Edwards v. State

• Citation: 51 Wis.2d 231,186 N.W.2d 193
• Decision Date: 04 May 1971
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Parties: Talmadge EDWARDS, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. tate 130.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Page 193

186 N.W.2d 193

51 Wis.2d 231

Talmadge EDWARDS, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.

No. State 130.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 4, 1971.

Talmadge Edwards and one Robert Words, Jr., were charged with armed robbery while masked of a National Foods Store in Milwaukee, in violation of secs. 943.32(1) and 946.62, Stats. After the charge was reduced to robbery, masked, Edwards pleaded guilty. He was questioned by the court to determine whether he understood the charge and to ascertain the voluntariness of the plea. He was also questioned by his counsel as to voluntariness. Testimony was taken of a police officer who testified from police reports of the investigation. A read-in of 30 offenses committed by Talmadge Edwards in Milwaukee county was then made. Edwards took the stand, testifying he was a heroin addict and the crimes were committed to support his heroin requirements. He admitted participation in the robbery.

Edwards was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not more than eight years in the Green Bay Reformatory and the court suspended sentences on two companion cases of theft and receiving stolen property. The appeal is from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying a motion after verdict to withdraw the plea.

Richard Perry, Hayes, Peck, Perry & Gerlach, Milwaukee, for plaintiff in error.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz and George L. Frederick, Asst. Attys. Gen., Madison, E. Michael McCann, Milwaukee County Dist. Atty., Milwaukee, for defendant in error.

HALLOWS, Chief Justice.

Edwards raises two questions on his appeal: (1) Whether a defendant in a criminal action may withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right when the record does not show he was informed specifically that the plea constituted a waiver of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination, of a trial by jury, and to confront his accusers; and (2) whether he may withdraw his plea because the trial court failed to make an adequate evidentiary inquiry of the factual basis for the plea.

A defendant may be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty if allowing the plea to stand would result in manifest injustice. The petition, which is addressed to the discretion of the court, was first stated in State v. Reppin (1967), 35 Wis.2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9, and has been followed since. Brisk v. State (1969), 44 Wis.2d 584, 172 N.W.2d 199; Gibson v. State (1970), 47 Wis.2d 810, 177 N.W.2d 912. But a plea may be withdrawn as a matter of right when the acceptance of the plea constituted or was based upon a denial of a relevant constitutional right. Creighbaum v. State (1967), 35 Wis.2d 17, 29, 150 N.W.2d 494; Ernst v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 661, 667, 170 N.W.2d 713. To withdraw a plea as a matter of right on constitutional grounds, a defendant must show a violation of a constitutional right; that this violation caused him to plead guilty; and at the time of his plea he was unaware of the potential constitutional challenges to the case against him because of the violation of his constitutional rights.

Edwards argues he is entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty because the record does not show that he specifically waived his right against self-incrimination, trial by jury, and to confront his accusers. For a person to intelligently make a plea of guilty he must know and understand what constitutional rights are waived by the plea. Understanding only the nature of the charge and the potential punishment is not sufficient; although that is all sec. 971.08(1)(a), Stats., seems to expressly require. Since the plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of several constitutional rights, it must meet the due-process standard of an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

It was pointed out in Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, relied on by Edwards, that a plea of guilty involves a simultaneous waiver of such constitutional rights, but we do not read this language to require that these rights must be specifically waived in seriatim form on the record. McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, also speaks of these rights and both Boykin and McCarthy emphasize that because these constitutional rights are waived by a plea of guilty, it is important the plea be intelligently and voluntarily made and a record preserved. See Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747; Annot. (1970), Validity of Guilty Pleas, 25 L.Ed.2d 1025.

If a defendant knows the constitutional rights which are automatically waived by a plea of guilty, the plea cannot be invalidated on the ground that each of these constitutional rights were not specifically waived as such on the record. It is sufficient in such circumstances that the record shows he entered his plea voluntarily and knowingly.

Besides the rights mentioned in Boykin and McCarthy, other constitutional rights are waived by the entry of a guilty plea. These include the right to compulsory process, Washington v. Texas (1967), 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct....