 P. 459; Decker v. Seattle, 80 Wash. 137, 141 P. 338; Wagner v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 275, 146 P. 621, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 720; Titus v. City of Montesano, 106 Wash.

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