State v. D.D.M.
| Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 14-20-00426-CV |
| Parties | THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. D.D.M., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 209th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1663415
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.
MAJORITY OPINION
The State of Texas appeals an order expunging certain records relating to an alleged 2018 drug offense for which D.D.M. was arrested but acquitted. Generally, a person is entitled to have arrest records expunged if the person is acquitted of the offense for which the person was arrested. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 55.01(a)(1)(A). An exception exists if the offense for which the person was acquitted arose out of a criminal episode, and the person was convicted of or remains subject to prosecution for at least one other offense occurring during the criminal episode. Id. art 55.01(c). The State asserts that the exception applies here because the 2018 offense for which D.D.M. was acquitted is the same as, or similar to, two prior offenses of which D.D.M. was convicted, and the 2018 offense arose out of a criminal episode.
Because we agree that D.D.M. does not meet the statutory criteria entitling him to expunction of the 2018 arrest, we reverse the trial court's order and render judgment denying his petition for expunction.
In 2001, D.D.M. was arrested for the state jail felony offense of delivery of cocaine, less than one gram (the "2001 Arrest"). The date of the offense was March 22, 2001. In cause number 872413 in the 208th District Court of Harris County, D.D.M. pleaded guilty to this offense and was convicted. The court sentenced him to nine months in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division ("TDCJ-SJD").
In 2016, D.D.M. was arrested for the state jail felony offense of delivery of cocaine, less than one gram (the "2016 Arrest"). This offense occurred in October 2016. In cause number 1526049 in the 263rd District Court of Harris County, D.D.M. pleaded guilty to this offense and was convicted. The court sentenced him to 180 days in TDCJ-SJD.
In December 2018, D.D.M. was arrested and charged with the state jail felony offense at issue in the present matter, namely manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, penalty group 1, less than one gram (the "2018 Arrest").[1] The charge arising from the 2018 Arrest was docketed in cause number 1614822 in the 209th District Court of Harris County. The parties agree a jury acquitted D.D.M. He then filed a petition to expunge the records relating to the 2018 Arrest in the 209th District Court. The trial court granted the request based on the acquittal and signed an order expunging D.D.M.'s 2018 Arrest records.
The State filed a motion for new trial, arguing that D.D.M. is not entitled to expunction of the 2018 Arrest records because he had two previous convictions for the same offenses stemming from the 2001 Arrest and the 2016 Arrest. The State argued that the 2001 and 2016 convictions comprised a criminal episode and that the 2018 Arrest arose out of that criminal episode. The State attached to the motion for new trial certified copies of the judgments of conviction relating to the 2001 Arrest and the 2016 Arrest. The State requested the court to grant a new trial and to deny the petition for expunction. Without a hearing, the trial court denied the State's motion for new trial, stating that "there is no evidence that the defendant's prior case[s] were out of the same transaction nor of a common scheme or plan." The State timely noticed its appeal.
Although the expunction statute appears in Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 55, an expunction proceeding is a civil remedy. Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Tex. 2002); R.G. v. Harris Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office, 611 S.W.3d 69, 71 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet denied). "Because the remedy is a privilege defined by the Legislature, and not a constitutional or common-law right, the statutory requirements are mandatory and exclusive and cannot be equitably expanded by the courts." Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d 313, 316 (Tex. 2021); see also R.G., 611 S.W.3d at 71. The petitioner bears the burden of proving all statutory requirements. See State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018); R.G., 611 S.W.3d at 71; In re M.T.R., 606 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
In relevant part, the expunction statute provides:
A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest expunged if . . . the person is tried for the offense for which the person was arrested and is . . . acquitted by the trial court, except as provided by Subsection (c).
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 55.01(a)(1)(A). Subsection (c) provides:
A court may not order expunction of records and files relating to an arrest for an offense for which a person is subsequently acquitted, whether by the trial court, a court of appeals, or the court of criminal appeals, if the offense for which the person was acquitted arose out of a criminal episode, as defined by Section 3.01, Penal Code, and the person was convicted of or remains subject to prosecution for at least one other offense occurring during the criminal episode.
Id. art. 55.01(c). "Criminal Episode," as defined by Penal Code section 3.01, means:
Tex. Penal Code § 3.01.
We review a trial court's ruling on a petition for expunction for an abuse of discretion. R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 317; T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620; R.G., 611 S.W.3d at 72. A trial court has no discretion, however, in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts, and thus we review a trial court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620; R.G., 611 S.W.3d at 72. Likewise, construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. R.G., 611 S.W.3d at 72 (citing T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620); see also R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 317. We analyze statutes "as a cohesive, contextual whole" with the goal of effectuating the legislature's intent and employing the presumption that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result. R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d at 317; T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 620; R.G., 611 S.W.3d at 72.
In a single issue, the State contends that D.D.M. is not entitled to expunction of the 2018 Arrest records because the offense of which he was acquitted arose out of the same criminal episode as the earlier offenses of which he was convicted. The State argues that the offenses underlying D.D.M.'s 2001 Arrest, 2016 Arrest, and 2018 Arrest all constitute part of the same criminal episode under Penal Code subsection 3.01(2) because they "are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses." Thus, the State continues pursuant to article 55.01(c)'s exception, the trial court could not expunge D.D.M.'s records relating to the 2018 Arrest.[2] The order of expunction states that the expunction request is granted, but it does not reference article 55.01(c). In the order denying the State's motion for new trial, the trial court stated, "there is no evidence that the defendant's prior case[s] were out of the same transaction nor of a common scheme or plan." We interpret the court's statement as referring to Penal Code section 3.01(1). See Tex. Penal Code § 3.01(1). But section 3.01 additionally provides that a criminal episode means the commission of two or more offenses when "the offenses are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses." Id. § 3.01(2); accord Duncan v. State, No. 18-12-00328-CR, 2013 WL 5716179, at *2 (Tex. App.-El Paso Oct. 18, 2013, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("To be characterized as a single criminal episode, multiple offenses occurring on different dates, in different places, and against several complainants must either: (1) be the same or similar; (2) share a common scheme or plan; or (3) have been repeated in a similar fashion.").
According to our dissenting colleague, the judgments of conviction based on D.D.M.'s 2001 and 2016 Arrests were not before the trial court, and thus are not before this court, because they were merely attached to the State's motion for new trial and were neither offered nor admitted into evidence. We disagree. Generally speaking, in the civil context, a trial court has the discretion to consider evidence appended to a motion for new trial if the court affirmatively indicates in the record that it accepted or considered the evidence. See, e.g., Castro v. Walker County, No 07-20-00224-CV, 2020 WL 8916061, at *2 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Mar. 18, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); PNP Petroleum I, LP v. Taylor, 438 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2014, pet. denied); Circle X Land & Cattle Co. v. Mumford Indep. Sch. Dist., 325 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Auten v. DJ Clark, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Stephens v. Dolcefino, 126 S.W.3d 120, 133 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). Here, the trial court's order denying the motion for new trial clearly refers to the two judgments, which the State placed before the court with its motion for new...
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