Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China Fellowship

• Citation: 146 Cal.App.3d 440,194 Cal.Rptr. 240
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 24 August 1983
• Parties: EVANGELIZE CHINA FELLOWSHIP, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EVANGELIZE CHINA FELLOWSHIP et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 66148.

Page 240

194 Cal.Rptr. 240

146 Cal.App.3d 440

EVANGELIZE CHINA FELLOWSHIP, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EVANGELIZE CHINA FELLOWSHIP et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 66148.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 24, 1983.

[146 Cal.App.3d 442] Tuttle & Taylor Incorporated, Merrick J. Bobb and Henry T. Greely, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

Gary L. Bostwick, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

L. THAXTON HANSON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. (hereinafter ECF, Inc.) appeals from the trial court's minute order quashing service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, an order which we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

ECF, Inc. and Evangelize China Fellowship, Hong Kong (hereinafter ECF, Hong Kong) are independent entities both of which were founded by Reverend Andrew Gih for the purpose of promoting "christianity among persons of chinese descent."

A battle for power developed between these two organizations and Reverend Gih was replaced by plaintiff Edwin Orr as the head of ECF, Inc. Orr is not a party to this appeal.

ECF, Hong Kong, publishes The Life Magazine through its printing office entitled Sheng Tao Press (hereinafter Press). It is conceded by the parties that 600 out of 8,500 copies of The Life Magazine are sent to California readers each month. The majority of the issues are distributed to readers in China and Taiwan.

[146 Cal.App.3d 443]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On or about March 19, 1981, plaintiff ECF, Inc. and Orr filed a complaint against ECF, Hong Kong, Press, Jonathan Lee, Calvin Lee, Y.Y. Lee, Philips Lee, Y.H. Lee, C.N. Lee and various Does praying for damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, imposition of a constructive trust and an accounting of funds allegedly wrongfully received.

The first three causes of action revolve around defendants' conduct allegedly misleading to contributors of donations. Such conduct consists of the sending of receipts to donors that bear the name and Los Angeles address of ECF, Inc. along with Press' name and Hong Kong address, and a false statement that "gifts are deductible for tax purposes."

The fourth cause of action alleged that an editorial appearing in the July 1980 issue of The Life Magazine was libelous of plaintiff ECF, Inc. and Orr.

The complaint was verified by the plaintiff's attorney pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 446. ¹

On November 25, 1981, all of the defendants except for Jonathan Lee and Philip Lee (who are not parties to this appeal) filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, to dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. Argument on the motion was heard on January 19, 1982. The trial court granted defendants' motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction and entered its minute order on January 25, 1982.

ISSUE

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in holding that California did not have personal jurisdiction over the respondents.

[146 Cal.App.3d 444]

DISCUSSION

The applicable standard of review was set forth in Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 991, 994-995, 107 Cal.Rptr. 744, wherein it is stated: "We test [the] record in light of the principles that: (1) where a defendant properly moves to quash out of state service of process for lack of jurisdiction, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (Wilson v. Eddy, 2 Cal.App.3d 613, 617 [82 Cal.Rptr. 826]; Martin Bros. Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 121 Cal.App.2d 790, 794 [264 P.2d 183]; Briggs v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.2d 240, 251 [183 P.2d 758] ); (2) evidence of those facts or their absence may be in the form of declarations with the verified complaint being treated as a declaration for that purpose (Atkins, Kroll & Co. v. Broadway Lbr. Co., 222 Cal.App.2d 646, 654 [35 Cal.Rptr. 385, 12 A.L.R.3d 880] ); ² (3) where there is a conflict in the declarations, resolution of the conflict by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if the determination of that court is supported by substantial evidence (Vibration Isolation Products, Inc. v. American Nat. Rubber Co., 23 Cal.App.3d 480, 482 [100 Cal.Rptr. 269]; Atkins, Kroll & Co. v. Broadway Lbr. Co., supra, 222 Cal.App.2d 646, 654, 35 Cal.Rptr. 385); and (4) we are not permitted on appeal to consider evidence not before the trial court (6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, §§ 218, 219)."

In the case at bench, the defendants' motion to quash service of summons was supported by the following declarations: David Foltz, chairman of ECF, Hong Kong, stating that the only contact between ECF, Hong Kong or its publication department (Press) and California are the 600 out of 8,500 monthly issues of The Life Magazine and the receipts sent to California contributors of funds; Y.H. Lee, a citizen of Hong Kong and a director of ECF, Hong Kong, stating that his/her only contact with California was in 1979 when (s)he was "in transit"; Calvin Lee, a resident of Hong Kong and a director of both ECF, Hong Kong and Press, stating that his only contact with California was while on a vacation in 1976; and C.N. Lee, a citizen of Hong Kong and a director of Press, stating that his/her only contacts with California were in 1971 while visiting relatives, and 1975 while attending a funeral.

Plaintiff's memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to defendants' motion to quash was supported by a copy of a page from a 1979 issue of The Life Magazine and an Engilsh translation thereof stating ECF, [146 Cal.App.3d 445] Hong Kong's intent to establish an office in North America to be administered by Jonathan Lee who was already present in Los Angeles. ³ The Supreme Court recently set forth a concise statement of the constitutional requirements before a court can exercise jurisdiction over non-residents in Secrest Machine Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 664, 668-669, 190 Cal.Rptr. 175, 660 P.2d 399, wherein the court stated:

"A California court may exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents on any basis not inconsistent with the United States or California Constitutions. (Code Civ.Proc., § 410.10.) The parameters of the states' constitutional powers to compel absent defendants to defend suits brought in state courts has been defined in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions of which Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310 [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057] is the seminal case. Generally, the rule is that the forum state may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant

only where the defendant has 'certain minimum contact with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." ' (Internat. Shoe Co., supra, 326 U.S. at p. 316 [66 S.Ct. at p. 158, 90 L.Ed. at p. 102].) 'In determining whether a particular exercise of state-court jurisdiction is consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on "the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner [ (1977) 433 U.S. 186 (97 S.Ct. 2569 at 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683) ] at 204;' (Rush v. Savchuk (1980) 444 U.S. 320, 327 [100 S.Ct. 571, 576-577, 62 L.Ed.2d 516, 524].)

"The high court has said that 'the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.... Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.' (Internat. Shoe Co., supra, 326 U.S. at p. 319 [66 S.Ct. at pp. 159-160, 90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 103-104].) Thus, where a corporation's activities have been extensive or wide ranging, or substantial, continuous and systematic, they justify jurisdiction for all causes of action asserted against the corporation. (See, Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147 [127 Cal.Rptr. 352, 545 P.2d 264]; Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 893, 898-899 [80 Cal.Rptr. 113, 458 P.2d 57]; Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 447-448 [72 S.Ct. 413, 419-420, 96 L.Ed. 485, 493-494].)

[146 Cal.App.3d 446] "Less extensive activity may support jurisdiction for purposes of a particular cause of action depending upon the nature and quality of the acts, the degree of relation to the asserted cause of action, and the balance between the convenience of the parties and the interest of the state in asserting jurisdiction. (Cornelison v. Chaney, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 143, 148 [127 Cal.Rptr. 352, 545 P.2d 264]; Hess v. Pawloski (1927) 274 U.S. 352 [47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L.Ed. 1091]; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (1957) 355 U.S. 220, 223 [78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, 226]; Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, 250-253 [78 S.Ct. 1228, 1237-1238, 1239, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 1295-1297].) California has recognized that a state may exercise jurisdiction over one who causes effects in the state by an act or omission done elsewhere with respect to causes of action arising from the effects. This is so unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state make exercise of jurisdiction unreasonable. (Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 443 [128 Cal.Rptr. 34, 546 P.2d 322]; Quattrone v. Superior Ct. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 296 [118 Cal.Rptr. 548]; see, Judicial Council com. to Code Civ.Proc., § 410.10, 14 West's Ann.Cal.Code; Rest.2d Conf. of Laws, § 37.)

"In cases where jurisdiction is based on the defendant's occasional activities the United States Supreme Court has said that '... it is essential ... that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the...