Estate of Brice v. Toyota Motor Corp.

• Citation: 373 P.3d 977,2016 NMSC 018
• Decision Date: 19 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. S–1–SC–34873.,S–1–SC–34873.
• Parties: ESTATE OF Alice C. BRICE, by and through Personal Representative Tracy A., and Minors, Emily A., and Hannah A., by and through their parent and next friend, Tracy A., Plaintiff–Appellant, v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, a Japanese corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., a California corporation; Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., a Kentucky corporation; Toyota Motor North America, Inc., a California corporation; Toyota Motor Manufacturing, California, Inc., a California corporation; Toyota Technical Center U.S.A., a Japanese corporation; Toyota Technical Center Japan, a Japanese corporation; Larry H. Miller Corporation New Mexico, d/b/a American Toyota; New Mexico State Highway Department; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico

373 P.3d 977

2016 NMSC 018

ESTATE OF Alice C. BRICE, by and through Personal Representative Tracy A., and Minors, Emily A., and Hannah A., by and through their parent and next friend, Tracy A., Plaintiff–Appellant

v.TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, a Japanese corporation; Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., a California corporation; Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., a Kentucky corporation; Toyota Motor North America, Inc., a California corporation; Toyota Motor Manufacturing, California, Inc., a California corporation; Toyota Technical Center U.S.A., a Japanese corporation; Toyota Technical Center Japan, a Japanese corporation; Larry H. Miller Corporation New Mexico, d/b/a American Toyota; New Mexico State Highway Department; and Does 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, Defendants–Appellees.

No. S–1–SC–34873.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

May 19, 2016.

Tucker Law Firm, P.C., Steven Lee Tucker, Santa Fe, NM, Curtis & Lucero, Lisa K. Curtis, Amalia J. Skogen Lucero, Albuquerque, NM, The Komyatte Law Firm, Paul Komyatte, Golden, CO, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Edward R. Ricco, Jeffrey M. Croasdell, Todd E. Rinner, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants–Appellees.

OPINION

MAES

, Justice.

{1} In this certified appeal we consider whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applies to actions under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA), NMSA 1978, Sections 41–2–1

to –4 (1882, as amended through 2001). This is an issue of first impression in New Mexico. We hold that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may apply to toll the statutory limitations period for a wrongful death claim if a defendant has fraudulently concealed a cause of action, thereby preventing that defendant from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense until the plaintiff learned or, through reasonable diligence, could have learned of the cause of action. Accordingly we reverse and remand to the district court.

I. Background

{2} Alice Brice (Decedent) died in an automobile accident on September 13, 2006, when her 2002 Toyota Camry suddenly accelerated into a highway intersection, collided with a tractor-trailer, and burst into flames. The Estate of Alice C. Brice (Plaintiff) filed a wrongful death lawsuit on August 31, 2010, asserting products liability and various other claims against the car manufacturer, the dealer, and others (Defendants).

{3} Because this wrongful death action was filed three years and eleven months from the date of Decedent's death, Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in district court pursuant to Rule 1–012(C) NMRA

. Defendants argued that under the three-year statute of limitations period in the WDA, (1) a wrongful death cause of action accrues “as of the date of death,” § 41–2–2 (1961), (2) this provision is strictly construed, and (3) this provision does not allow for tolling. Plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations period was equitably tolled by Defendant's fraudulent concealment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants prevented Plaintiff from obtaining knowledge about the cause of action, that Defendants were aware of the sudden acceleration problem in its vehicles for most of the decade preceding 2010 and well before Decedent's 2006 accident, and that Defendants' fraudulently concealed these problems until February 2010 when the sudden acceleration problems drew public attention and led to congressional hearings. Plaintiff contends that it had no way to discover its wrongful death cause of action before February 2010. Plaintiff asserts that after discovering its cause of action, it promptly filed its wrongful death suit on August 31, 2010.

{4} The district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appealed the unfavorable summary judgment to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the WDA limitations period may be equitably tolled on the basis of fraudulent concealment. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to this Court under NMSA 1978, Section 34–5–14(C)(2) (1972)

and Rule 12–606 NMRA stating that resolution of this appeal involves significant issues of law and policy that are of substantial public interest that should be determined by the New Mexico Supreme Court. We accepted certification.

Standard of Review

{5} Whether the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may serve to toll the statutory limitations period for a cause of action under the WDA presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See Glaser v. LeBus, 2012–NMSC–012, ¶ 8, 276 P.3d 959

. “When this Court construes statutes, our guiding principle is that we should determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent when it enacted the statute.” State ex rel. Brandenburg v. Sanchez, 2014–NMSC–022, ¶ 4, 329 P.3d 654. “In discerning the Legislature's intent, we are aided by classic canons of statutory construction, and [w]e look first to the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Delfino v. Griffo, 2011–NMSC–015, ¶ 12, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We have repeatedly cautioned that despite the ‘beguiling simplicity’ of parsing the words on the face of a statute, we must take care to avoid adoption of a construction that would render the statute's application absurd or unreasonable or lead to injustice or contradiction.”

State v. Strauch, 2015–NMSC–009, ¶ 13, 345 P.3d 317

. Therefore, when the Legislature's intent is not clear from the plain language of a statute, “we consider the statute's history and background insofar as it may help to give effect to the Legislature's intent.” Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010–NMSC–009, ¶ 33, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, “[s]tatutes should be construed so as to facilitate their operation and the achievement of the goals as specified by the legislature.” Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Services, 1992–NMSC–042, ¶ 12, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442.

II. Discussion

{6} Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is deeply rooted in the common law and provides equitable grounds for tolling the limitations period in the WDA. Defendants argue that the limitations period in the WDA must be “strictly” applied and that it is for the Legislature to decide if fraudulent concealment applies to toll the limitations period of the WDA. To resolve this issue of first impression, we discuss the common-law doctrine of fraudulent concealment and then examine whether the Legislature intended fraudulent concealment to apply to the limitations period in the WDA. Finally, we consider Defendants' reliance on a number of older, inapposite cases, both from this Court and the Court of Appeals.

A. Fraudulent Concealment at Common Law and in New Mexico

{7} The common law has long recognized that a person who commits fraud should not be permitted to benefit from that conduct. See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 158, 1 L.Ed. 540 (1795)

(“[P]ersons guilty of fraud, should not gain by it. Hence the efficacy of the legal principle, that no man shall set up his own fraud or iniquity, as a ground of action or defence.”). Public policy further supports this legal principle.

To decide the case we need look no further than the maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply rooted in our jurisprudence this principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by both law and equity courts and has frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations.

Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33, 79 S.Ct. 760, 3 L.Ed.2d 770 (1959)

.

{8} It is well settled in both “general common law” and “federal law[ ] that fraudulent concealment of a cause of action by the defendant will toll the statute of limitations.” Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 340–41 (5th Cir.1971)

(citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g.,

Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 347–50, 21 Wall. 342, 22 L.Ed. 636 (1874) (tolling the statute of limitations period because the defendant's fraudulent concealment of assets during bankruptcy proceedings prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury incurred by that concealment); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946) (concluding that the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment “is read into every federal statute of limitation”).

{9} In 1876, before the enactment of the WDA, the New Mexico Territorial Legislature adopted “the common law as recognized in the United States of America” as the law of New Mexico. NMSA 1978, § 38–1–3 (1876)

; see

Lopez v. Maez, 1982–NMSC–103, ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269. Not only has New Mexico adopted the common law, to the extent it is applicable to our “condition and circumstances,” Johnson v. Amstutz, 1984–NMSC–030, ¶ 3, 101 N.M. 94, 678 P.2d 1169, the New Mexico courts likewise generally adhere to the proposition that one should not be allowed to take advantage of one's own wrong, see, e.g.,

Sauter v. Saint Michael's College, 1962–NMSC–107, ¶ 24, 70 N.M. 380, 374 P.2d 134 (“To permit the defendant to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against a situation created by his own fraud would certainly not be in keeping with the principles of equity and it is a fundamental principle of equity that no one can take advantage of his own wrong.”).

{10} Consistent with those views, New Mexico courts have applied the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. See, e.g., Kern ex rel. Kern v. St. Joseph Hosp., Inc., 1985–NMSC–031, ¶¶ 10–11, 102 N.M. 452, 697 P.2d 135

(discussing fraudulent concealment in the context of medical malpractice). In New Mexico, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is distinct from but is nonetheless grounded “upon the principle of equitable estoppel. The theory is premised on the notion that the one who has prevented the plaintiff from bringing suit within...