M.T. v. People

• Citation: 269 P.3d 1219,2012 CO 11
• Decision Date: 13 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10SC254.,10SC254.
• Parties: M.T., Petitioner v. PEOPLE, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

2012 CO 11

269 P.3d 1219

M.T., Petitioner

v.PEOPLE, Respondent.

No. 10SC254.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Feb. 13, 2012.

Philip A. Cherner, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Petitioner.

Don Quick, District Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District, Russell Wentworth, Deputy District Attorney, Brighton, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.

Ann England, Violeta R. Chapin, Boulder, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Criminal Defense Bar.

Justice BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this appeal, we review the court of appeals' opinion in M.T. v. People, ––– P.3d ––––, 2010 WL 376525 (Colo.App.2010), to determine whether section 24–72–308(3)(c), C.R.S. (2011), which prohibits the sealing of records pertaining to a conviction involving unlawful sexual behavior, applies to a successfully-completed and dismissed deferred judgment. The court of appeals held that a case dismissed after a deferred judgment constitutes a conviction under the statute and may not be sealed. We likewise conclude that the term conviction includes a deferred judgment for purposes of section 24–72–308(3)(c). Any other construction would render section 24–72–308(3)(c) superfluous. We therefore affirm the court of appeals and return the case with instructions to remand to the trial court to vacate the order sealing the records in M.T.'s criminal case.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 M.T. was charged in 2004 with sexual assault on a child, § 18–3–405, C.R.S. (2011). He pleaded guilty under terms of a deferred judgment to attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, §§ 18–2–101, 18–3–405.3, C.R.S. (2011), an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior, and the prosecution dismissed the charge of sexual assault on a child.

¶ 3 Four years later, M.T. successfully completed the terms of the deferred judgment and withdrew his guilty plea. Pursuant to the deferred judgment, prosecutors dismissed the charge of attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust. Thereafter, M.T. filed a civil petition to seal the criminal records associated with his case, pursuant to section 24–72–308(1), C.R.S. (2011). Over the prosecution's objection, the district court granted the petition. That court reasoned that the exception contained in section 24–72–308(3)(c), which prohibits the sealing of “records pertaining to a conviction of an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior,” does not apply to a successfully-completed and dismissed deferred judgment. The court relied on section 18–1.3–903(2), C.R.S. (2011), which defines “conviction” for purposes of sentencing sex offenders as “conviction after trial by court or jury or acceptance of a plea of guilty.”

¶ 4 The court of appeals reversed. The majority held that files in a case dismissed after a deferred judgment contain records pertaining to a conviction and therefore the statutory exception precluded the sealing of M.T.'s records. M.T., ––– P.3d at ––––. In dissent, Judge Webb concluded that the successful completion of a deferred judgment voids the conviction ab initio, eliminating any basis for invoking the statutory exception. Id. at ––––. We granted certiorari and now affirm the court of appeals.¹

II. Analysis

A. The Issue

¶ 5 Colorado's sealing statute, section 24–72–308, allows the sealing of arrest and criminal records in three instances: (1) when the person was not charged; (2) when the case was completely dismissed; and (3) when the person was acquitted:

[A]ny person in interest may petition the district court of the district in which any arrest and criminal records information pertaining to said person in interest is located for the sealing of all of said records, except basic identification information, if the records are a record of official actions involving a criminal offense for which said person in interest was not charged, in any case which was completely dismissed, or in any case in which said person in interest was acquitted.

§ 24–72–308(1)(a)(I).

¶ 6 After providing for a petition to seal in these three instances, the statute prohibits the sealing of records for several categories of offenses, including records pertaining to convictions for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior (“Exception (3)(c)”):

This section shall not apply to records pertaining to a conviction of an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 16–22–102(9), C.R.S.

§ 24–72–308(3)(c) (emphasis added).

¶ 7 It is undisputed that “attempted sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust,” the offense to which M.T. pleaded guilty as part of the deferred judgment, is an offense for which the factual basis involved “unlawful sexual behavior” as defined by section 16–22–102(9). The People assert that the records in this case are “records pertaining to a conviction of an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior,” and, therefore, M.T. is statutorily ineligible to petition to seal his records. M.T. argues that his records do not pertain to a conviction because the charge against him was dismissed when he completed the terms of the deferred judgment. The question we must answer is whether a successfully-completed and dismissed deferred judgment for an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior constitutes a “conviction” within the language of Exception (3)(c) so that records pertaining to the deferred judgment may not be sealed. To answer this question, we must construe the term “conviction” for purposes of Exception (3)(c).

B. Standard of Review

¶ 8 The construction of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 457 (Colo.2005). Our fundamental responsibility in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the General Assembly in enacting it. Alvarado v. People, 132 P.3d 1205, 1207 (Colo.2006). To discern that intent, we look first to the language of the statute. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). If the language of the statute is clear, we interpret the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Hernandez v. People, 176 P.3d 746, 751 (Colo.2008). Only if the language is ambiguous may we look to external aids in construction. Id. “The language at issue must be read in the context of the statute as a whole and the context of the entire statutory scheme.” Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo.2010). “Where possible, the statute should be interpreted to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” Dist. Court, 713 P.2d at 921.

C. Construction of the Sealing Statute

¶ 9 We begin our review by looking at the language of the statute. The sealing statute itself does not define “conviction.” Nevertheless, the structure and evolution of the statutory scheme compel the conclusion that the term “conviction” in Exception (3)(c) must include deferred judgments.

¶ 10 Entitled “sealing of arrest and criminal records other than convictions,” the statute allows an interested person to petition for sealing when the person 1) was “not charged,” 2) was “acquitted,” or 3) had a case “completely dismissed.” By its own terms, the sealing statute does not contemplate the sealing of records relating to any kind of conviction. However, a person with a conviction may become eligible to petition for sealing if, by some means, the case is later “completely dismissed.” A deferred judgment and sentence creates such a situation.

¶ 11 In a deferred judgment and sentencing arrangement, the court accepts a defendant's plea of guilty, but defers judgment and sentencing for a specified period to allow the defendant to complete stipulated conditions akin to those of probation. § 18–1.3–102(2), C.R.S. (2011). The court's acceptance of the guilty plea yields a conviction. See § 16–7–206(3), C.R.S. (2011) (trial court's acceptance of guilty plea “acts as a conviction for the offense”); see also Hafelfinger v. Dist. Court, 674 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo.1984) (acceptance of guilty plea as part of deferred sentence constitutes a conviction for purposes of a bail bond statute that did not separately define the term); Jeffrey v. Dist. Court, 626 P.2d 631, 635 n. 4 (Colo.1981) (court's acceptance of guilty plea in exchange for deferred judgment and sentence constitutes a conviction for purposes of double jeopardy); People v. Allaire, 843 P.2d 38, 41 (Colo.App.1992) (prohibition on persons previously convicted from possessing weapons applies to a guilty plea and deferred judgment). A breach of any condition of the arrangement results in entry of judgment and the imposition of sentence upon the guilty plea. § 18–1.3–102(2).

¶ 12 Upon full compliance with the terms of the deferred judgment, the guilty plea is withdrawn “and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred [is] dismissed with prejudice.” Id. Thus, generally, a successfully completed and dismissed deferred judgment would enable a defendant to petition to seal records under the “completely dismissed” category of the sealing statute. However, the General Assembly has excepted certain categories of convictions from sealing.

¶ 13 In one category, the General Assembly prohibits the sealing of records relating to sexual offenses. Exception (3)(c) prohibits the sealing of records “pertaining to a conviction of an offense for which the factual basis involved unlawful sexual behavior.” § 24–72–308(3)(c). Because the sealing statute does not allow records relating to any conviction to be sealed, the only logical reason for the General Assembly to include such an exception is to address those convictions which are later “completely dismissed,” thereby bringing them within the language of the statute, i.e. deferred judgments.

¶ 14 In the context of the statute as a whole, an exception...