Decker v. City of Seattle

• Citation: 80 Wash. 137,141 P. 338
• Decision Date: 23 June 1914
• Docket Number: 11956.
• Parties: DECKER et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

141 P. 338

80 Wash. 137

DECKER et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

No. 11956.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 23, 1914

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Everett Smith Judge.

Action by H. P. Decker and others against the City of Seattle. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Higgins & Hughes and Hyman Zettler, all of Seattle, for appellants.

James E. Bradford and Howard M. Findley, both of Seattle, for respondent.

ELLIS J.

This case presents the same questions as those involved in Jorguson v. Seattle, 141 P. 334, just decided, and is, in the main, controlled by that decision. The only additional question is as to the sufficiency of the claim presented to the city council and filed with the city clerk. This claim was verified on February 12, 1913, and was presented and filed February 15, 1913. It contained the statement:

'That the claimants' residence for one year last past has been and now is No. 1122 Tenth Avenue South, Seattle Washington.'

The uncontradicted evidence was to the effect that the residence of the plaintiffs on February 12, 1913, when the claim was verified, was, in fact, No. 1122 Tenth Avenue South, in the city of Seattle, Wash., and so continued at the time the claim was presented and filed on February 15, 1913, and for a long period subsequent thereto. The trial court held the notice of claim insufficient, in that it spoke as of the date of the verification, three days before it was filed, hence did not meet the requirement of the statute (Rem. & Bal Code, § 7995), which provides that every claim for damages sounding in tort, filed in compliance with valid charter provisions of any city of the first class, shall contain, in addition to the valid requirements of the charter:

'A statement of the actual residence of such claimant, by street and number, at the date of presenting and filing such claim; and also a statement of the actual residence of such claimant for six months immediately prior to the time such claim for damages accrued.'

The court dismissed the action. The plaintiffs appealed.

In support of the judgment, the respondent urges that the claim was fatally defective, citing cases in which this court has held that the above-quoted provisions of the statute are mandatory, that a compliance therewith is 'a condition precedent to the bringing of the action, and that the giving of the notice in substantial compliance with the statute must be alleged and proven.' Ransom v. South Bend, 76 Wash. 396, 136 P. 365; Collins v. Spokane, 64 Wash 153, 116 P. 663, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 846; Connor v. Seattle, 76 Wash. 37, 135 P. 617; Benson v. Hoquiam, 67 Wash. 90, 121 P. 58.

In the Ransom Case the claim was not filed until 73 days after the accident. In the Collins Case the claim contained none of the statutory requirements. In the Connor Case, and also in the Benson Case, the claim contained no reference whatever to the claimants' place of residence. It is obvious that in none of these cases was there any compliance with the statute, substantial or otherwise. We have never held that even a mandatory requirement may not be met by a substantial, though not an exact, nice, and literal compliance.

In Lindquist v. Seattle, 67 Wash. 230, 121 P. 449, we said:

'The obvious purpose of the charter provision is to insure such notice as will enable the city, through its proper officials, to investigate the cause and character of the injury while the facts are comparatively recent, and thus protect itself against fraudulent or exaggerated claims. This court, in common with many others, has held that, where there is a bona fide effort to comply with the law, and the notice filed actually accomplished the purpose of notice as to the place and character of the defect in the street, it is sufficient, though defective, if the deficiencies therein are not such as to be actually misleading. Ellis v. Seattle, 47 Wash. 578, 92 P. 431; Hammock v. Tacoma, 40 Wash. 539, 82 P. 893; Falldin v. Seattle, 50 Wash. 561, 97 P. 658. This court has also held that claims of this character are to be viewed with at least that liberality which is accorded to a pleading. Hase v. Seattle, 51 Wash. 174, 98 P. 370, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938. These, and many other decisions which might be cited, show that this court has never adopted that Draconic strictness of construction which would sacrifice the just and reasonable purpose of the law to a technical exactness of terms,

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