Estate of Basalyga v. Estate of Basalyga, 3D04-2069.

• Decision Date: 24 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 3D04-2028.,No. 3D04-2069.,3D04-2069.,3D04-2028.
• Citation: 949 So.2d 251
• Parties: ESTATE OF Peter P. BASALYGA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. ESTATE OF Geneva M. BASALYGA, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

949 So.2d 251

ESTATE OF Peter P. BASALYGA, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. ESTATE OF Geneva M. BASALYGA, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 3D04-2069.

No. 3D04-2028.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

January 24, 2007.

Rehearing Denied March 15, 2007.

Greene Smith McMillan and Cynthia Greene; Stanley M. Newmark, Miami, for appellant.

Sinclair, Louis, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik and John Zavertnik, Miami; Hall & Hendrick, Coral Gables, for appellee.

Before GERSTEN, RAMIREZ, and SHEPHERD, JJ.

SHEPHERD, J.

Before their deaths, Peter P. Basalyga, the Former Husband, and Geneva M. Basalyga, the Former Wife, appealed multiple orders arising out of their pending dissolution proceedings. Although both parties are now deceased, it remains necessary for us to dispose of the issues raised.

On his appeal, the Former Husband claimed the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law by invalidating the parties' prenuptial agreement. Upon careful review of the record, we find that the trial court committed no error of law and that there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision to invalidate the prenuptial agreement. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980). On the same basis, we conclude the trial court committed no error of law and did not abuse its discretion on any of the multiple property distribution decisions contested by the parties either on the direct appeal or the cross-appeal. Id. Accordingly, on the merits issues raised on the appeal and cross-appeal, we affirm in all respects.

At the same time, the trial court reversibly erred in awarding attorney fees to the Former Wife for the services of her trial counsel. Although a trial court may consider many factors in granting statutory attorney fees to a litigant under section 61.16 of Florida's dissolution statutes, the "primary factor" the trial court must consider is the party's financial resources. Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So.2d 697, 700 (Fla. 1997). The relevant context in which to make this judgment "is after the dissolution proceeding has concluded, based upon the financial circumstances in which it has left the parties." Kelly v. Kelly, 925 So.2d 364, 368-69 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

In this "golden years" marriage gone awry, the Former Wife claimed a net worth of $851,377 at the outset of the proceeding, and the Former Husband $2,075,433. After invalidating the pre-nuptial agreement, in the amended final judgment, the trial court equitably distributed approximately $1.3 million to each party. For her part, the Former Wife received a half-interest in the couple's Sevilla home, with an option to acquire the complete interest in exchange for $320,000 in cash or stock. After electing this option, the Former Wife...