Evans v. State
| Decision Date | 12 August 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. A03A1462.,A03A1462. |
| Parties | EVANS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James W. Smith, Athens, Earl D. Clark, Jr., for appellant.
Dennis C. Sanders, Dist. Atty., William P. Doupé, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee. ELDRIDGE, Judge.
Following a bench trial in the Superior Court of Wilkes County, Howard Evans was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and a seat belt violation. He appeals and challenges the denial of his motion to suppress as well as the sufficiency of the evidence against him. Because Evans' enumerated claims are without merit, we affirm.
1. On motion to suppress evidence, the trial judge sits as the trier of the facts and hears the evidence;
his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support [them].1
A reviewing court "must also construe the evidence most favorable to the upholding of the trial court's findings and judgment and must not disturb the findings of the trial judge unless no evidence exists to support them."2
With these principles in mind, we have reviewed the trial court's extensive findings of fact as set out in its order on Evans' motion to suppress. These factual findings are supported by both testimonial evidence from State Trooper B. Erickson, who was the only witness to testify, and a videotape made during the stop; thus, recitation here is authorized:
Georgia State Patrolman [B.] D. Erickson, was patrolling in Wilkes County, Georgia, near the end of his shift on May 1, 2001. He came upon the defendant operating a vehicle on Hospital Drive in the City of Washington, Wilkes County, Georgia. The trooper observed that the defendant was not wearing a seatbelt. The defendant was leaning over as if he were reaching for something, which later turned out to be fried chicken, and, obviously to the trooper, did not notice him. The trooper observed that when the defendant did notice him, he appeared startled and immediately made a left turn.
The trooper knew that the street onto which the defendant was turning came back onto the street he was on, so he went around the block to make a determination as to whether or not the defendant, after his turn, was going to resume traveling in the same direction from which he turned. If he did not, the trooper candidly testified that he did not intend to make the stop; however, if he did proceed in the same direction he was previously going, then he was going to assume that the defendant was making an intentional effort to evade him. If so, the trooper testified that he would suspect one of three things: that defendant was driving with a suspended license, was driving under the influence of some intoxicant, or had drugs in the vehicle. Upon relocating the defendant, the trooper learned that defendant was in fact traveling in the same direction he was previously traveling, and effectuated a traffic stop.
In addition, our review of the videotape pertinently reveals that Trooper Erickson was writing out the citation for the seat belt violation at the time he asked Evans for permission to search the car; that there was no delay between obtaining the radio information about the validity of Evans' license and the time in which the citation was filled out; that it was necessary for the trooper to obtain additional information from Evans since Evans did not have his driver's license with residential information; that the trooper retained possession of Evans' ticket only after permission to search was obtained; and that, after the cocaine was located pursuant to the consent search, Trooper Erickson confirmed to Evans he had believed him to be in possession of contraband based upon his evasive driving, his physical reactions to the trooper, and the suspected contraband material seen in plain view in Evans' vehicle.
Before this Court, Evans contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine found during a search of the vehicle he was driving. In so doing, Evans does not challenge the legality of the initial stop. Nor does he claim that his consent to search the vehicle was not knowing and voluntary. Evans' sole claim is that Trooper Erickson did not a have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing at the time he began questioning Evans about drugs in the vehicle, thereby "exceeding the scope" of a seat belt violation stop. We disagree.
The evil to be avoided occurs when an officer "continues to detain the subject after the conclusion of the traffic stop" without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.4 This unsupported "additional detention," not police questioning, constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation, because, of course, "mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure."5 6
As stated by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Purcell, [supra at 1280,] 7
In this case, the drug questions asked by Trooper Erickson did not prolong the traffic detention. The videotape reveals no undue delay between obtaining Evans' identification, a radio call for license verification since Evans did not have one on his person, and the writing out of the ticket. The request to search was made while the officer was writing the ticket. Accordingly, there was, no Fourth Amendment violation. In each case upon which Evans relies for a contrary result, the questioning occurred either after the traffic stop was already completed thereby prolonging the detention,8 or the officer—without an apparent valid purpose since no investigation was being conducted into the traffic violation authorizing the stop—retained the detainee's identification materials thereby prolonging the detention for questioning.9
As the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the officer's questioning was not the product of an illegal detention, we find no basis for reversal in the content of the questions, themselves.
(b) To determine whether a reasonable articulable suspicion exists, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances.
The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person. The second element is the concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being [detained] is engaged in wrongdoing.10
In this case, the trial court...
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