Ex parte Hallmark
| Decision Date | 15 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 71865,71865 |
| Citation | 883 S.W.2d 672 |
| Parties | Ex Parte John Alex HALLMARK, Appellant. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
This is a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.07, § 2, V.A.C.C.P. In 1983 Applicant pled guilty and was convicted of murder and attempted capital murder. He was sentenced to confinement for forty years and twenty years, respectively. Both offenses were committed in October, 1982. Applicant contends he is being denied restoration of good conduct time that he forfeited while incarcerated because of retroactive application of V.T.C.A. Government Code, § 498.005. Applicant alleges this violates the ex post facto provisions of the United States Constitution, Article 1, § 9, and the Texas Constitution, Article 1, § 16.
Section 498.005 states:
At least annually, the board shall review the institutional division's rules relating to restoration of good conduct time that has been forfeited, the manner in which inmates are reclassified, and the manner in which additional good conduct time is awarded retroactively to inmates who have been reclassified. The board shall consider in its review whether the inmate overcrowding in the institutional division has decreased and whether it is necessary for purposes of decreasing overcrowding to classify inmates according to Section 498.002 to restore good conduct time under Section 498.004, or to award additional good conduct time retroactively to inmates who have been reclassified. If the board determines that overcrowding has decreased and it is not necessary to restore good conduct time or award additional good conduct time, it shall direct the institutional division to discontinue those practices.
Applicant states that the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice issued an order pursuant to § 498.005, effective November 20, 1993, directing that forfeited good conduct time will no longer be restored. He contends that application of this policy to his case constitutes an ex post facto violation because his offense occurred prior to the effective date of this policy and § 498.005.
In Ex Parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), this Court addressed an ex post facto claim in the context of good time credit. We held ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions were violated by retroactive application of an amendment to the Prison Management Act, Article 6184o, V.A.C.S. Such application prevented a defendant from receiving good time credit for which he would have otherwise been eligible based upon law in effect on the date of the commission of his offense. We analyzed the issue under then-applicable interpretation of ex post facto law to find that retroactive application of the amendment acted "to the substantial disadvantage of the applicant (whether or not it is technically considered an increase in the punishment)." Id. at 462.
Since our decision in Ex Parte Rutledge we have followed the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court and returned to an earlier interpretation of ex post facto law. In Grimes v. State, 807 S.W.2d 582 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we disavowed the "substantial protections" concept used in Ex Parte Rutledge, and adopted the analysis in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). Therefore, for purposes of an analysis under the state or federal constitution of a claimed ex post facto violation we determine (1) whether the statute punishes as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done; (2) whether the statute changes the punishment and inflicts greater punishment than the law attached to a criminal...
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