Ex Parte Mcdaniel
| Decision Date | 11 July 1923 |
| Parties | Ex parte McDANIEL. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Habeas corpus by E. B. McDaniel to be admitted to bail pending disposition of his motion for new trial after conviction of assault with attempt to commit murder. Bail allowed.
Syllabus by the Court
No court or judge can properly deny bail before conviction except in capital cases. In all except capital cases, where the proof is evident or the presumption great, the admission to bail is a right which the accused can claim before conviction, and which no court or judge can properly deny.
Denial of bail, where accused not charged with capital offense, or where so charged proof not evident or presumption great, held violation of constitutional rights. If one who is duly charged with a crime is denied the right to bail when the offense charged is not a capital offense, or when the charge is of a capital offense and the proof is not evident or the presumption is not great of the guilt of the accused of the capital offense charged, such denial of the right to bail is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution, as well as a denial of the organic right to bail in all cases, except for capital offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great.
Use and purpose stated. The use of the writ of habeas corpus to speedily determine whether a person charged with an offense is entitled to bail before trial and conviction is authorized by law, so as to render effective the rights to bail and to liberty as provided by the Constitution.
Application for bail pending motion after conviction for new trial held not within circumstances where otherwise bailable cases may be forfeited. Even if there are circumstances under which the right to bail in otherwise bailable cases may be forfeited this is not a case in which the facts warrant resort to that principle.
H. H. Wells, of Chipley, and John M. Calhoun, of Marianna, for petitioner.
Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., and Paul Carter, of Marianna, for respondent.
Upon application of petitioner a writ of habeas corpus, addressed to the sheriff of Jackson county, Fla directing him to produce the body of petitioner before this court, was issued by Division B of the court. For return the sheriff certified that he held the petitioner in his custody in the county jail of Jackson county under a capias, copy of which is attached to and made a part of the return. From this copy it appears that the petitioner is held to answer an indictment found by a grand jury of Jackson county, charging him with an assault with intent to commit murder.
The petition alleges that petitioner upon trial was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder in the second degree; that he thereupon filed a motion for new trial, but that the hearing of this motion has been continued, and had not, at the time of the application for the writ, been passed upon, but was then still pending and undisposed of; that, because of a misunderstanding of petitioner as to whether this case would be considered at the first day of the term to which it was continued, he was not present when his name was called and his bond was estreated, but that he did appear during the term and the order of estreature was thereupon vacated, but that he nevertheless was committed to jail and was not allowed to give bond for his appearance; that the judge of the court, because of ill health, has gone away to a health resort for treatment for an indefinite stay.
The motion is for bail pending disposition of the case by the circuit court.
By certified copy of minutes of proceedings in the trial court it is shown that previous to the trial petitioner had twice defaulted and failed to appear on the day the case was set for trial upon the charge resting against him, in accordance with the conditions of appearance bonds made and filed in the case by him, and such bonds had, because of such failures to appear, been estreated by the court.
Conceding the offense to be bailable under ordinary circumstances, bail is resisted by the state on the ground that, because of his previous failures to appear, as required by bonds entered into by him, petitioner has, so it is contended, forfeited his right to be released under bond pending further consideration in his case. This is the only question in the case.
By the Constitution of the state it is ordained that 'all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences, where the proof is evident or the presumption great.' Section 9, Declaration of Rights. The Constitution also provides that the courts of the state shall be open, so that a remedy may be afforded by due process of law to every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay (section 4, Declaration of Rights), and that no person shall be deprived of...
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State v. Patel
...(Fadeley, J., concurring). Although we are aware of two jurisdictions that had reached a contrary conclusion; see Ex parte McDaniel, 86 Fla. 145, 149, 150, 97 So. 317 (1923) (right to bail continues until conviction, which means adjudication of guilt and not simply verdict by jury); New Orl......
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Anderson v. Chapman
...... State, 97 Fla. 23, 119 So. 393; Tootle v. State, 98 Fla. 469, 123 So. 922; Maniscalco v. State, 98 Fla. 468, 123 So. 922; Ex parte McDaniel, 86. Fla. 145, 97 So. 317; Mathis v. State, 67 Fla. 277,. 64 So. 944; Burns v. State, 97 Fla. 232, 120 So. 360; Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. ......
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Bozovichar v. State
...of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution, which would call for prompt corrective action. Ex parte McDaniel, 1923, 86 Fla. 145, 97 So. 317. The State takes the position that 'since this is obviously not a final judgment, from its nature, it must be construed as......
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Satterfield v. State
...due process of law, in violation of the Constitution, which would—rightly—call for prompt corrective action. See Ex Parte McDaniel, 86 Fla. 145, 97 So. 317, 318 (1923). Ultimately, though, the criminal jurisprudence of Indiana and any corresponding discussion of bail is founded on a presump......