Esquibel v. Bd. of Educ. Centennial Sch. Dist. R-1

• Decision Date: 14 January 2016
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 15CA0603
• Citation: 369 P.3d 794
• Parties: Augustine Roy ESQUIBEL, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION CENTENNIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT R–1, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

369 P.3d 794

Augustine Roy ESQUIBEL, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION CENTENNIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT R–1, Defendant–Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 15CA0603

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

Announced January 14, 2016

Alexander Halpern, LLC, Alexander Halpern, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Caplan and Earnest, LLC, W. Stuart Stuller, Kristin C. Edgar, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee.

Opinion by JUDGE FURMAN

¶ 1 Augustine Roy Esquibel appeals the district court's order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought to enjoin the Board of Education Centennial School District R–1 (Board) from declaring his school district director seat vacant after he pleaded guilty to felony drug possession under a deferred sentencing agreement. Because we conclude that a board member who pleads guilty to a felony under a deferred sentencing agreement has been "found guilty of a felony" within the meaning of the director vacancy statute, § 22–31–129(1)(e), C.R.S.2015

, we affirm the district court's order.

I. The Vacancy on the Board

¶ 2 Esquibel was elected as a director to the Board in 2011. While he was still serving as a director, he entered a plea of guilty to resisting arrest and felony cocaine possession. Esquibel entered his plea under a deferred sentencing agreement with the district attorney, which resulted in his judgment and sentence being deferred for a period of twelve months. See § 18–1.3–102(1)(a), C.R.S.2015

("In any case in which the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, the court accepting the plea has the power ... to continue the case for the purpose of entering judgment and sentence ... for a period not to exceed four years."). When entering the plea, Esquibel acknowledged, "If I have entered into a Stipulation of Deferred Judgment and Sentence, and I have not yet completed the terms of that agreement, my guilty plea may be used against me in any future proceeding."

¶ 3 Approximately two weeks after Esquibel pleaded guilty, the Board voted on a resolution and declared his seat vacant. This resolution was based on the director vacancy statute, which provides that "[a] school director office shall be deemed to be vacant upon the occurrence of any one of the following events prior to the expiration of the term of office: ... [i]f the person who was duly elected or appointed is found guilty of a felony." § 22–31–129(1)(e)

.

¶ 4 Esquibel then brought this action in district court seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction. Esquibel's motion for a preliminary injunction asserted he had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. This motion was premised on claims that he would be "found guilty of a felony" only if and when he failed to complete the mandatory terms of the deferred sentencing agreement, and that he was compliant with the terms of the agreement. The district court disagreed, ruling that Esquibel did not have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits. Esquibel challenges the district court's ruling.

II. "Found Guilty of a Felony"

¶ 5 A district court's ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction is reviewed with deference and will not be overturned unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1274 (Colo.1993)

. But, if the issue on appeal concerns only legal, rather than factual, questions, a district court's preliminary injunction ruling is subject to independent review. Friends of Denver Parks, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2013 COA 177, ¶ 38, 327 P.3d 311 (citing Evans, 854 P.2d at 1274 ).

¶ 6 The issue here only concerns a legal question—the meaning of the term "found guilty of a felony" in the director vacancy statute. § 22–31–129(1)(e)

. To address this question, we are guided by common rules of statutory interpretation.

¶ 7 When interpreting a statute, our primary task is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. McKinley v. City of Glenwood Springs, 2015 COA 126, ¶ 5, 361 P.3d 1080

. To discern legislative intent, we look first to the statutory language, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. Swieckowski by Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380, 1384–85 (Colo.1997). When reviewing statutory language, we assume the legislature "understands the legal import of the words it uses and does not use language idly, but rather intends that meaning should be given to each word." McKinley, ¶ 5 (quoting Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, ¶ 25, 325 P.3d 571 ). And, we read statutes as a whole, giving "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts." People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 254 (Colo.2009) (citation omitted).

¶ 8 We must determine whether Esquibel was "found guilty of a felony" when he entered his guilty plea. To do so, we look to the language of the deferred sentencing statute and rules of criminal procedure applicable to guilty pleas.

¶ 9 Colorado's deferred sentencing statute requires a defendant to enter "a plea of guilty" to a charge before the court continues the case for the purpose of later entering judgment and sentence. § 18–1.3–102(1)(a)

. But, a court may not accept a plea of guilty without first determining, among other things, that "the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which he is pleading and the effect of his plea" and that "there is a factual basis for the plea." Crim. P. 11(b)(1), (6).

¶ 10 After the court makes these determinations and accepts a plea of guilty, its acceptance "acts as a waiver by the defendant of the right to trial by jury on all issues including the determination of the penalty to be assessed." § 16–7–206(3), C.R.S.2015

.

¶ 11 Thus, Esquibel's guilty plea served as a finding of guilt because he waived his right to have a jury decide otherwise. And, "the acceptance of such plea also acts as a conviction for the offense." Id.

¶ 12 The dissent nevertheless suggests that the legislature deems a board seat vacant only when a director is "found guilty of a felony" by a judge or jury, not when a defendant is convicted of a felony following a plea of guilty. We respectfully disagree because the term "conviction" is commonly understood to mean "[t]he act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime," Black's Law Dictionary 384 (9th ed. 2004), and includes "a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that is accepted by the court," § 18–1.3–107(8)(c), C.R.S.2015

. "Conviction" also includes "having received a deferred judgment and sentence." § 181.3–107(8)(c).

¶ 13 Because the clear intent of the director vacancy statute is to remove a person "found guilty of a felony" from serving on a board of education, § 22–31–129(1)(e)

, we conclude that the district court did not err by denying Esquibel's motion to enjoin the Board from determining there was a vacancy in his position.

¶ 14 Even so, Esquibel contends that the director vacancy statute does not apply to him because the court's acceptance of his guilty plea does not constitute a "judgment of conviction," which is only entered if he violates the terms of his deferred sentencing agreement. Esquibel points out that when the Board declared his seat vacant, he was in full compliance with the terms of his deferred sentencing agreement. We disagree for several reasons.

First, the director vacancy statute is triggered when a person is "found guilty of a felony," not when the person has had a "judgment of conviction" entered against him. See § 22–31–129

.

¶ 16 Second, Esquibel confuses his potential future status with his current status. The benefit of a deferred sentencing agreement—including the withdrawal of "the plea of guilty previously entered"—is not realized until a defendant has fully complied with conditions of the deferral period. § 18–1.3–102(2)

. When the Board declared his seat vacant, Esquibel had not completed the deferral period.

¶ 17 Third, the deferred sentencing statute distinguishes between a "conviction" and a "judgment of conviction." Such a reading is consistent with our supreme court's decision in Hafelfinger v. District Court,

which held that "a ‘conviction’ occurs upon the acceptance by the trial court of the defendant's plea of guilty; whereas, a ‘judgment of conviction’ occurs, if at all, when it is determined that the defendant has violated the conditions of the deferred judgment and sentence." 674 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo.1984) (citing People v. Widhalm, 642 P.2d 498, 500 (Colo.1982) ). Thus, Esquibel was convicted when the court accepted his guilty plea to cocaine possession. He was also, therefore, necessarily found guilty of a felony. See M.T. v. People, 275 P.3d 661, 663 (Colo.App.2010) ("It is true that where sentencing is deferred, there is no ‘judgment of conviction,’.... But in most other contexts involving deferred judgments, accepting a guilty plea yields a conviction."), aff'd, 2012 CO 11, 269 P.3d 1219.

¶ 18 Because a defendant under a deferred sentencing agreement has suffered a "conviction," the fact that he or she is in compliance during the deferral period does not erase the collateral consequences of being found guilty of a felony. For example, a person who pleads guilty under a deferred sentencing agreement, but has not yet completed the deferral period, must report the conviction to the nursing board when applying for a license. Weber v. Colo. State Bd. of Nursing, 830 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Colo.App.1992)

.

¶ 19 Esquibel's reliance on People v. Jacquez, 196 Colo. 569, 572, 588 P.2d 871, 874 (Colo.1974)

, for the proposition that until judgment is entered, "the fact of guilt has not been judicially declared," is misplaced. Jacquez involved the interpretation of a habitual criminal statute, which specifically required that a prior offense count toward enhanced sentencing only if the prior offense was based on both a "conviction" and "entry of judgment." Id. at 572, 588 P.2d at 873–74. But, the director vacancy statute does not...