Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. De Johnson, Civil 2897

• Decision Date: 14 April 1930
• Docket Number: Civil 2897
• Citation: 36 Ariz. 428,286 P. 817
• Parties: THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. PAULA M. DE JOHNSON, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

286 P. 817

36 Ariz. 428

THE EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. PAULA M. DE JOHNSON, Appellee

Civil No. 2897

Supreme Court of Arizona

April 14, 1930

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Joseph S. Jenckes, Judge. Affirmed.

Messrs Armstrong, Lewis & Kramer, for Appellant.

Mr. Wm J. Fellows, for Appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, C. J.

This is an action by Paula M. De Johnson, hereinafter called plaintiff, against the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, a corporation, hereinafter called defendant, to recover on a policy issued by defendant insuring the life of Clark Victor Johnson, and payable to plaintiff. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from the judgment rendered thereon defendant has appealed.

There is but one issue for us to consider on the appeal, and that is whether or not the evidence sustains the verdict. The policy contained a provision that if the insured committed suicide within one year from the date of issuance defendant's liability should be limited to an amount equal to the premium paid only. Defendant admitted the death of Johnson, but claimed that he committed suicide. This was the only controverted issue before the jury, and it is the contention of defendant that the verdict, which in effect meant that it was not proved the deceased did commit suicide was directly contradictory to the only evidence in the case. It is the well-known rule of this court that when there is a conflict in the evidence so that a reasonable man might find the issues in favor either of plaintiff or defendant, we will not disturb the verdict of the jury on the facts. This has been held by us so often that no citation is needed to sustain it. On the other hand, it is equally true that where the evidence is of such a nature that a reasonable man could find only one state of facts to exist, a verdict which necessarily is based on the assumption of an opposite situation will not be allowed to stand. The law applicable to cases of this nature may be stated as follows: Where the defense of suicide is set up in an action by a beneficiary on an insurance policy, the burden of proving that the deceased committed suicide is upon the defendant. In the absence of proof of the cause of death, the presumption is against suicide. These principles are supported fully by the adjudicated cases. In addition thereto, it is almost universally held that when circumstantial evidence is relied on, the defendant must establish facts which exclude any reasonable hypothesis of anything except suicide. Boynton v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 105 La. 202, 52 L.R.A. 687, 29 So. 490; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Milward, 118 Ky. 716, 4 Ann. Cas. 1092, 68 L.R.A. 285, 82 S.W. 364; Jenkin v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 131 Cal. 121, 63 P. 180; Home Benefit Assn. v. Sargent, 142 U.S. 691, 35 L.Ed. 1160, 12 S.Ct. 332; Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, 4th ed., par. 438; and in cases where either conclusion could be reached, the question is one for the jury. Neasham v. New York Life Ins. Co., (D.C.) 244 F. 556; Bromberg v. North American Life Ins. Co., 192 Mich. 143, 158 N.W. 141.

On the other hand, there is a limit beyond which even a jury may not go, and that is the line of reasonable probability. If the evidence be such that there is no reasonable theory which can be deduced from the evidence -- even though there may be a possible or conjectural one not based on the testimony -- on which the jury may find the death was not the result of suicide, a verdict which negatives suicide cannot be sustained. Hart v. Supreme Lodge of Fraternal Alliance, 108 Wis. 490, 84 N.W. 851; Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Fletcher, 78 Miss. 377, 28 So. 872, 29 So. 523; Mott v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 155 Ark. 259, 244 S.W. 733; Hodnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 17 Ga.App. 538, 87 S.E. 813; Agen v. Mettropolitan Life Ins. Co., 105 Wis. 217, 76 Am. St. Rep. 905, 80 N.W. 1020; Rens v. Northwestern Mut. Relief Assn., 100 Wis. 266, 75 N.W. 991; Green v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 Iowa 32, 182 N.W. 808; Deweese v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 110 Kan. 434, 204 P. 523.

With these rules before us, let us consider the evidence bearing on the question of whether the death of the insured was caused by suicide or some other reason.

It is entirely circumstantial in its nature, but there is no conflict therein, nor is there the slightest reason to suspect that any of the witnesses who testified were not telling the absolute truth. Such being the case, the jury was bound to accept their testimony as to the facts which actually existed. Otero v. Soto, 34 Ariz. 87, 267 P. 947; Crozier v. Noriega, 27 Ariz. 409, 233 P. 1104.

Deceased was a man of about fifty-seven years of age, and had been engaged as a miner either in the United States or Mexico for many years. His health was as good as that of the ordinary man of his age, except that when he changed from day to night shift he was slightly troubled with insomnia for a few days and would then get some medicine from the doctor to cause him to sleep better. His domestic relations were apparently happy, and he had no financial difficulties of any kind, nor had there been anything in his conduct which would have caused the ordinary person to suspect he contemplated suicide.

On the 17th of February, 1928, he went to his work at about 3:00 P.M. as...