Esmont v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 16 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. CV025560CPS.,CV025560CPS.
• Citation: 371 F.Supp.2d 202
• Parties: Paula Anne ESMONT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

371 F.Supp.2d 202

Paula Anne ESMONT, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants.

No. CV025560CPS.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

March 16, 2005.

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Jennifer C.E. Ajah, Law Office of Jennifer Ajah, Jamaica, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jennifer Ann Vazquez, NYC Law Department, Pamela Lynam Mahon, Corporation

Counsel of the City of NY, New York City, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SIFTON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Paula Anne Esmont brings this action against the City of New York, Mohamed Soliman, Jackie Ronayne,¹ and Colleen Brady, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint alleges the following five claims for relief against all defendants: 1) false arrest and imprisonment; 2) malicious prosecution; 3) a claim for municipal liability for the acts of its agents; 4) excessive force; and 5) invasion of privacy. Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Esmont's motion to strike the defendants' answer to the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 37(d)², and Esmont's cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.

For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment and to strike the defendants' answer are denied. Summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants on all claims for relief.

Background

The following facts are taken from the Local Rule 56.1 statements, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties. They are undisputed except where noted.³

At the time of her arrest, Esmont was fifty-seven years old. She lived in Woodhaven in a house owned by her son, Robert Esmont. Prior to her arrest, Esmont kept as many as nineteen dogs at the house at a time. Esmont did not walk the dogs, but instead placed newspaper on the floor upon which the animals relieved themselves. This resulted in complaints by neighbors regarding odors and debris, letters from the New York City Department of Health, and multiple inspections.

On June 29, 2001, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Health issued an order informing Esmont that the condition of her yard constituted a nuisance as defined in New York City Administrative Code § 17-142,⁴ and a violation of the New York City Health Code §§ 3.11,⁵ 151.03,⁶ and 151.05.⁷ The order further instructed Esmont that city health officials would return in five days to conduct a compliance inspection and abate the nuisance if Esmont had not done so herself.

New York Department of Health employees Mohamed Soliman and Jackie Ronayne went to Esmont's house at 10:00 a.m. on July 16, 2001, to conduct the compliance inspection. Soliman testified that because he anticipated difficulty with Esmont, he requested that police be present during the inspection. Officer Colleen Brady and Lieutenant Messina of the NYPD accompanied Soliman and Ronayne.

When the defendants arrived, Esmont was standing in front of the gate of her driveway.⁸ Soliman showed Lieutenant Messina a copy of the New York City Health Code and the notices sent to Esmont. Officer Brady asked Esmont to open the gate leading to her house and yard, and to step aside to permit the inspection. Esmont refused. Lieutenant Messina ordered Brady to arrest Esmont.

Brady rear handcuffed Esmont and placed her in the back of a squad car. Esmont states that she banged her head upon being placed in the car. Esmont testified that she was held in the back of the car for ten minutes and that the inside of the car was hot, causing her to sweat profusely.

Esmont was brought to the 102nd precinct to be processed. Esmont testified that she was handcuffed to a cross bar during the duration of her stay with no place to rest her elbow, the bathroom she was required to use was monitored by a security camera, and that Officer Brady insisted on watching her while she used the bathroom. Esmont testified that she was held in custody approximately 7½ hours before being released.

Esmont testified that while in custody, she suffered an asthma attack. Although Esmont had been diagnosed with asthma many years before, she did not use or carry medication. Instead of medication, she requested a cup of hot tea, which she did not receive. An officer called emergency medical services, but Esmont refused treatment after she was told that a trip to the hospital might delay her release. She was eventually released with a desk appearance ticket.

Upon release, Esmont states that she sought medical treatment two days after her release for damage to her wrist caused by the handcuffing. She states that the doctor gave her a "half cast," which she wore for a week. The report from the physician who X-rayed her wrist states, "Views of the left wrist demonstrate no fracture, dislocation or effusion. The osseous structures are intact. There is no evidence of arthritis. The soft tissues are normal." (Def. Ex. M.) Esmont testified that her wrist was not dislocated or lacerated, and that she missed no work as a result. She testified that she suffers from diminished use of her left hand, but has not sought additional medical treatment.

Esmont states that she was arraigned in Queens Criminal Court on charges that she violated New York Penal Law § 195.05, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. Esmont testified that the prosecution required her to appear in court eight times, but the charges were eventually dismissed by the District Attorney.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]hen the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law." FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Vill. of E. Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2003). A fact is material when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.

The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir.1987). In order to defeat such a motion, the non-moving party must raise a genuine issue of material fact. Although all facts and inferences therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving party must raise more than a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Harlen Assoc. v. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 498 (2d Cir.2001). The non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation. Twin Labs., Inc., v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir.1990). Rather, the non-moving party must produce more than a scintilla of admissible evidence that supports the pleadings. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem. Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir.2003).

The trial court's function in deciding such a motion is not to weigh the evidence or resolve issues of fact, but to decide instead whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000).

To recover on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, Esmont must show that the defendants acted under color of state law and that she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.2004). The parties do not dispute that the defendants were acting under color of state law.

First Claim: False Arrest

False arrest claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 borrow their elements from the law of the state in which the arrest occurred. Davis v. Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 424, 433 (2d Cir.2004). To establish a claim of false arrest under New York law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally confined her without justification or consent. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.2004). Probable cause to arrest the plaintiff provides such justification. Id. Probable cause exists where the officer has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime." Id. (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996)). Probable cause is an objective matter and does not depend on the subjective biases of the arresting officer. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Defendants contend that Brady had probable cause to believe that Esmont was obstructing governmental administration in the second degree in violation of New York Penal Law § 195.05, which states:

A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from performing an official function, by means of intimidation, physical force or interference, or by...