Eisenbach v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority

• Decision Date: 29 June 1984
• Citation: 62 N.Y.2d 973,468 N.E.2d 293,479 N.Y.S.2d 338
• Parties: , 468 N.E.2d 293 Robert EISENBACH, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 338

479 N.Y.S.2d 338

62 N.Y.2d 973, 468 N.E.2d 293

Robert EISENBACH, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 29, 1984.

James Gilroy, Paul O'Dwyer and Joseph Licata, New York City, for appellant

Edward G. Lukoski and Thomas M. Taranto, Jamaica, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Appellant, Robert Eisenbach, in November 1982 commenced this negligence action against respondents, Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Long Island Railroad, alleging that in August 1981, while a passenger, he fell from one of respondents' trains and was struck by another, sustaining extensive physical injuries. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred (CPLR 3211, subd. par. 5). The parties have agreed that the applicable limitations period is one year and 30 days; this action was not in fact commenced until one year and 80 days after the accident. The issue presented is whether the limitations period should have been tolled, pursuant to CPLR 208, for the 68-day period following the accident during which appellant, while hospitalized and treated with strong pain-killing drugs, was, in his words, "generally confused, disoriented, and unable to effectively attend to affairs." Appellant claims that he is entitled to the benefit of the tolling provision because this disability amounted to "insanity" within the meaning of CPLR 208. Special Term denied respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether appellant's condition "was such that he was mentally incapable of protecting his rights and handling his own affairs." The Appellate Division reversed and granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that " 'the toll claimed by in this instance is untenable as a matter of law' ". (97 A.D.2d 808, 809, 468 N.Y.S.2d 676.)

In McCarthy v. Volkswagen of Amer., 55 N.Y.2d 543, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457, 435 N.E.2d 10, we held that a toll claimed by the plaintiff on the basis of "post traumatic neurosis" was untenable as a matter of law in view of the Legislature's intention that the toll for insanity be narrowly interpreted and the fact that a contrary interpretation of that statute "could greatly and perhaps inappropriately expand the class of persons able to assert the toll for insanity and could, concomitantly, weaken the policy of the Statutes of...