Eminent Household Woodmen v. Prater

Decision Date13 July 1909
Docket NumberCase Number: 193
Citation24 Okla. 214,103 P. 558,1909 OK 163
PartiesEMINENT HOUSEHOLD OF COLUMBIAN WOODMEN v. PRATER.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. INSURANCE--Life Insurance--"Serious Illness." The term "serious illness," as used in an application for a life insurance policy, means such an illness as permanently or materially impairs, or is likely permanently or materially to impair, the health of the applicant.

2. INSURANCE--Life Insurance--Application--False Statements. An applicant for a life insurance policy warranted in her application that her answers to the medical examiner on the reverse side of her application were "true and accurate," and that they should constitute the basis for the covenant. The policy recited that it was executed in consideration of the warranties made in the application, and that the application should be made a part of the covenant. Held, that the answers of the insured to the medical examiner were her warranties, and that a false statement made therein by her rendered the policy void.

3. INSURANCE--Life Insurance--"Spitting or Coughing of Blood." The phrase "spitting or coughing of blood," as used in a question propounded by a medical examiner to an applicant for a life insurance policy, as to whether she had ever had "spitting or coughing of blood," means the disorder so called, whether the blood comes from the lungs or from the stomach.

Error from District Court, Love County; Stilwell H. Russell, Judge.

Action by William H. Prater against the Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Smith & Hastings and Robert E. Lee, for plaintiff in error, citing: 3 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, pp. 1935, 1936, 1950 1951, and cases cited; Cobb v. Covenant, etc., Ass'n, 153 Mass. 176.

H. C. Potterf and E. A. Walker, for defendant in error.

HAYES, J.

¶1 This is an action on a policy of life insurance, in which defendant in error, plaintiff below, is the beneficiary. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the policy, plaintiff in error, defendant below, brings this proceeding in error. The policy was taken out by Elizabeth Prater, plaintiff's mother, on the 19th day of December, 1905, who died on the 17th day of February, 1906. The insurance order by its answer admits the execution and delivery of the policy and the death of the insured, but denies liability under the policy upon several grounds. Under the state of the record in this case it will only be necessary to mention and consider two of the questions raised in defendant's answer as defenses. It alleges, first, that Mrs. Prater, in her application for the policy, had stated that she had never had hemorrhage or inflammation of the lungs, spitting of blood, and had never been seriously sick, nor attended by any physician during any such serious sickness, that such statements were by her application and the contract of insurance made her warranties upon which the policy was issued, and that such statements were untrue. Second. That she had made the misrepresentations aforesaid knowing them to be untrue; that they were material, and were relied upon by defendant when it issued the policy. The trial was to the court without a jury, who made a general finding for plaintiff. Under our view of this case it will be necessary for us to investigate the facts and the law to determine only whether there was a breach of warranty by the insured.

¶2 Some of the alleged misrepresentations complained of by defendant are in the application of the insured; others are in her answers to questions in the worthy physician's report on the reverse side of the application. There is no contention by plaintiff that the statements made in the application are not, by the provisions of the application and the policy, made warranties of the applicant, and we shall first ascertain whether there was any breach of warranty by reason of false statements made in the application. The following questions and answers occur in the application:

"Q. Give date of last serious illness, month and year. A. Was never seriously ill. Q. What was it? A. Nothing. Q. Name and address of attending physician. A None."

¶3 In the month of August, 1904, deceased became ill one afternoon, and suffered from hemorrhage. She spit up much blood. A physician was called, and the physician who attended her testified at the trial that deceased was at that time very sick; that she bled profusely from the lungs; that her pulse ceased beating, and that she became cold and clammy; that life was almost gone; and that she coughed up blood at almost every breath. Other witnesses corroborate the attending physician's statement that decedent had a profuse hemorrhage at that time, and that her condition was alarming, and there is evidence that she continued in a state of impaired health from that date up till the time of her death, and that subsequent to this illness, she was under the treatment of a Christian Scientist, but the evidence as to the severity of this illness is conflicting. Plaintiff testified that his mother recovered immediately and entirely after this illness. There is also evidence from other witnesses who lived at that time as neighbors of the deceased, who did not see her when she had the hemorrhage, but who saw her within a day or two thereafter, to the effect that she appeared to be in good health, and that in her appearance she bore no evidence of having suffered from a serious illness. There is further evidence to the effect that her health after this illness was better than usual until she was attacked by her last illness. On the other hand, there is evidence that at the time of the hemorrhage deceased was afflicted with consumption; that she continued to be so afflicted until her death; that her death was due to this disease, but this evidence is controverted.

¶4 On the conflicting state of the evidence as to whether the illness of the deceased during August, 1904, was a serious illness it was for the jury or court to whom the case was submitted to decide. The question propounded to applicant did not require her to give information as to the last illness she had suffered, but the last serious illness. Not every illness is serious. An illness may be alarming at the time, or thought to be serious by the one afflicted, and yet not be serious in the sense of that term as used in insurance contracts. An illness that is temporary in its duration, and entirely passes away, and is not attended, nor likely to be attended, by a permanent or material impairment of the health or constitution, is not a serious illness. It is not sufficient that the illness was thought serious at the time it occurred, or that it might have resulted in permanently impairing the health. Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222, 20 L. Ed. 617. A cold may be, and sometimes is, followed by pneumonia, pleurisy, abscess of the lungs, and consumption, but to hold that because a cold may be attended or followed by such consequences it is a serious illness, and that a failure to mention such in response to an inquiry in an application for insurance as to the nature and character of any serious illness the applicant has suffered, would result in invalidating almost all contracts of insurance, the covenants of which are based upon the statements in the application as warranties; for, if a careful investigation should be made in the lives of persons insured, in almost every life there would be found some incident of illness of such ordinary occurrence and insignificance in its effect, yet of possible seriousness, which the applicant, without careful scrutiny and accurate recollections of his past life, has overlooked to mention. "A serious illness is a grave, important, weighty trouble." Brown v. Insurance Co., 65 Mich. 306, 32 N.W. 610, 8 Am. St. Rep. 894. In the Century Dictionary it is defined to be "an illness attended by danger, giving rise to apprehension." In Caruthers v. Kansas Mut. Life Ins. Co. (C. C.) 108 F. 487, a negative answer of the applicant to the question as to whether he had ever had "any serious illness, constitutional disease, or surgical operation" was held not a false representation which would avoid the policy as a breach of warranty because applicant once broke his leg, which was set and attended by a physician. "A sickness may be very bad and very sad, and yet not serious. Any permanent or material impairment of health" is a serious illness. Drakeford v. Supreme Conclave, etc., 61 S.C. 338, 39 S.E. 523; Masons Benev. Soc. v. Winthrop, 85 Ill. 537. Upon the conflicting evidence as to deceased's condition within a day or two after the hemorrhage, and as to the condition of her health thereafter until her last illness, and the entire absence of any evidence that such loss of blood as occurred to her on that day was likely to result in permanent or material impairment of her health, the general finding of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff is conclusive against defendant as to the nature of that illness. Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson, supra; Hockaday v. Jones, 8 Okla. 156, 56 P. 1054.

¶5 The insured's answer that she was not attended by any physician was not false, for this question had reference to the physician who attended her during a serious illness, and was not intended to elicit from her information as to the name and address of the attending physician at the time of any other illness than inquired about by the preceding questions. That such was the intention of the parties is indicated by a subsequent question in the application which reads as follows: "When did you last consult a physician, and for what?" On the reverse side of the application were the statements of the worthy physician who made the examination of the insured for the company, together with certain questions propounded by him to the insured and her answers thereto. Among such questions and answers are the...

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8 cases
  • Knights & Ladies of Sec. v. Grey
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    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
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    ...a part of this application and the medical examination be considered a part of my beneficiary certificate." ¶8 In Woodmen v. Prater, 24 Okla. 214, 103 P. 558. 23 L.R.A. [N. S.] 917, 20 Ann. Cas. 287, it is held:"[2] An applicant for a life insurance policy warranted in her application that ......
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