Evans v. CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TEL. CO. OF MD.
Decision Date | 16 March 1982 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. M-80-2898. |
Citation | 535 F. Supp. 499 |
Parties | Leonard EVANS v. CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY OF MARYLAND. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Charles J. Wargo, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
Leonard E. Cohen, Mary E. Pivec and Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
The plaintiff in this action, Leonard Evans, has sued his former employer, the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland (C & P Telephone), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for alleged racial discrimination in connection with his employment. The defendant's first motion for summary judgment based on, among other things, the expiration of the relevant limitations period was denied previously, although summary judgment was granted as to all theories of recovery based on acts occurring prior to November 10, 1977.1 Citing an alleged change in the law in this District, the defendant moved for leave to file an amended answer and for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's remaining claims.2 The court, without a hearing,3 granted the motion for leave to amend and denied the renewed motion for summary judgment.4 This Memorandum sets out the reasons for the court's decision on the latter motion.
The plaintiff's legal claims and factual allegations have been summarized previously by the court5 but will be repeated briefly for the convenience of the reader.
The plaintiff began his employment with C & P Telephone on July 17, 1970, as a maintenance worker at 320 St. Paul Street and was discharged on November 16, 1977, purportedly due to customer complaints regarding sexual harassment by the plaintiff. While employed at C & P Telephone, he was assigned to various positions in C & P offices in the Baltimore area.
The complaint in this action was filed on November 5, 1980. The principal thrust of the complaint is that the plaintiff was improperly terminated by C & P Telephone on November 16, 1977, due to racially discriminatory practices of the company as well as in retaliation for his having filed a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII.
Until recently, the judges of this District were in agreement that the period of limitations applicable to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was the general, three-year period set out in Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101 (1980 Rep. Vol.).6 In McGill v. General Electric Co., 524 F.Supp. 1126 (D.Md.1981), Judge Young held that the appropriate period of limitations for a section 1981 claim in the employment context was the six-month period for filing an administrative charge with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations. Md. Code Ann. art. 49B, § 9(a) (1979 Rep. Vol.). Since McGill, two other judges of this court have held, based on the reasoning of that case, that section 1981 claims were subject to dismissal if not filed within six months of the alleged discriminatory act.7
Although the judges of this court are not bound by each other's rulings, there is a special need for uniformity within a District in connection with matters such as periods of limitation. Nevertheless, the undersigned member of this court is constrained, respectfully, to disagree with the reasoning of McGill, and, therefore, declines to follow its result.
For reasons to be developed below, the court holds that the most appropriate state law period of limitations applicable to a claim under section 1981 is the three-year period of Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 5-101, and thereby reaffirms its prior decisions on this question. E.g., Evans v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 518 F.Supp. 1074, 1077 (D.Md.1981); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F.Supp. 949, 953 (D.Md.1977).
Because the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986, do not themselves contain limitations periods, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires that the federal courts in such cases borrow, with certain conditions, "an appropriate limitations period from the state in which the claims arose." McCausland v. Mason County Board of Education, 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1981). If a state statute prescribes a specific period of limitations for actions brought under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, this state-specified limitations period will be applied, see Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 n.3 (4th Cir. 1972), provided it does not unreasonably discriminate against or burden the federal right to be protected, Johnson v. Davis, 582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978). Where no such state statute exists, as in Maryland, the federal courts must look to a state limitations period incident to an "analogous" state recognized right to determine the appropriate limitations period to apply to the federally protected right. McCausland v. Mason County Board of Education, 649 F.2d at 279; McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1097 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160, 180, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2599, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976); Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.2d 260, 262 (4th Cir. 1977).
A common thread in the Fourth Circuit decisions in this area is that, in determining the "appropriate" or "analogous" state statute of limitations to be applied, the federal courts must not focus solely on the specific relief sought by the federal plaintiff but rather on the broad nature of the federal right giving rise to the federal claim.8
In a series of decisions, beginning with Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972), the Fourth Circuit has determined that "it is to the state statute of limitations for personal injuries to which we usually look in determining when claims brought under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 are time-barred." McCausland v. Mason County Board of Education, 649 F.2d at 279.
In Almond, an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner alleged he was (1) physically beaten, (2) placed in isolation, (3) subject to excessive bail and (4) deprived of his property without due process of law by the Sheriff of Augusta County, Virginia and the Virginia State Police. The court applied the then relevant statute of limitations, Va. Code Ann. § 8-24 (1957 Rep. Vol.), which provided as follows:
Almond had contended that the beating and other personal injury claims were subject to Virginia's two-year statute of limitations, and that the remaining claims were subject to a five-year limitations period. The defendants conceded that the two-year period applied to Almond's personal injury claims but argued for a one-year period as to the other claims.
Adopting a two-year period for all of Almond's claims under section 1983, Judge Winter stated for the court:
459 F.2d at 203-04 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). See McCausland v. Mason County Board of Education, 649 F.2d at 279 ( )
As additional support for its rejection of the one-year limitations period,9 in Almond the court stated:
The reasoning of Almond was extended in Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982. In that case, the plaintiffs sought damages for humiliation, emotional distress and anxiety in connection with the defendants' initial refusal to sell them a house. Applying Virginia's two-year limitations periods adopted in Almond, the court concluded...
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