Espinosa v. Baker

• Citation: 631 S.W.3d 631
• Decision Date: 27 July 2021
• Docket Number: WD 83911
• Parties: Melissa K. ESPINOSA, TRUSTEE OF the MELISSA K. ESPINOSA REVOCABLE TRUST, Respondent, v. Eric BAKER and Veronica Baker, Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

631 S.W.3d 631

Melissa K. ESPINOSA, TRUSTEE OF the MELISSA K. ESPINOSA REVOCABLE TRUST, Respondent,

v.Eric BAKER and Veronica Baker, Appellants.

WD 83911

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: July 27, 2021

Steve Scott, Columbia, MO, Attorney for Respondent.

Danieal H. Miller and James P. Barton, Jr., Columbia, MO, Attorneys for Appellants.

Before Division Three: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer and W. Douglas Thomson, Judges

Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Eric Baker and Veronica Baker (the "Bakers") appeal from the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri ("trial court"), awarding Melissa K. Espinosa, Trustee of the Melissa K. Espinosa Revocable Trust ("Espinosa"), possession of the real property located at 20400 North Ponderosa Road, Clark, Missouri (the "Premises") and Chapter 534 statutory damages, on her Petition for Unlawful Detainer. The Bakers assert two substantial-evidence challenges to the judgment on appeal. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On September 16, 2019, Espinosa, as "Landlord," and the Bakers, as "Tenants," entered into a Residential Lease Agreement ("Lease") for the Premises. The term of the Lease was for six months at a monthly rent of $700. The Bakers also agreed to pay a non-refundable pet deposit of $250, a security deposit of $700, and six-months rent of $4,200, for a total of $5,150.

At the end of September or the beginning of October 2019, Ms. Baker began to suffer physical illnesses, including breathing difficulties, coughing, voice loss, severe headaches, and lethargy, when she was present in the Premises. Ms. Baker sought medical consultation and, afterwards, concluded that the cause of her problems was a mold infestation on the Premises.

Espinosa agreed to have the Premises tested for mold and the test results confirmed that the bathroom on the Premises did, in fact, demonstrate a high level of mold.

Because of the test results, Espinosa told the Bakers that she would be willing to terminate the Lease and reimburse them the full amount of their lease payments. On October 23, 2019, the parties mutually agreed to terminate the Lease. Espinosa refunded $5,150 to the Bakers and even agreed to give the Bakers two weeks to remove their belongings. Thereafter, however, the Bakers did not remove their personal belongings and surrender the Premises back to Espinosa as agreed.

On November 22, 2019, Espinosa filed a Petition for Unlawful Detainer against the Bakers. The Bakers filed an Answer, admitting that Ms. Espinosa had been entitled to possession of the Premises since the date of termination of the Lease and admitted that the fair value of the Premises was $700 per month. The Answer did not assert any affirmative defenses or otherwise claim that the fair value of the Premises was lessened due to the presence of mold on the property. After suit was filed, the Bakers hired a moving company to remove their personal belongings¹ and Espinosa received possession of the Premises from the Bakers on January 28, 2020.

A bench trial was held on June 11, 2020. Espinosa asked the trial court to award statutory double damages commencing October 24, 2019, at the rate of $1,400 per month (twice the fair rental value that had been admitted to by the Bakers in their Answer) or $46.67 per day from October 24, 2019, through January 28, 2020. She also testified to "waste" (rotting food and trash left on the Premises) and "injury" (missing table and chair belonging to Espinosa) to the Premises, with restitution damages totaling $200. Though the Unlawful Detainer statutory scheme does not authorize the award of attorney fees, Espinosa requested the trial court to award her $365 in attorney fees.² The trial court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Espinosa and against the Bakers and awarded Espinosa possession of the Premises; $4,526.99 for "[d]ouble damages 10/24/19 to 1/28/20=97 days x $46.67/day"; $200 for "[p]hysical damage to premises (cleaning and missing table and chair)"; and $365 for attorney fees, for a total of $5,091.99 in monetary damages.

The Bakers timely appealed.

Standard of Review

"[T]he judgment of the trial court will be affirmed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." I-70 Mobile City, Inc. v. Cartwright , 595 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "We review de novo questions of law decided in court-tried cases." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"When reviewing whether the circuit court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the circuit court's judgment and defer to the circuit court's credibility determinations." Ivie v. Smith , 439 S.W.3d 189, 200 (Mo. banc 2014) (internal citation omitted). Additionally, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's judgment and disregard all contrary evidence. Id.

Analysis³

Unlawful detainer proceedings are governed by section 534.030.⁴ Section 534.030.1 defines four distinct scenarios under which a person is guilty of unlawful detainer:

When any person willfully and without force holds over any lands, tenements or other possessions, [1 – the holdover tenant class] after the termination of the time for which they were demised or let to the person, or the person under whom such person claims; or [2 – the foreclosure class] after a mortgage or deed of trust has been foreclosed and the person has received written notice of a foreclosure; or at least ten business days have elapsed after the date of the notice described in subsection 3 of this section; or [3 – the holdover employee class] when premises are occupied incident to the terms of employment and the employee holds over after the termination of such employment; or [4 – the wrongful possession class] when any person wrongfully and without force, by disseisin, shall obtain and continue in possession of any lands, tenements or other possessions, and after demand made, in writing, for the delivery of such possession of the premises by the person having the legal right to such possession, or the person's agent or attorney, shall refuse or neglect to vacate such possession, such person is guilty of an "unlawful detainer" .

See Kocina v. Johannes , 505 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016).

Section 534.200 governs the proof required by a complainant in an unlawful detainer action and provides that: "The complainant shall not be compelled to make further proof of the forcible entry or detainer than that he was lawfully possessed of the premises , and that the defendant unlawfully entered into and detained or unlawfully detained the same ." (Emphasis added.)

[T]he complainant shall not be compelled to make further proof of the ... detainer than that he was lawfully possessed of the premises, and that the defendant unlawfully entered into and detained or unlawfully detained the same; and that would seem to be the legislative interpretation of what was meant by "willfully holding over."

AgriBank FCB v. Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc. , 919 S.W.2d 256, 261 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lehnen v. Dickson , 148 U.S. 71, 79, 13 S.Ct. 481, 485, 37 L.Ed. 373, 376 (1893) ).

I.

In their first point, the Bakers attempt to re-position themselves into the "wrongful possession class" as opposed to the "holdover tenant class" of section 534.030 and, in so doing, assert that there was no substantial evidence of "wrongfulness."⁵

But, this argument (i.e. "wrongful possession class") is not consistent with the undisputed "holdover tenant class" evidence at trial. Here, in their Answer, the Bakers admitted that they obtained possession of the Premises by becoming tenants pursuant to the Lease prior to October 23, 2019. The Bakers next admitted that they agreed to mutually terminate the Lease on October 23, 2019. And, finally, the Bakers admitted that Espinosa was entitled to possession of the Premises since the termination date of the Lease.⁶ Accordingly, the Bakers were clearly within the "holdover tenant class" of section 534.030.1 and not the "wrongful possession class."

The "wrongful possession class" scenario—defined in section 534.030.1 as "wrongfully and without force" obtaining and continuing in possession after demand made, in writing, for the delivery of such possession—is not applicable to this case because the Bakers initially took possession of the Premises pursuant to the terms of the Lease. See Kocina , 505 S.W.3d at 477. Hence, the corresponding argument by the Bakers as to the record being devoid of "wrongfulness" evidence is misplaced.

Instead, the evidence deemed credible at trial by the trial court is that Espinosa was lawfully entitled to possession of the Premises beginning on October 24, 2019 (the day after both parties had mutually agreed to terminate the Lease), and the Bakers unlawfully and willfully possessed the Premises from October 24, 2019, until possession was finally surrendered on January 28, 2020.

Point I is denied.

II.

In the Bakers’ second point, they attempt to inject a breach of the warranty of habitability claim by way of a "substantial-evidence" challenge. There are numerous flaws with this argument by the Bakers.

Initially, we note that the point on appeal is not claiming that the trial court erred when it refused to permit the Bakers to submit evidence of inhabitability. Arguably, this evidence may have been relevant on the topic of the fair rental value of the Premises⁷ (which is relevant to the statutory double damages provision of section 534.330.1) beginning on October 24, 2019; for, even Espinosa's own evidence presented at trial was that her mold expert had told her that the Premises would be habitable after the mold issue had been remediated. Conversely, in their responsive pleading, the Bakers admitted that the fair rental value of the Premises was $700 per month and,...