Ex Parte Fairfield Nursing and Rehab. Ctr.
Decision Date | 27 March 2009 |
Docket Number | 1080158,1080160. |
Parties | Ex parte FAIRFIELD NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, L.L.C. (In re Leisa Roby, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Brenda Joyce Roby, deceased v. Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C., et al.) Ex parte Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C. (In re Myrtis Hill and Fred Hill v. Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C., et al.) |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Thomas M. Rockwell and Tom B. Walsh of Rockwell & Kaufman, L.L.C., Mobile, for petitioner.
Barry Walker of The Walker Law Firm, Birmingham, for respondents.
These two petitions for the writ of mandamus, which have been consolidated for purposes of issuing one opinion, involve separate actions against Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, L.L.C. ("Fairfield"), in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The trial court entered an order in both actions requiring Fairfield to produce certain documents that Fairfield asserts are privileged under § 22-21-8, Ala.Code 1975, and therefore not subject to discovery. We grant the petitions and issue the writs.
Fairfield is a long-term-care facility. In case no. 1080158, Leisa Roby, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Brenda Joyce Roby, deceased, alleged medical-malpractice claims against Fairfield relating to Brenda's death while she was a patient at Fairfield. In case no. 1080160, Myrtis Hill and Fred Hill sued Fairfield asserting medical-malpractice claims based on injuries Myrtis allegedly suffered as a result of Fairfield's actions. Leisa Roby and the Hills are hereinafter collectively referred to as "the plaintiffs" or "the respondents."
In the underlying cases, the plaintiffs filed requests for the production of documents. In the Roby action, Leisa requested "any and all incident reports and/or complaints involving Brenda Roby." The Hills filed a similar request in their action, seeking "incident reports regarding Myrtis Hill from June 1992 to Present." Fairfield filed an objection to both requests based on several grounds, including the contention that the requests sought information privileged under § 22-21-8, Ala.Code 1975.
The plaintiffs in each case moved the trial court to compel the production of the requested documents. The trial court granted the motions to compel. Fairfield filed a motion to "reconsider" in each case, citing § 22-21-8.1 Accompanying each motion were affidavits asserting that Fairfield does not keep in the ordinary course of business incident reports and witness statements concerning residents and that any such documents do not become part of a resident's medical chart. Additionally, the affidavits asserted that incident reports and witness statements are created for quality-assurance purposes.
Following oral arguments on Fairfield's motions to reconsider, the trial court, in each case, ordered Fairfield to produce the requested documents. Fairfield then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus in each case.
The issue presented by these petitions is whether Fairfield sufficiently demonstrated that it is entitled to the privilege in § 22-21-8, Ala.Code 1975, with respect to the requested documents. Section 22-21-8 provides:
In support of its assertion of the privilege in both of the underlying cases, Fairfield offered the affidavits of Donna Guthrie, the executive director of its facility, and Janie Dawson, the former director of nursing at the facility. Both Guthrie's and Dawson's affidavits identically stated as follows:
In Ex parte Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 789 So.2d 208 (Ala.2000), this Court reaffirmed the principle that the party asserting the privilege under § 22-21-8 has the burden of proving the existence of the privilege and the prejudicial effect of disclosing the information. 789 So.2d at 219-20 (citing Ex parte St. Vincent's Hosp., 652 So.2d 225, 230 (Ala. 1994)). Fairfield contends that the affidavits it submitted with its motions to reconsider sufficiently demonstrated that the requested documents were privileged "quality assurance" materials under § 22-21-8 and that disclosing the information would be prejudicial to Fairfield. Fairfield primarily relies on two cases in support of its position: Ex parte Qureshi, 768 So.2d 374 (Ala.2000), and Kingsley v. Sachitano, 783 So.2d 824 (Ala.2000).
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