Matthews v. State

• Decision Date: 25 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. A08A1020.,A08A1020.
• Parties: MATTHEWS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

670 S.E.2d 520

294 Ga. App. 836

MATTHEWS v. The STATE.

No. A08A1020.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

November 25, 2008.

Thomas J. Bowers III, for appellant.

Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, James L. Cannella, Jr., Sara A. Thompson, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

SMITH, Presiding Judge.

Larry Matthews appeals from his conviction for speeding and possession of methamphetamine in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30. Matthews contends that the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress; (2) denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) limiting its in camera review of juvenile records to prior adjudications of delinquency. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Matthews asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because a police officer "illegally expanded the scope of the initially valid traffic stop." In reviewing a trial court's order on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the court's findings and judgment. State v. Brown, 278 Ga.App. 457, 460, 629 S.E.2d 123 (2006). The trial court sits as the trier of fact; its findings are akin to a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless no evidence exists to support them. Id. at 459-460, 629 S.E.2d 123; see also Evans v. State, 262 Ga.App. 712(1), 586 S.E.2d 400 (2003). We "cannot, and will not, usurp the authority of the trial judge to consider such factors as demeanor and other credibility-related evidence in reaching its decision." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Lanes, 287 Ga.App. 311, 312, 651 S.E.2d 456 (2007).

So viewed, the record shows that a patrol officer stopped Matthews for driving 48 miles per hour on a street with a posted speed limit of 25 miles per hour at 3:32 in the morning. The officer approached Matthews's car and obtained his driver's license and insurance card. While doing so, he noticed a young female in the front passenger seat "bouncing . . . uncontrollably" with bloodshot eyes, "a very sunk-in face," and "very rough skin." Based on her appearance and behavior, the officer asked her for identification. She replied that she did not have any, but provided the officer with a name and date of birth that would have made her 19 years old.

The officer returned to his patrol car to conduct a standard check for outstanding warrants on both Matthews and his passenger. While he was waiting for the information to return, the officer wrote a speeding ticket for Matthews.

When the passenger's information "did not return," the officer became concerned. In his experience, "nine times out of ten" the information does not return "because they have a warrant or they're suspended or they're on probation or parole. Something's going on." His concern was amplified by her strange behavior and appearance, the fact that "[s]he looked younger than the age she gave me," and the "curfew in Georgia."

The officer returned to Matthews at the driver's window to "to make sure [he] didn't make a mistake with her name and her date of birth" and to give Matthews a ticket. The passenger told him that she possessed a driver's license and identification card and gave the officer a different name with the same date of birth. The officer returned to his patrol car again to confirm the new information, which also did not return on file. Convinced that the passenger was lying to him, the officer approached the passenger side of Matthews's car to talk with her. She appeared "highly intoxicated" to the officer, and he smelled alcohol on her breath. He administered an alco-sensor test of her breath, which was positive for alcohol. The officer concluded that it was unlawful for her to consume alcohol based upon the date of birth she had provided. When confronted by the officer, she admitted that she was highly intoxicated and claimed that Matthews was her uncle who was giving her a ride home. She also provided a different date of birth that made her 17 years old.

At this point, the officer was concerned about the teenager's underage drinking, as well as her safety, and tried to confirm whether Matthews was her uncle. He returned to Matthews's side of the car, and Matthews denied that he was her uncle. While talking with Matthews, the officer noticed a cigarette box in Matthews's crotch area that was also underneath his right leg. It looked odd to the officer because a plastic bag was sticking out of the corner. The officer asked Matthews what was inside the box and Matthews replied that he did not know because "the girl just gave it to him to hide." Matthews agreed to let the officer look inside the box, where the officer discovered crystal methamphetamine. When the officer searched Matthews's car after arresting him, he found a pipe with white residue in a "side cupholder pocket" of the center console.

The officer never gave the completed ticket to Matthews; the unissued ticket written by the officer was later "voided out" based upon Matthews's arrest for possession of methamphetamine. The speeding violation was instead pursued through a warrant.

2. Matthews asserts that the police officer illegally prolonged his detention because the officer should have issued him a ticket for speeding after completing his first check on Matthews and his teenage companion. Matthews argues, therefore, that the fruits of that search should have been suppressed because he gave consent to search during a prolonged detention. We disagree.

The issue of "the validity of a consent to search given during a traffic stop[ ] is a difficult area of the law and one which has caused much confusion in the real world." (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga.App. 724, 727(2), 665 S.E.2d 422 (2008). In Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645 (2006), the Georgia Supreme Court clarified this area of the law by ruling that "[t]he Fourth Amendment is not violated when, during the course of a valid traffic stop, an officer questions the driver or occupants of a vehicle and requests consent to conduct a search." Id. at 736(1), 632 S.E.2d 645. "If a driver is questioned and gives consent while he is being lawfully detained during a traffic stop, there is no Fourth Amendment violation." (Citation omitted.) Id. See also Blitch v. State, 281 Ga. 125, 636 S.E.2d 545 (2006).

The police may lawfully ask questions unrelated to the purpose of a valid traffic stop, so long as the questioning does not unreasonably prolong the detention. Salmeron, supra, 280 Ga. at 736-738(1), 632 S.E.2d 645; Hayes, supra, 292 Ga.App. at 728(2), 665 S.E.2d 422.

A reasonable time includes the time necessary to verify the driver's license, insurance, registration, and to complete any paperwork connected with the citation or written warning. A reasonable time also includes the time necessary to run a computer check to determine whether there are any outstanding arrest warrants for the driver or the passengers.

(Citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) Hayes, supra, 292 Ga.App. at 729(2)(b), 665 S.E.2d 422; see also Rosas v. State, 276 Ga.App. 513, 518(1)(c), 624 S.E.2d 142 (2005) (officer conducting routine traffic stop may check for outstanding warrants or criminal histories on the vehicle's occupants).

(a) In this case, the police officer asked for consent to search while still investigating the identity of a teenager in a car with a much older man at 3:30 a.m. The search was completed eighteen minutes after the police officer first stopped Matthews for speeding and less than nine minutes after the police officer completed writing the speeding ticket. Based upon the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the police officer's conduct unreasonably prolonged Matthews's detention and rendered his consent to search invalid. See Hayes, supra, 292 Ga.App. at 731, 665 S.E.2d 422 (search initiated within ten minutes after officer completed writing warning ticket); State v. Williams, 264 Ga.App. 199, 204, 590 S.E.2d 151 (2003) (traffic stop not unreasonably prolonged even though consent to search obtained twenty-six minutes after stop began).

( b) We further find, in the alternative, that the information developed during the course of the valid traffic stop provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion to prolong Matthews's detention beyond the time reasonably required for completion of the traffic stop standing alone. The officer's inability to obtain a return when he normally did, the difference in age between Matthews and the teenager, the late hour, the teenager's inconsistent answers about her age and identity, her appearance and demeanor, her underage consumption of alcohol, and the conflicting information about Matthews's status as her uncle, all provided the officer with reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue his detention of Matthews. See Andrews v. State, 289 Ga.App. 679, 682-683, 658 S.E.2d 126 (2008) (conflicting stories during traffic stop provided reasonable suspicion to prolong traffic stop); Carnes v. State, 293 Ga.App. 549, 667 S.E.2d 620 (2008) (articulable suspicion developed during course of traffic stop to expand the scope of inquiry).

(c) Matthews asserts that our opinions in State v. Joyner, 270 Ga.App. 533, 607 S.E.2d 184 (2004)¹ and State v. Swords, 258 Ga.App. 895, 575 S.E.2d 751 (2002)² require a different result. Each of these cases, however, was impliedly overruled by the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion in Salmeron, supra. The rationale for each of these cases was that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when an officer questions a suspect about matters unrelated to the original reason for a traffic stop. Joyner, supra, 270 Ga.App. at 534-535, 607 S.E.2d 184; Swords, 258 Ga. App. at 896, 575 S.E.2d 751. This proposition is no longer valid in Georgia and should not be followed. See Salmeron, supra, 280 Ga. at 737-738, 632 S.E.2d 645 (overruling similar rationale in Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 841-842(1), 597...