Estevez v. State, 4D03-4874.
Decision Date | 11 May 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 4D03-4874.,4D03-4874. |
Parties | George ESTEVEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Steven J. Hammer, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
George Estevez appeals a conviction and sentence for aggravated battery, and argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing jurors in a single aggravated battery case that the defendant's use of force was not justifiable if he was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after commission of an aggravated battery. We agree and reverse for a new trial.
Estevez was charged with one count, aggravated battery, for a stabbing occurring at a bar. In the course of his jury trial, Estevez claimed self-defense, alleging he was in fear of the victim, Walter Burgos, based on a 1993 incident in which Burgos had stabbed him four times. When Estevez saw Burgos enter the bar with four other men, he was afraid there would be trouble and believed Burgos was going to start a fight. The men approached Estevez and Burgos began making verbal threats at Estevez from about two feet away. Burgos told him something like, "I ought to beat your ass." Before Burgos got close, Estevez tried to move to his left, but the group of men encircled him in a semi-circle, boxing him in. As Estevez testified, It was when Burgos came toward Estevez aggressively with his hands up, balled into fists, that Estevez pulled out his knife and stabbed Burgos once in the stomach and then ran out of the building.
In delivering the jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
After the jury rendered a guilty verdict, the trial court adjudicated Estevez guilty and sentenced him accordingly.
We hold that the trial court committed fundamental error by instructing jurors in a single aggravated battery case that the defendant's use of force was not justifiable if he was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after commission of an aggravated battery. The fundamental error that occurred here was clearly harmful and deprived Estevez of a fair trial, as his sole defense was self-defense.
"Trial judges have wide discretion in decisions regarding jury instructions, and the appellate courts will not reverse a decision regarding an instruction in the absence of a prejudicial error that would result in a miscarriage of justice." Lewis v. State, 693 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). "A court's decision to give a particular instruction should not be reversed `unless the error complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice or the instruction was reasonably calculated to confuse or mislead the jury.'" Giles v. State, 831 So.2d 1263, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citation omitted).
Giles is very instructive to the result in the instant case. Estevez's case is essentially the same as that of the defendant in Giles, except that the self-defense involved in Giles was the use of non-deadly force rather than the use of deadly force, and Giles' trial counsel objected while Estevez's did not. However, the type of force has no bearing upon the resolution of this issue, and, moreover, even though Giles' counsel objected to the instruction, this court held in Giles that the error in that case constituted fundamental error.
The instruction given by the court (see infra) is based on section 776.041(1), Fla. Stat., which provides in pertinent part as follows:
While the charged offense of aggravated battery is indeed a "forcible felony" under section 776.08, Florida Statutes, this court noted in Giles that "the plain language of section 776.041 indicates that it is applicable only under circumstances where the person claiming self defense is engaged in another, independent `forcible felony' at the time." Id. at 1265. Nevertheless, just as in Giles, the present case "was not one where the alleged aggravated battery occurred while [the defendant] was attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of some other independent forcible felony." Id.
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