Elms v. Crane

• Decision Date: 07 October 1919
• Citation: 107 A. 852
• Parties: ELMS v. CRANE.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

107 A. 852

ELMS

v. CRANE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 7, 1919.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County, at Law.

Action by Frieda L. Elms against Rebecca Riggs Crane. On report. Judgment for plaintiff.

See, also, 118 Me. 18, 105 Atl. 385.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and HANSON, PIIILBROOK, DUNN, MORRILL, and DEASY, JJ.

Charles T. Smalley, of Rockland, for plaintiff.

A. S. Littlefleld, of Rockland, for defendant.

DEASY, J. On report. Action for libel. The circumstances involved occurred at Islesboro, where in the summer and autumn of 1917 the plaintiff and the deponent, Sarah L. Yeager, were boarding with the witness Laura E. Hatch, and the defendant was occupying a summer cottage owned by her mother.

The plaintiff, who is by occupation an artist's model, posed during the summer for Charles Dana Gibson. In her spare time she was employed by the defendant, who is an amateur sculptress. In September Mr. Gibson left Islesboro, and the plaintiff, for about two weeks, posed exclusively for the defendant.

On Saturday, September 22d, the plaintiff's employment by the defendant terminated. A little later on the same day the defendant discovered that a beaver coat owned by her was missing. She suspected that the plaintiff had taken it, and knowing Mrs. Yeager, and that she lived at Mrs. Hatch's house, where the plaintiff was boarding, wrote the following letter:

"Dear Mrs. Yeager: We cannot find that long soft beaver coat you have so often seen me come in in. I am very anxious not to make a fuss that would hurt Miss Elms in any way, but we have also missed a pair of Mr. Crane's gold-rimmed goggles and a small electric lamp. Could you get her away quietly and make a search without her knowing it? She is the only one who has been where these things were. I implore you to keep it a dead secret. I am hurrying, as I am afraid she goes to Camden tonight or tomorrow.

"Hastily, R. R. Crane."

Mrs. Yeager informed Mrs. Hatch, and together they searched the plaintiff's room, but did not find the coat. The following (Sunday) morning, after an interview with the plaintiff, the defendant again wrote Mrs. Yeager, as follows:

"Dear Mrs. Yeager: I have told Miss Elms to produce the coat and I will forget the money. She confessed she had lied to me about the board. She tells me she has only $14 left, and Mrs. Hatch better see to it that she is paid before she leaves on the 2:40 today, which is when I told her to at first, but have just written her that if she can't produce the coat today to wait over until tomorrow and think it over. Please get Mrs. Hatch to let me know When she does go. Marsh has missed a razor since her visit today.

"So sorry to bother you. "Sincerely yours, Rebecca R. Crane." Some time after both parties left islesboro the coat was found in some shrubbery and returned to Mrs. Crane. This action of libel is brought against the defendant for the writing and publishing of the letters above quoted.

Are letters libelous?

"If the defamatory words, taken in their natural and ordinary signification fairly import a criminal charge it is sufficient to render them actionable." Thompson v. Sun Pub. Co., 91 Me. 207, 39 Atl. 557; Davis v. Starrett, 97 Me. 575, 55 Atl. 516.

It is clear, and is not disputed by the defendant's counsel, that the letters above quoted, construing their language according to its natural and ordinary meaning, fairly import a charge of larceny.

Privilege.—The defendant claims that her communications were privileged, in that they were written for the purpose of aiding in the investigation and punishment of crime.

"Upon grounds of public policy, communications which would otherwise be slanderous are protected as privileged, if they are made in good faith in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed and for the purpose of detecting and bringing to punishment the criminal." Eames v. Whittaker, 123 Mass. 344. See, also, to same effect, Chapman v. Battle, 124 Ga. 574, 52 S. E. 812; Flanagan v. McLane, 87 Conn. 220, 87 Atl. 727, 88 Atl. 96; Beshiers v. Allen, 46 Okl. 331, 148 Pac. 141, L. R. A. 1915E, 413.

But to be on this ground privileged any accusation of crime in pursuance of such inquiry must be made (1) in good faith and without actual malice (Eames v. Whittaker, supra; McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22, 39 Atl. 285; Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 105 Iowa, 488, 75 N. W. 355, 67 Am. St. Rep. 306); (2) upon reasonable or probable cause, after a reasonably careful inquiry (McNally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 23, 39 Atl. 285); and (3) for the public purpose of detecting and bringing a criminal to punishment (Eames v. Whittaker, supra; Bigner v. Hodges, 82 Miss. 215, 33 South. 980; Fahey v. Shafer, 98 Wash. 517, 167 Pac. 1118).

1. Malice, in its popular sense of rancor, personal animosity, or ill will, is not shown in this case. But the courts construe the word more broadly. A charge of crime is malicious, and therefore not privileged, if made "wantonly and recklessly, * * * out of an entire disregard to the rights of the person" accused. Robinson v. Van Auken, 190 Mass. 166, 76 N. E. 602.

In this sense the conduct of the defendant may be fairly characterized as malicious.

2. The case of McNally v. Burleigh, cited above, is, of course, not parallel to the pending case. It involved the publication of a libel in a newspaper. Such a publication manifestly requires for its justification a better foundation and a fuller inquiry than a publication by private letter. But a charge of crime based upon groundless suspicion can never be privileged.

In this case the only reasrrn for suspicion was the by no means exclusive opportunity which the plaintiff had to take the coat. The admitted fact that Miss Elms deceived the defendant in respect to the board does not affect the situation. The accusation of larceny had been made before the defendant discovered the deception.

3. The defendant made the accusation, not to an officer charged with the duty of enforcing the law, but to a private person having no duty and no responsibility in the premises. It is apparent that hers was not the public motive of vindicating the law and protecting society by...