Satterfield v. State

• Decision Date: 12 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 49A02–1409–CR–659.,49A02–1409–CR–659.
• Citation: 30 N.E.3d 1271
• Parties: James SATTERFIELD, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

30 N.E.3d 1271

James SATTERFIELD, Appellant–Defendant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 49A02–1409–CR–659.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 12, 2015.

James H. Voyles, Jr., Jennifer M. Lukemeyer, Voyles Zahn & Paul, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant–Defendant, James Satterfield (Satterfield), appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to let bail following his arrest and charge for murder.

[2] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

ISSUES

[3] Satterfield raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the State established that the proof of Satterfield's guilt for murder is evident or the presumption of that guilt strong despite his claim of self-defense.

[4] The State raises one issue on cross-appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether Satterfield filed a timely notice of appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[5] On the morning of April 2, 2014, Satterfield met Maegan Biddle (Biddle) at the Bankers Lane Apartments located on the near east side of Indianapolis, Indiana. Biddle was a prostitute in the area and she and Satterfield had engaged in illicit sex for money a couple of times previously. Biddle and her friend, Andre Brown (Brown), had just returned from visiting Biddle's mother in Ohio, and she decided to prostitute herself that morning to raise money to buy crack cocaine.

[6] Satterfield picked up Biddle along Washington Street and proceeded to the apartments where he parked under a carport. As usual, he locked the car's doors prior to parking. Biddle began performing fellatio on Satterfield for thirty-five dollars. Shortly thereafter, Satterfield noticed a man, later identified as Brown, walking through the parking lot and towards the rear of his car. Noticing Brown approach his vehicle, Satterfield became nervous and retrieved his gun¹ from behind the passenger side seat. Despite the locked doors, Brown opened the passenger's side door and leaned down, saying “hey” in a forceful voice and holding a shiny object. (Transcript p. 45). Satterfield fired a single shot. As Brown fell backward, Biddle recognized him as her friend. Satterfield drove away quickly. After driving around for a couple of minutes, Satterfield paid Biddle and she left the car.

[7] Around 9:30 a.m. that morning, a maintenance man from the apartment complex found Brown's body. Detective Marcus Kennedy (Detective Kennedy) of the Indianapolis Police Department was notified. By the time Detective Kennedy arrived on the scene, Brown's body had been removed but a claw hammer was located in close proximity to where Brown's body was discovered. In a subsequent forensic investigation, the hammer tested positive for Brown's DNA. Brown's car was also found behind the carport, and inside the officers found some of Biddle's possessions. Within twenty-four hours of learning that Brown was dead, Satterfield arranged, through counsel, to turn himself in and to provide a voluntary statement. Satterfield has no criminal history, has never before been arrested, and has been employed in lawn care irrigation since 1988.

[8] On April 7, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Satterfield with murder, a felony, Ind.Code § 35–42–1–1. On July 18, 2014, Satterfield filed a motion to let bail, which the trial court considered during a hearing on August 15, 2014. During the bail hearing, witnesses testified and exhibits were admitted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied Satterfield bail. On August 29, 2014, Satterfield filed a motion to reconsider, which was again denied by the trial court.

[9] Satterfield now appeals and the State cross-appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[10] Because the State presents us with a threshold procedural question, we will first address the merits of its cross-appeal.

CROSS–APPEAL

[11] In its cross-appeal, the State maintains that Satterfield forfeited his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his bail by failing to file a notice of appeal within the requisite thirty days of the trial court's order. Because the trial court's order constituted a final appealable judgment and the motion to reconsider did not toll the running of time, the State maintains that the notice of appeal was due eight days prior to Satterfield's filing of his notice of appeal.

[12] A trial court's denial of bail is deemed a final judgment and appealable as of right. Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied. In order to perfect an appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the final judgment being appealed. Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). A motion to reconsider does not “extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion, or proceedings[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 53.4(A). Accordingly, with the trial court's issuance of its order on August 15, 2014, Satterfield's notice of appeal was due on September 15, 2014, not on September 23, 2014.

[13] In an effort to avoid a forfeiture of his appeal, Satterfield contends that he labored under the mistaken impression that the trial court took the case under advisement at the conclusion of the bail hearing. “In this case, the trial court made an initial ruling but demonstrated some hesitancy in that it asked for guidance from other jurisdictions, which counsel then provided at a later date. The parties below were operating under the assumption that the initial order was not final until the trial court ha[d] a chance to consider the authority from other jurisdictions.” (Appellant's Reply Br. pp. 1–2). After reviewing the transcript of the bail hearing, we find Satterfield's argument is, at best, disingenuous.

[14] While we agree with Satterfield insofar as the transcript reflects his counsel's request to undertake more research with respect to the applicability of justifiable defenses in a bail hearing, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court nevertheless reiterated that its “ruling is going to stand.” (Tr. p. 76). Satterfield's counsel affirmed that she “understand[s] the ruling stands now.” (Tr. p. 76). Consequently, the trial court's denial of Satterfield's request for bail was a final, appealable order.

[15] However, In the Matter of the Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind.2014), our supreme court clarified that

[t]he untimely filing of a Notice of Appeal is not a jurisdictional defect depriving the appellate courts of the ability to entertain an appeal. Instead, the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional only in the sense that it is a Rule-required prerequisite to the initiation of an appeal in the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals. Timely filing relates neither to the merits of the controversy nor to the competence of the courts on appeal to resolve the controversy.... [T]he right to appeal having been forfeited, the question [then becomes] whether there are extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.

In this case, we answer the question in the affirmative.

[16] The right to bail is “a traditional and cherished right.” Bozovichar v. State, 230 Ind. 358, 103 N.E.2d 680, 681 (1952), abrogated on different grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind.2013). As such, “[t]he right to freedom by bail pending trial is an adjunct to that revered Anglo–Saxon aphorism which holds an accused to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85, 88 (1959). “Unless [that right] is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951). Despite the broad language, the right to bail, as enshrined in the Indiana Constitution, is not unqualified as “[o]ffenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.” Ind. Const. art. I, § 17. Because of these strictly defined qualifiers in the case of murder or treason, each request for bail in those instances must be reviewed upon its individual merits. Thus, the denial of the right to award bail where the proof of guilt is not evident or the presumption of guilt is not strong would be a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Constitution, which would—rightly—call for prompt corrective action. See Ex Parte McDaniel, 86 Fla. 145, 97 So. 317, 318 (1923). Ultimately, though, the criminal jurisprudence of Indiana and any corresponding discussion of bail is founded on a presumption of individual innocence. See Bozovichar, 103 N.E.2d at 681 ; see U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (“[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”). It is the unique confluence of this fundamental liberty interest along with one of the most valued rights in our culture—the right to bail—that we conclude that Satterfield's otherwise forfeited appeal deserves a determination on its merits.

APPEAL

I. The Fry Decision

[17] The Indiana Constitution specifically provides that “[o]ffenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.” Ind. Const. art. I, § 17. “This qualification was proper because murder is ‘the most serious charge that can be lodged by the [S]tate against an individual and carries with it the possibility of the imposition of a sentence of death, society's hashest penalty,’ and the purpose of bail would likely be disserved by an unqualified right in such a case.” Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Ind.2013) (quoting Phillips v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1290, 1294–95 (Ind.1990), abrogated ...