Ervin v. Iowa Dist. Court for Webster County

• Decision Date: 17 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 91-1984,91-1984
• Citation: 495 N.W.2d 742
• Parties: Donald P. ERVIN and Midwest Research and Recycling, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBSTER COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 742

495 N.W.2d 742

Donald P. ERVIN and Midwest Research and Recycling, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBSTER COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 91-1984.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 17, 1993.

C. Joseph Coleman, Jr. of Mitchell, Coleman, Perkins & Enke, Fort Dodge, for plaintiffs.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., and David R. Sheridan and David L. Dorff, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendant.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and SCHULTZ, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

Plaintiff in this original certiorari proceeding challenges an order punishing him for contempt. It is an environmental matter. Plaintiff, and his corporation, undertook to restore and recycle waste tires. The enterprise came under challenge by the Iowa attorney general for violation of the solid waste disposal statutes in Iowa Code chapter 455B (1991) and regulations promulgated by the Iowa department of natural resources. After the plaintiff failed to comply with a court-ordered cleanup of his premises, he was found in contempt. Because we agree he was in contempt, and that the prescribed punishment was appropriate, we annul the writ.

Plaintiff Donald Ervin (Ervin) founded Midwest Research and Recycling, Inc. (Midwest) ¹ for the purpose of developing and operating a tire reclamation plant in Webster County. He sought to develop a process to decompose tires.

The attorney general brought this suit against Ervin, seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief. Fire lanes were demanded as a part of the relief sought. Due to Ervin's vast accumulation of tires, the attorney general later filed an application for temporary injunction, requesting that Ervin be prohibited from accumulating any more tires at the dump and be required to install fire lanes in accordance with the terms of his solid waste disposal permit issued by the department of natural resources (hereinafter DNR). At the time of the application, the DNR estimated there were more than 800,000 tires at the site--twenty times the 40,000 authorized by Ervin's permit. Other estimates place the number of tires at or near 2,000,000. Following hearing before the district court, Judge Ronald H. Schechtman issued an order enjoining Ervin from accumulating any more tires and ordering the installation of fire lanes at the site within ten days. There is no contention of further accumulation; the dispute became centered upon the requirement to install fire lanes by removing or relocating tires.

The fire lanes were to be constructed in accordance with the engineering plans submitted to DNR by Ervin, and made a part of the DNR permit. The injunctive order recognized it might not be possible to install all required lanes within ten days of the order. The district court therefore stated it would allow a temporary deviation from the exact places and dimensions prescribed, but only with consent of the DNR and a local fire department. Within six or seven days of the court's order, counsel for Ervin approached the attorney general's office concerning a plan. After consulting with the DNR and local fire department, the attorney general's office responded with a plan mapping out what the DNR and the fire department considered a realistic course of action over the next seventeen days.

Ervin failed to install any fire lanes. On the basis of this failure, the State filed a contempt application. At the hearing Ervin admitted he had not installed the fire lanes. His sole defense for noncompliance was claimed "technical and financial" impossibility. Ervin and his witnesses testified concerning Ervin's and Midwest's financial condition. Evidence was also offered concerning Ervin's physical condition. It was said that Ervin's back problems prevented him from moving any tires himself.

Following hearing, Judge Mark S. Cady entered the challenged order, finding Ervin in contempt. The court found Ervin's failure to comply with his court-imposed duty to construct fire lanes was willful and that he failed in his efforts to show otherwise. Ervin was sentenced to six months in jail, with the provision that he be released after twenty days and given an opportunity to purge himself of the contempt. Failure to begin construction of the fire lanes within two days following release would result in incarceration for the remainder of the six-month term.

Ervin then filed the petition for writ of certiorari with us. The writ was granted and the case was transferred to the court of appeals. That court reversed the district court finding of contempt. The matter is before us on further review.

I. Contempt can be described as willful disobedience. Amro v. Iowa Dist. Court, 429 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Iowa 1988). A finding of willful disobedience

requires evidence of conduct that is intentional and deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of others, or contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern whether the contemner had the right or not.

Id. "Contempt is sufficiently shown if some of the default was willful." Id. Willfulness is the only issue remaining in this dispute, so the case turns on the sufficiency of evidence regarding Ervin's ability to comply with the order.

We apply a special rule in reviewing facts in contempt cases. State v. Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d 605, 606 (Iowa 1992). When a finding of contempt is challenged on appeal, review is not de novo; rather, the court examines the evidence to ensure that proper proof--substantial evidence--supports the judgment of contempt. Id. Because of the quasi-criminal nature of the proceeding, the finding of contempt must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Court, 380 N.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Iowa 1986). Hence substantial evidence can be described as such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lipcamon, 483 N.W.2d at 606; State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980).

Where, as here, violation of a court order is shown, so that the question turns on willfulness, the burden shifts to the alleged contemner. Our cases are not consistent on whether the...