Ellis v. State, A96A0629
| Decision Date | 03 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. A96A0629,A96A0629 |
| Citation | 221 Ga.App. 103,470 S.E.2d 495 |
| Parties | ELLIS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Nicholas Pagano, Mableton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Nancy I. Jordan, Debra H. Bernes, Frank R. Cox, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Charles Harvey Ellis challenges certain conditions imposed by the trial court on the probated portion of his sentence for the offense of child molestation.
1. In sentencing Ellis to probation, the trial court had broad discretion to impose conditions which were reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and to the rehabilitative goals of the probationary sentence. State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 670, 208 S.E.2d 472 (1974); Land v. State, 262 Ga. 898, 901, 426 S.E.2d 370 (1993). The first objected-to condition of probation required that: Another condition required that:
Given Ellis's conviction for child molestation, it was reasonable for the trial court to regulate Ellis's contact with children by imposing conditions prohibiting his association with groups dealing with children and prohibiting his presence at certain locations where children are present. See Potts v. State, 207 Ga.App. 863, 866, 429 S.E.2d 526 (1993). However, such conditions should be stated with reasonable specificity so that Ellis has notice of the groups and locations he must avoid and so that the conditions are not so broadly worded as to encompass groups and locations not rationally related to the purpose of the sentencing objective.
Both of the above conditions, which included but were not limited to the listed groups and locations used as examples, lack the required specificity. For example, the condition restricting Ellis from working for businesses providing services for children could be literally read to prohibit him from taking a job in any capacity with a company which provides any sort of service for children, even if the job would involve no contact with children. Similarly, the restriction against spending time at locations where children are present or likely to be present could be literally applied to prohibit Ellis from shopping at virtually any store.
The conditions, as written, are susceptible of being read and applied in ways which are not reasonably related to the sentencing objectives. Accordingly, both of the above conditions of probation are vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court for...
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Kaiser v. State
...we erred when we initially held that the invalidity of probation condition vitiated the entire sentence. See Ellis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 103, 104(1), 470 S.E.2d 495 (1996); Davis v. State, 172 Ga.App. 787, 790(6), 324 S.E.2d 767 ...
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State v. Cornell
...the condition prohibited lingering, loitering, or spending time at locations where children were “present.” Ellis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 103, 470 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1996). The court there concluded this condition lacked specificity because it could be applied to prohibit the defendant “from sh......
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Rutledge v. State
...of the offense and the rehabilitative goals of probation" and did not unduly burden his free speech rights. Ellis v. State , 221 Ga. App. 103, 105 (3), 470 S.E.2d 495 (1996). Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to modify Sex Offender Condition 8. See id. ......
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Hallford v. State, A07A2350.
...has also vacated conditions of probation and remanded the case for resentencing only as to the vacated condition. Ellis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 103, 104(1), 470 S.E.2d 495 (1996) (vacating condition of probation prohibiting defendant from "spending time at locations where children were presen......