English v. Newark Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 12 January 1976
• Citation: 138 N.J.Super. 425,351 A.2d 368
• Parties: Harry ENGLISH and Inez English, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEWARK HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 425

138 N.J.Super. 425

351 A.2d 368

Harry ENGLISH and Inez English, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEWARK HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant-Respondent.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division.

Submitted Dec. 15, 1975.

Decided Jan. 12, 1976.

Emanuel S. Fish, Maplewood, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Budd, Larner, Kent, Gross, Picillo & Rosenbaum, Newark, for defendant-respondent (Henry A. Larner, Newark, of counsel).

Before Judges CARTON, CRAHAY and HANDLER.

PER CURIAM.

The narrow question posed on this appeal is whether the Newark Housing Authority is a 'public entity' within the meaning of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1--3.

Plaintiff is a tenant in an apartment leased from defendant Authority. He brought this action against the Authority to recover damages for personal injuries sustained when he fell in the leased premises. The trial judge dismissed the action on the ground that the Tort Claims Act barred suits against the Authority for claims entailing a nonpermanent injury and medical expenses of less than $1,000.

The main ground urged by plaintiff for reversal is that the act was never intended to apply to actions for personal injuries between tenants and landlords. The difficulty with this argument is that it appears to run counter to the clear and specific language of the act and its general purpose.

The law was long established that the State and its agencies were not subject to suit without the consent of the State having been first obtained. Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966). The doctrine of sovereign immunity was abrogated in Willis v. Dept. of Cons. & Ec. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34 (1970), where the court held that the State could, in a proper case, be held liable in tort. However, the court recognized that there were practical reasons for not applying the decision retroactively and postponed its effective date to permit the Legislature to adopt appropriate legislation.

Thereafter the legislative will was expressed by the enactment of N.J.S.A. 52:4A--1, which provided, with certain exceptions not pertinent here, that

* * * no action shall be instituted or continued against the State or any department or agency thereof for the recovery of money damages, whether based on contract or tort, where the cause of action accrues prior to July 1, 1971. (Later amended to cover any tort action accruing prior to July 1, 1972.)

The validity of this statute as originally enacted was upheld in P.T. & L. Const. Co. v. Comm'r, Dept. of Trans., 57 N.J. 439, 273 A.2d 353 (1971). During the moratorium period provided by N.J.S.A. 52:4A--1 comprehensive legislation dealing with the entire problem of the liability of public entities and public employees was prepared and enacted into law as the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1--1 Et seq. It seems clear from the language of that act that the Legislature intended to deal with the whole area of sovereign immunity in this one statute.

The legislative declaration proclaimed, among other things:

* * * (I)t is hereby declared to be the public policy of this State that public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act and in accordance with the fair and uniform principles established herein. All of the provisions of this act should be construed with a view to carry out the above legislative declaration. (N.J.S.A. 59:1--2)

The legislation also contained the following directive:

Except as otherwise provided by this act, a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person. (N.J.S.A. 59:2--1(a))

The language of the legislation makes it clear that the basic legislative premise is to re-establish immunity for all governmental bodies within its definition of 'public entity.' Immunity is all-inclusive within that definition except as otherwise provided by the act.

N.J.S.A. 59:1--3 specifically defines 'public entity':

'Public entity' includes the State, and any county, municipality, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in the State.

'State' shall mean the State and any office, department, division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State, but shall not include any such entity which is statutorily authorized to sue and be sued.

We note that immediately following this section there appears the following comment:

The definition of 'Public Entity' provided in this section is intended to be all inclusive and to apply uniformly throughout the State of New Jersey to all entities Exercising governmental functions. The intent of this provision is to provide a basis upon which an established body of law may be uniformly applied. * * * (Emphasis supplied)

In light of the legislative definition it is evident that the Newark Housing Authority is a 'public entity' and more particularly a 'public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public body in the State.'

In interpreting the meaning of these terms we adopt the analysis of Judge Breslin in Wade v. N.J. Turnpike Auth., 132 N.J.Super. 92, 332 A.2d 232 (Law Div.1975):

The two definitions, 'Public entity' and 'State' should be viewed as follows: The former is a greater inclusive grouping based on sovereignty, I.e. political subdivisions; the second is a lesser included grouping based on administrative subdivisions of the State. 'State' then is but one of the public entities listed in the former definition. 'Public entity' is the general term. 'State' is a specific. Each of the parts included under the term 'Public entity' has had that sovereignty possessed by the State parcelled out to it, and is to that degree independent of the State, and the equal of ...