Kocina v. Johannes

• Decision Date: 20 December 2016
• Docket Number: WD 79324
• Citation: 505 S.W.3d 474
• Parties: Doris KOCINA, Respondent, v. Tracy JOHANNES, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

505 S.W.3d 474

Doris KOCINA, Respondent,

v.Tracy JOHANNES, Appellant.

WD 79324

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Opinion filed: December 20, 2016

Doris Kocina, Respondent Pro-se.

Michael T. Carney, for Appellant.

Before Division One: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE

Tracy Johannes ("Johannes") appeals the judgment of the trial court in an unlawful detainer action finding her possession of an apartment owned by Doris Kocina ("Kocina") to be wrongful and ordering her to pay damages in the amount of "double the reasonable rental value of the property" from August 18, 2015, to September 10, 2015, as well as court costs.

On appeal, Johannes alleges that she was a month-to-month at-will tenant and entitled to one month's notice of termination under sections 441.060.3 and 534.030.1.¹ Thus, Johannes argues that Kocina did not have standing to file her complaint for unlawful detainer until her tenancy terminated after the expiration of the statutorily required one-month notice period. We find that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between Johannes and Kocina and, therefore, that Kocina did have standing to file her complaint for unlawful detainer against Johannes.

Johannes alleges in her second point on appeal that the trial court erred in assessing court costs against her because she was represented by Mid–Missouri Legal Service, Corp., which filed a Certificate of Inability to Pay Costs, Fees, and Expenses pursuant to section 514.040.3. We find that the trial court erred in assessing court costs against Johannes.² As to those costs, the trial court's judgment is reversed and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History³

Johannes' son entered into an oral employment agreement with Kocina wherein he agreed to provide maintenance at an apartment complex owned by Kocina in exchange for a furnished apartment and utilities. Johannes moved in with her son. On or about June 30, 2015, Johannes' son informed Kocina that he would not continue providing maintenance at the apartments, thereby terminating his tenancy.

Kocina offered Johannes' son the option to continue living in the apartment at $500 per month, but he rejected the proposed arrangement. After Johannes' son terminated the employment agreement, he did not provide any further services to Kocina, make any rental payments, or pay for utilities. Johannes' son vacated the apartment in early August, but his personal possessions remained and Johannes continued to live in the apartment. On August 18, 2015, Johannes was served with a written notice to deliver possession of the apartment to Kocina. Johannes remained in the apartment until September 10, 2015.

Meanwhile, Kocina filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer on August 26, 2015. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment finding that, while the notice referenced a month-to-month tenancy, Johannes never had an agreement with Kocina to occupy the premises and her possession after August 18, 2015, was thus wrongful. The judgment ordered Johannes to pay double the "reasonable rental value of the property" from August 18, 2015 to September 10, 2015, and ordered court costs be paid by Johannes and her son. Johannes appeals the judgment against her.

II. Standard of Review

In a court-tried civil case, the court's judgment will be affirmed "unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law." Murphy v. Carron , 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).

III. Discussion

Johannes alleges two points of error on appeal. First, Johannes alleges that the trial court's judgment was in error because the evidence established that she was a month-to-month at-will tenant and entitled to one month's notice of termination under sections 441.060.3 and 534.030.1. As a result, Johannes argues, Kocina did not have standing to file her complaint for unlawful detainer until after the expiration of the required notice period. Johannes alleges in her second point that the trial court erred in assessing court costs against her because she was represented by Mid–Missouri Legal Service, Corp., who filed a Certificate of Inability to Pay Costs, Fees, and Expenses, and the assessment of court costs under such circumstances was prohibited pursuant to section 514.040.3.

A. Standing

In her first point on appeal, Johannes alleges that the evidence established that she was a month-to-month at-will tenant and therefore entitled to one month's notice of termination under sections 441.060.3 and 534.030.1.

"Unlawful detainer" is defined by section 534.030.1:

When any person willfully and without force holds over any lands, tenements or other possessions, [1] after the termination of the time for which they were demised or let to the person, or the person under whom such person claims; or [2] after a mortgage or deed of trust has been foreclosed and the person has received written notice of a foreclosure; or [3] when premises are occupied incident to the terms of employment and the employee holds over after the termination of such employment; or [4] when any person wrongfully and without force, by disseisin, shall obtain and continue in possession of any lands, tenements or other possessions, and after demand made, in writing, for the delivery of such possession of the premises by the person having the legal right to such possession, or the person's agent or attorney, shall refuse or neglect to vacate such possession, such person is guilty of an "unlawful detainer."

Thus, there are four distinct scenarios under which a person is guilty of unlawful detainer—the holdover tenant class, the foreclosure class, the holdover employee class, and the wrongful possession class. See P.M. Const. Servs., Inc. v. Lewis , 26 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000).

Johannes alleges on appeal that she and Kocina had a landlord-tenant relationship and, accordingly, that she was within the holdover tenant class of section 534.030.1 and entitled to one month's notice under section 441.060.3. As a result, she argues that her occupation was lawful and her tenancy did not terminate until expiration of the one-month notice period; until such point, an action for unlawful detainer did not lie. We agree with the trial court that there was no landlord-tenant relationship between Kocina and Johannes and, therefore, the one-month notice requirement found in section 441.060.3 was inapplicable.

One of the elements required to establish a landlord-tenant relationship is "a contract, either express or implied, between the parties." Letsinger v. Drury College , 68 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Mo. banc 2002) (citation omitted); see also Santa Fe Trail Redevelopment Corp. v. W.F. Coehn & Co. , 154 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005). Johannes essentially argues that a landlord-tenant relationship was created by implied consent because Kocina pursued a suit for rent against her and knew of her occupancy both during Johannes' son's employment lease term and after its termination.

Johannes relies, in part, on the case of Schnucks Carrollton Corp. v. Bridgeton Health & Fitness Inc. , which states that a tenant who keeps possession after the expiration of the lease term without the landlord's consent and thus has a tenancy at sufferance can be converted to a true tenant if the landlord otherwise "consents to the holdover's continuing possession [.]" 884 S.W.2d 733, 738–39 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) (citations omitted). In such a situation, the court stated that "a demand or suit for rent or words showing the intention to treat the holdover as a tenant are sufficient." Id . at 739 (citations omitted). Johannes relies on language in the notice that Johannes and her son were occupying the apartment as tenants from month-to-month and that the notice was given for the purpose of terminating the tenancy in accordance with section 441.060.

The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from Schnucks in that Johannes never had a lease term, never established a landlord-tenant relationship with Kocina, and therefore could not be a holdover tenant. In addition, Kocina's action was not a suit for rent. The trial court's consideration of the written notice and ultimate finding that "while the notice referenced a month-to-month tenancy, Johannes never had an agreement with Kocina to occupy the premises" is in accord with this analysis.

Johannes also seeks support from White v. Marshall , where this court found a resident was a month-to-month tenant, even though the resident was not a party to the underlying expired lease agreement and the lessee had moved out. 83 S.W.3d 57, 61 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002). In finding the existence of a tenancy, the White court relied on the facts that the landlord had consented to the resident living in the apartment and that the...