Estate of Hillier, Matter of

• Citation: 473 N.W.2d 811,189 Mich.App. 716
• Decision Date: 17 June 1991
• Docket Number: Docket No. 117129
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Harold O. HILLIER, Deceased. Jerry L. STEWART, Personal Representative of the Estate of Harold O. Hillier, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellee, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT of TREASURY, Respondent-Appellant. 189 Mich.App. 716, 473 N.W.2d 811
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 811

473 N.W.2d 811

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Harold O. HILLIER, Deceased.

Jerry L. STEWART, Personal Representative of the Estate of Harold O. Hillier, Deceased, Petitioner-Appellee, v. STATE of Michigan, DEPARTMENT of TREASURY,

Respondent-Appellant.

Docket No. 117129.

189 Mich.App. 716, 473 N.W.2d 811

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted April 3, 1991, at Detroit.

Decided June 17, 1991, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication Sept. 19, 1991.

[189 MICHAPP 716] Rupp, Ehrlich, Foley & Serwer, P.C. by Joseph H. Ehrlich, Troy, for petitioner-appellee.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., and E. David Brockman and Shirley L. Palardy, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent-appellant.

[189 MICHAPP 717] Before DANHOF, C.J., and GRIFFIN and FITZGERALD, JJ.

FITZGERALD, Judge.

Respondent, Michigan Department of Treasury, appeals as of right from a November 18, 1988, order of Oakland Probate Judge Norman Barnard granting Jerry L. Stewart's petition for rehearing of the amount of inheritance tax due on behalf of the estate of Harold Hillier because of errors made in the original computation of tax to be paid. The department filed a petition for reconsideration of that decision, which was denied by order of April 24, 1989, by Judge Barnard's successor, Judge Joan Young. The department argues that the trial court erroneously decided that MCR 2.612 granted the probate court authority to redetermine an inheritance tax more than ninety days after the final tax determination had been entered, because the specific jurisdictional bar contained in the statute cannot be nullified by a court rule. We agree and reverse.

Harold Hillier, who died testate on November 16, 1984, nominated petitioner as his personal representative. Petitioner was also named trustee of decedent's trust, which accounted for a majority of decedent's assets. A final account by petitioner was filed and approved by Judge Barnard on December 30, 1987. At that time, all that remained before discharging petitioner as fiduciary was for the Michigan inheritance tax to be resolved. A final inheritance tax order was entered by Judge Barnard on February 2, 1988.

Upon receipt of the order, petitioner met with the inheritance tax examiner regarding possible claims against the estate which had not been considered in the tax order, including probate and federal district court litigation, alimony obligations, marital deductions, and mortgage payments. The [189 MICHAPP 718] tax examiner agreed that additional deductions could be credited to the estate only upon substantiation of the claims.

Petitioner subsequently returned to the tax examiner with documents substantiating some of the alleged estate obligations. The tax examiner advised petitioner that he was unable at that time to issue a revised final inheritance tax order because of the expiration of the ninety-day appeal period.

On August 11, 1988, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing of the inheritance tax order and for issuance of a new order pursuant to MCR 2.612(C)(2). ¹ The department filed objections, asserting that the petition was brought in contravention of the specific jurisdictional bar of M.C.L. Sec. 205.213(5); M.S.A. Sec. 7.574(5), which limits the period for the rehearing of a final inheritance tax order to ninety days. On November 18, 1988, Judge Barnard issued an order granting the petition pursuant to MCR 2.612.

The department's position both on appeal and below is that petitioner's request for a redetermination is barred under Sec. 13(5) of the inheritance tax act, M.C.L. Sec. 205.213(5); M.S.A. Sec. 7.574(5), which provides in relevant part:

The judge of probate upon the written application of any person interested, filed with him within 90 days after the final determination by him of any tax under this act, may grant a rehearing upon the matter of determining such tax. The attorney general may file the written application for rehearing upon the matter of determining such tax any time prior to the allowance of the final account.

The department reasons that because the ninety-[189 MICHAPP 719] day period expired on May 2, 1988, the trial court was without jurisdiction to grant rehearing on the basis of the petition for rehearing filed on August 11, 1988. The department does not challenge the merits of the probate court's finding that error had been made in the original computation of the tax. Admittedly, both parties agree with regard to the alleged errors. In light of that fact, we are hard pressed to understand why the department did not stipulate to the amendment of the tax order. While we believe that equity has not been achieved in this case, the law prevents us from arriving at an equitable result.

Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, deriving all of their powers from statutory authority. Const. 1963, art. 6, Sec. 15; D'Allessandro v. Ely, 173 Mich.App. 788, 794, 434 N.W.2d 662 (1988). See also M.C.L. Sec. 600.841; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.841; M.C.L. Sec. 700.1 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 27.5001 et seq. Jurisdiction of the probate court cannot be expanded by appellate courts without legislative consent. D'Allessandro, supra at 794, 434 N.W.2d 662.

Clearly, the Legislature has granted probate courts the power to decide issues related to inheritance tax orders. M.C.L. Secs. 205.210, 205.213(1); M.S.A. Secs. 7.571, 7.574(1). The Legislature has also limited the time in which a probate court can entertain motions for rehearing involving orders of inheritance tax. M.C.L. Sec. 205.213(5); M.S.A. Sec. 7.574(5).

The Legislature has also vested the Supreme Court with rule-making powers governing practices and procedures in the Supreme Court and all other courts of record. M.C.L. Sec. 600.223; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.223. While a court rule cannot enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction of a court, as defined by statute or constitution, it must be determined if a court rule in fact addresses jurisdiction of a court or rather addresses procedure. Where there is a [189 MICHAPP 720] conflict between a statute and a court rule, the court rule prevails only if it governs practice or procedure. Krajewski v. Krajewski, 125 Mich.App. 407, 414, 335 N.W.2d 923 (1983), rev'd on other grounds 420 Mich. 729, 362 N.W.2d 230 (1984).

This Court previously addressed the issue whether a motion for rehearing can be heard by the probate court beyond the ninety-day time limit established by M.C.L. Sec. 205.213(5); M.S.A. Sec. 7.574(5), by utilizing M.C.L. Sec. 600.848(1); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.848(1), the general statute granting the probate court the right to rehear matters. In In re Johnson Estate, 152 Mich.App. 200, 394 N.W.2d 136 (1986), this Court determined that the ninety-day time limit prevailed over the general statute. Applying a general rule of construction that a specific statute controls over a general statute, the Court held that failure to file a petition for rehearing within the ninety-day...