Elkem Metals Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Washington County Bd. of Revision

• Decision Date: 13 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1088,97-1088
• Citation: 81 Ohio St.3d 683,693 N.E.2d 276
• Parties: ELKEM METALS COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION et al.; Warren Local School District Board of Education, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 683

81 Ohio St.3d 683

693 N.E.2d 276

ELKEM METALS COMPANY, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellee, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION et al.; Warren Local School District Board of Education, Appellant.

No. 97-1088.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 27, 1998.

Decided May 13, 1998.

On February 24, 1995, Elkem Metals Company, Limited Partnership ("Elkem"), appellee, filed a real property valuation complaint for tax year 1994 with the Washington County Board of Revision ("BOR"). In response, the Board of Education of Warren Local School District ("BOE"), appellant, filed a counter-complaint, which it later amended. On March 30, 1995, Elkem filed an amended complaint and a counter-complaint.

The BOE filed a motion with the BOR to dismiss Elkem's complaint, claiming that Elkem lacked standing to file. The BOE alleged that Elkem had filed a prior complaint in the same interim period and the 1994 complaint had not alleged any of the circumstances specified in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d).

For tax year 1993, Elkem had filed a real property valuation complaint and was granted some reduction in valuation by the BOR. Elkem filed an appeal with the Washington County Common Pleas Court, seeking additional reduction (case No. 94-AA-233). The BOE filed a motion to dismiss with the common pleas court, alleging that Elkem's complaint had failed to state the amount of decrease it was seeking or any basis for claiming a reduction. The common pleas court sustained the BOE's motion and dismissed the appeal and the 1993 complaint for lack of "subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of this case." No further appeal was taken.

As to the 1994 complaint, after a hearing the BOR sustained the BOE's motion and dismissed Elkem's 1994 complaint because "a complaint was filed for a prior tax year within the same interim period." At the same time, the BOR also dismissed the BOE's counter-complaint.

Elkem appealed to the BTA, where Elkem argued that the 1993 complaint was not an effective complaint and, therefore, could not be considered a "filing" for purposes of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). The BTA agreed and reversed the BOR, finding that the 1993 complaint was void ab initio "because it failed to comport with the statutory requirements that are necessary for the filing of a proper complaint." Thus, the BTA concluded that Elkem had standing to file the 1994 complaint.

The BOE filed a notice of appeal with this court. The Washington County Auditor, joined by the BOR, filed a separate notice of appeal with this court. The appeal of the Washington County Auditor and the BOR was dismissed for want of prosecution.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.

Theisen, Brock, Frye, Erb & Leeper Co., L.P.A., and James S. Huggins, Marietta, for appellee.

Bricker & Eckler LLP, Charles F. Glander and Mary W. Leslie, Columbus, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

R.C. 5715.19(A)(2), provides:

"No person, board, or officer shall file a complaint against the valuation or assessment of any parcel that appears on the tax list if it filed a complaint against the valuation or assessment of that parcel for any prior tax year in the same interim period, unless the person, board, or officer alleges that the valuation or assessment should be changed due to one or more of the following circumstances * * *:

"(a) The property was sold in an arm's length transaction as described in section 5713.03 of the Revised Code;

"(b) The property lost value due to some casualty;

"(c) Substantial improvement was added to the property;

"(d) An increase or decrease of at least fifteen per cent in the property's occupancy has had a substantial economic impact on the property."

None of the circumstances set forth in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d) was alleged in the complaint filed by Elkem for tax year 1994. Moreover, tax years 1993 and 1994 were in the same interim period within the meaning of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2), and the 1993 and 1994 complaints concerned the same property.

The BOE contends that the complaint filed by Elkem for tax year 1993 constitutes a complaint filed within the same interim period, despite being dismissed, and, therefore, the complaint filed for tax year 1994 is prohibited by R.C. 5715.19(A)(2).

Elkem, on the other hand, contends that a dismissed property valuation complaint does not constitute a "filing" for the purposes of the prohibition of R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) against a second filing in the same interim period.

In Gammarino v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 388, 643 N.E.2d 1143, a real property valuation complaint for tax year 1990 was dismissed for lack of standing. Tax year 1990 was the first year of the interim period. Gammarino filed another complaint for tax year 1991 and it was dismissed by the board of revision for lack of prosecution. Gammarino appealed the dismissal of the 1991 complaint to the BTA, where the county auditor moved to dismiss it under R.C. 5715.19(A)(2). Gammarino's 1991 complaint did not allege any of the special circumstances enumerated in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d). The BTA denied the auditor's motion, finding the board of revision lacked the authority to dismiss the complaint.

On appeal, we reversed the BTA's decision. We stated that "R.C. 5715.19(A)(2) clearly provides that only one complaint can be filed during each interim period absent any showing of a change in circumstances as described in R.C. 5715.19(A)(2)(a) through (d)." Id. at 389, 643 N.E.2d at 1144.

In the current matter, the BTA held that the 1993 complaint filed by Elkem was void ab initio, a nullity, thereby finding that there was no filing for tax year 1993. We disagree and reverse.

In Seventh Urban, Inc. v. Univ. Circle Prop. Dev., Inc. (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 19, 22, 21 O.O.3d 12, 14, 423 N.E.2d 1070, 1073, we stated that jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause. See, also, Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton (1854), 3 Ohio St. 494; State v. King (1957), 166 Ohio St. 293, 2 O.O.2d 200, 142 N.E.2d 222. The jurisdiction for boards of revision is set forth in R.C. 5715.01 and 5715.11. R.C. 5715.01 provides, "There shall also be a board in each county, known as the county board of revision, which shall hear complaints and revise assessments of real property for taxation." R.C. 5715.11 provides, "The county board of revision shall hear complaints relating to the valuation or assessment of real property * * *. The board shall investigate all such complaints and may increase or decrease any such valuation * * *."

A review of the applicable statutes set forth above shows that a board of revision has been given jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints submitted to it. As part of its jurisdiction to hear and rule on complaints, a board of revision must undertake a two-step analysis. First, the board of revision must examine the complaint to determine whether it meets the jurisdictional requirements set forth by the statutes. Second, if the complaint meets the jurisdictional requirements, then the board of revision is empowered to proceed to consider the evidence and determine the true value of the property.

The statutory requirements for filing and filling out a complaint are contained in R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19. In Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 235, 67 O.O.2d 296, 298, 313...