Ex parte Youngblood
| Decision Date | 20 January 1995 |
| Citation | 656 So.2d 390 |
| Parties | Ex parte Jerry Allen YOUNGBLOOD. (Re Jerry Allen Youngblood v. State). 1930684. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Frank H. Hawthorne, Jr., Montgomery, and Bruce J. Downey III and William R. King of Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, P.A., Montgomery, for petitioner.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Jean Williams Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, for respondent.
We granted certiorari review in order to determine the following issues: (1) whether Jerry Allen Youngblood voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and (2) whether the trial court can order the court reporter to exercise the State's unused peremptory challenges.
The State's evidence tended to show that on April 8, 1992, Youngblood and his brother entered Dawson's Shirt Shop, located in Montgomery, Alabama. The two men had planned to rob the owner, Eula Mae Dawson, but brought no weapons with them. Mrs. Dawson drew a pistol on the two. While Mrs. Dawson and Youngblood struggled for the pistol, a single shot was fired; that shot struck Mrs. Dawson and she later died from her injuries.
A witness to the crime, Kathleen Rucker, testified that Youngblood and his brother had entered the shop earlier in the day to buy some bubble gum. Later, she said, the two brothers came back to the shop, ostensibly to have a pair of pants repaired. While Youngblood's brother talked with Mrs. Dawson about the pants, Youngblood walked over and demanded that she give him some money. Rucker stated that Youngblood threatened to kill her if she did not comply. Youngblood's brother forced Mrs. Rucker to the floor.
Mrs. Rucker testified that as Mrs. Dawson pulled her pistol out, Youngblood wrested it away from her, threatening her life; during the struggle, the shot was fired. Youngblood took Mrs. Dawson's purse, and the brother took Mrs. Rucker's wallet.
Youngblood was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Youngblood v. State, 656 So.2d 385 (Ala.Crim.App.1993).
Did the trial court err in denying Youngblood's motion to suppress his statements to the police?
Youngblood argues he has a low level of intelligence and a hearing impairment and that those conditions prevented him from making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.
The facts surrounding his statements are as follows: Youngblood was arrested approximately one hour after the crime was committed. Corporal G.P. Bellefleur read aloud to him the Miranda rights as they were stated on the back of a card, while looking down at the card and while sitting next to Youngblood in the police car. At police headquarters, Detective K.C. Baldwin read Youngblood his Miranda rights from a printed form. Baldwin then told Youngblood to read aloud the second paragraph of a prepared form, which states (C.R. 11.)
Detective Baldwin then asked Youngblood about the incident. Youngblood gave confusing answers to several questions. For example, when asked "Can you describe what she looks like?" Youngblood responded by giving directions to a house. (C.R. 21.) When asked "Is she kinda [sic] heavyset or small or what?" he said "Small hair, not long hair, small hair, black hair." (C.R. 21.) During the interview with Detective Baldwin, Youngblood stated that his brother shot the victim.
Detective Carmichael then entered the office to interrogate Youngblood. Carmichael read Youngblood his Miranda rights. Carmichael then said, (C.R. 27.) Carmichael then asked Youngblood to read a statement saying that he understood his rights and was waiving them. Youngblood read the statement out loud and told Detective Carmichael that he understood it.
Detective Carmichael then asked Youngblood about the incident. Youngblood told Carmichael that he, not his brother, shot the victim. Carmichael then read Youngblood his Miranda rights again. Subsequently, the police made a videotape of Youngblood, during which he repeated his statement for the police.
Dr. Karl Kirkland, a licensed psychologist, interviewed Youngblood for the purpose of assessing his competency to stand trial and his mental state at the time of the alleged crime. Dr. Kirkland testified that Youngblood had an IQ between 50 and 68. (R.T. 92.) He testified that Youngblood could read on a third- or fourth-grade level and that his IQ was borderline normal. Dr. Kirkland found, based on all the circumstances, that Youngblood had the mental capacity to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
The trial court's findings on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Ex parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52 (Ala.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2996, 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992). While a defendant's mental condition may be a significant factor in determining the "voluntariness" of a confession, this factor alone does not justify a conclusion that the mental condition, apart from its relation to any alleged coercion by police, should dispose of the voluntariness issue. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-66, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-21, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
After reviewing the record, we agree that the trial court did not err in finding that Youngblood voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda. The State presented expert testimony indicating that Youngblood was capable of waiving his rights. The State also presented testimony, from the police officers involved, that Youngblood seemed to understand his rights and that he subsequently waived them. Although Youngblood argues that his low mental capacity made him incapable of understanding his rights guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), this factor alone is insufficient to require such a finding.
Youngblood argues that his hearing impairment rendered his confession involuntary, because, he argues, that impairment caused him to be not adequately informed of his rights. Youngblood does have a hearing impairment; it requires him to read lips in order to communicate effectively. However, Youngblood was asked on two separate occasions to read a paragraph stating that he understood his rights, and he did so. The following exchange occurred immediately after Detective Carmichael read Youngblood his Miranda rights:
"Youngblood: No, sir."
(C.R. 26-27.)
Youngblood failed to present evidence that his hearing impairment or mental capacity prevented him from understanding the rights read to him. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Youngblood's motion to suppress the statements he made to the police.
Did the trial court err in ordering the court reporter to exercise three peremptory challenges on behalf of the State?
During the selection of the jury, the trial court informed counsel for the parties that each side had 16 strikes. After exercising 13 strikes, the State tendered its two remaining strikes and its one alternate strike to the trial court. Youngblood objected. The trial court then ordered the court reporter to strike the jurors on behalf of the State. Youngblood did not at that time object on the basis that that procedure violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The jury was sworn in and was seated.
The court then heard arguments on several motions, including Youngblood's motion to suppress his statements to the police, which was overruled. Youngblood then made a Batson motion. The State objected, arguing that the motion was not timely. The court noted that the motion was not timely and said that even if it had been, Youngblood had made no prima facie showing of racial discrimination, because there were five African-Americans on the jury.
Youngblood argues that the State's tender of its remaining peremptory challenges to the trial court and the trial court's subsequent order directing the court reporter to exercise the State's peremptory challenges was reversible error. Youngblood argues that...
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