Estate of Shoudt v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't (In re Protest of Notice of Claim of Tax Lien Issued)
Decision Date | 03 May 2021 |
Docket Number | No. A-1-CA-37896,A-1-CA-37896 |
Parties | ESTATE OF RICHARD SHOUDT and DIANE K. SHOUDT, Protestants-Appellees, v. NEW MEXICO TAXATION & REVENUE DEPARTMENT, Respondent-Appellant, IN THE MATTER OF THE PROTEST OF THE NOTICE OF CLAIM OF TAX LIEN ISSUED UNDER LETTER ID NO. L0468477232. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.
APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS OFFICE
Dee Dee Hoxie, Hearing Officer
Sanchez, Mowrer & Desiderio, P.C.
Isaac S. Emmanuel
Albuquerque, NM
Betzer, Roybal & Eisenberg, PC
Benjamin C. Roybal
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellees
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
David Mittle, Special Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
{1} Appellees Diane K. Shoudt and the Estate of Richard Shoudt (collectively, Protestants) protested the issuance of a tax lien by the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (the Department) for unpaid taxes assessed to a purported sole proprietorship owned by Diane K. Shoudt's deceased husband. Following Protestants' motion for summary judgment, the Administrative Hearings Office (AHO) hearing officer found in Protestants' favor and ordered the Department to release the lien. The Department filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed both orders to this Court. Because we conclude the Department's notice of appeal was not timely, pursuant to Gelinas v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department, 2020-NMCA-038, 472 P.3d 1231, cert. denied, 2020-NMCERT-___ (No. S-1-SC-38244, May 11, 2020), and the Department's arguments in support of a contrary result are not persuasive, we dismiss the Department's appeal.
{2} The hearing officer issued the decision and order granting summary judgment in Protestants' favor on November 21, 2018. The decision and order contained specific information addressing the Department's right to appeal:
Pursuant to NMSA 1978, [Section] 7-1-25 [(2015)], the parties have the right to appeal this decision by filing a notice of appeal with the New Mexico Court of Appeals within [thirty] days of the date shown above. See Rule 12-601 NMRA. If an appeal is not filed within [thirty] days, this [d]ecision and [o]rder will become final.
(Emphasis omitted.) The Department did not appeal within thirty days of the issuance of the decision and order, instead moving the hearing officer to reconsider. The hearing officer denied the motion for reconsideration on December 28, 2018, and the Department filed a notice of appeal on January 24, 2019, purporting to appeal both the order denying the motion for reconsideration and the decision and order granting summary judgment. Consequently, the Department's notice of appeal was filed sixty-four days after the decision and order was issued and twenty-seven days after the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Protestants argue that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
{3} This Court in Gelinas recently explained that a motion for reconsideration of an AHO hearing officer's decision and order does not toll the time to appeal. Relying on the plain language of the statute and rule governing such appeals, Gelinas first held that the Department's appeal, filed less than thirty days after the hearing officer's denial of the Department's motion for reconsideration but more than thirty days after the hearing officer's decision and order, was untimely. 2020-NMCA-038, ¶¶ 1, 3, 7 (Section 7-1-25 of the Tax Administration Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 7-1-1 to -83 (1965, asamended through 2021), and Rule 12-601 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure). Gelinas also held that, in this context, the Department was not "entitled to appeal the hearing officer's denial of its motion for reconsideration separately from its appeal of the decision and order," reasoning that allowing a separate appeal of an order denying a motion for reconsideration "would effectively insert the tolling language urged by the Department into Rule 12-601 and Section 7-1-25 that we have rejected." Gelinas, 2020-NMCA-038, ¶ 6; cf. Armijo v. Save 'N Gain, 1989-NMCA-014, ¶ 20, 108 N.M. 281, 771 P.2d 989 ( ). We conclude that, under Gelinas, the Department's appeal, coming as it did more than thirty days after the hearing officer's decision and order, is not timely. See 2020-NMCA-038, ¶ 5.
{4} The Department seeks to avoid this conclusion, arguing that (1) Gelinas should not apply retroactively to this case, and, alternatively, (2) unusual circumstances excuse the Department's untimeliness. We address each argument in turn.
{5} "The general presumption is that the holding established in a civil case will 'apply retroactively.' " Baca v. State, 2017-NMCA-076, ¶ 16, 404 P.3d 789 ( ). "The preliminary inquiry in a retroactivity analysis is whether the case in question announced a new rule." Edenburn v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 2013-NMCA-045, ¶ 29, 299 P.3d 424. The Department contends that Gelinas announced a new rule because it "overruled clear past precedent on which the litigants may have relied." See Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, ¶ 31 . In support, the Department cites only a proposed summary calendar disposition from another case, in which this Court proposed that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a hearing officer's decision and order extended the time to file a notice of appeal. Contrary to the Department's assertion, this proposed disposition does not amount to a holding of this Court, nor is it precedent.
{6} It is well established that "unpublished orders, decisions, or memorandum opinions are not meant to be cited as controlling authority because such opinions are written solely for the benefit of the parties." State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040, ¶ 48, 110 N.M. 218, 794 P.2d 361. Moreover, it is "even less appropriate" to cite or rely on a notice of proposed disposition as controlling authority because, for a variety of reasons, a notice of proposed disposition "may not indicate the ultimate disposition of [a] case." Id. ¶ 49. A notice of proposed disposition is not precedent; instead, it is signed by only one judge and "is a preliminary and tentative indication of how a panel might resolve theissues on appeal, but it is no more than that." Id. Thus, the cited proposed disposition is not, as the Department contends, a "past precedent" of this Court that Gelinas overruled.
{7} Nor did Gelinas otherwise establish a new rule of law. As this Court has recognized, where, as in Gelinas, the result was foreseeable as a matter of statutory interpretation of a statute's explicit language, see 2020-NMCA-038, ¶ 5 ( ), it will not be considered a new rule for purposes of a retroactivity analysis. See Baca, 2017-NMCA-076, ¶ 18 ( ); Gomez v. Chavarria, 2009-NMCA-035, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 46, 206 P.3d 157 (). In short, because Gelinas did not create a new principle of law, we conclude the Department has failed to overcome the presumption of retroactivity and Gelinas therefore is applicable in this case. See Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 2013-NMCA-077, ¶ 41, 306 P.3d 480 ( ).
{8} The Department next contends that, even if Gelinas is given retroactive effect, the Department's late appeal should be excused. Although the timeliness of an appeal is a mandatory precondition to the exercise of our jurisdiction, see Govich v. N. Am. Sys., Inc., 1991-NMSC-061, ¶ 12, 112 N.M. 226, 814 P.2d 94, and this Court must dismiss a case when it does not have jurisdiction, see Thornton v. Gamble, 1984-NMCA-093, ¶ 15, 101 N.M. 764, 688 P.2d 1268, we may waive this mandatory precondition where "unusual circumstances" are present. See Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMSC-028, ¶ 31, 285 P.3d 595 (). We are unpersuaded that such circumstances exist here.
{9} The Department urges this Court to conclude that unusual circumstances exist in the form of court error. See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC-024, ¶ 16, 117 N.M. 273, 871 P.2d 369 (...
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