Baird v. State

• Decision Date: 28 June 2002
• Citation: 849 So.2d 223
• Parties: Michael Ray BAIRD v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

849 So.2d 223

Michael Ray BAIRD v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-00-2047.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 28, 2002.

Rehearing Denied August 16, 2002.

Mariellen Morrison, Birmingham, for appellant.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Jean A. Therkelsen, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

COBB, Judge.

On April 6, 2001, Michael Ray Baird was convicted of intentional murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975, and felony-murder, a violation of § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975.¹ The trial court sentenced him, as an habitual offender, to two terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole; the sentences were to run consecutively. See § 13A-5-9(c)(4), Ala.Code 1975. Baird filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied following a hearing. This appeal followed.

The evidence at trial revealed the following. Baird is married to Ricky Lamastus's sister, Linda. The bodies of Ricky and Joyce Lamastus were discovered in their residence on Sunday, October 4, 1998, by a friend of Joyce Lamastus.² Ricky Lamastus had been shot twice, once in the head and once in the neck. Joyce Lamastus was shot four times, once in the chest that penetrated the heart and left lung and three times in the back of the neck around the base of the skull. All of the gunshots were from close range.

Mitch Rector, a forensic scientist with the Department of Forensic Sciences, testified that the six spent shell casings recovered from the gun in Baird's vehicle had been fired from the pistol that had been recovered from Baird's car. Rector testified that the bullets recovered from the crime scene or from the victims' bodies contained similarities to bullets that were test-fired from the gun recovered from Baird's vehicle. Rector testified that the gun could not be excluded from consideration as the gun that fired the bullets recovered from the Lamastuses' residence or from the bodies, but that the bullets were too badly damaged to state with absolute certainty that they had, in fact, been fired from that gun.

Ricky and Joyce Lamastus had filed charges against Baird stemming from a prior incident. One witness testified that Joyce Lamastus stated to her during a telephone conversation on October 1, 1998, that Baird had come to their house and waved a gun around.³ Then, on October 2, 1998, the Lamastuses filed a complaint against Baird, alleging that he had threatened in a telephone conversation to kill them. Another witness testified that on October 2, 1998, Baird had stated to her that he was going to kill Ricky and Joyce Lamastus if they did not leave him and his wife alone.

Baird was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol on Friday, October 2, 1998, at approximately 6:50 p.m. The arresting officer found a .38 caliber handgun in Baird's car. The deputy discovered that the pistol had six empty cartridges in the cylinder, which the deputy emptied from the gun. The deputy also noticed prescription bottles with Joyce Lamastus's name on them in the car. Shannon Kiley, Baird's stepdaughter, took Baird's car home. She discovered Joyce Lamastus's purse, prescription bottles, an ATM card, a debit card, Blockbuster video rental card, and other personal items belonging to Joyce Lamastus. Baird's wife subsequently turned the items over to the police.

Two witnesses testified as to their observations of Baird while he was in jail after he was arrested for driving under the influence. One witness testified that he saw Baird take a shower with his clothes on and saw him flush his socks down the toilet. This witness testified that Baird told him that he had killed somebody and that he had to get rid of the evidence. Another witness testified that he saw Baird cut his shoes into pieces and discard them in a trash can. Ricky and Joyce Lamastus's bodies were found in their residence at approximately 10:30 on the morning of Sunday, October 4, 1998.⁴ Baird, in a statement recorded by audio-and video-recording devices, confessed to committing the murders.⁵

Baird asserts 11 issues on appeal, and we address each in turn.

I.

First, Baird argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. Specifically, Baird argues that the trial court should have held that the gun and the prescription bottles were inadmissible because, according to Baird, they were seized during an unconstitutional warrantless search of his car. At trial, Baird argued that the State had not shown "a prerequisite" for the search. (R. 258.) The trial court conducted a hearing on Baird's motion to suppress. At the hearing, Baird argued that the items should have been suppressed because the police did not obtain a warrant and the search was not an inventory search. We disagree.

"In reviewing a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress where the evidence is not in dispute, we apply a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201 (Ala.1996)

; Barnes v. State, 704 So.2d 487 (Ala.Cr.App.1997)." Tuohy v. State, 776 So.2d 896, 898 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999); State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d 950, 952 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).

In State v. Otwell, supra,

this Court stated:

"`"This court has long held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, unless they fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Chevere v. State, 607 So.2d 361, 368 (Ala. Cr.App.1992). These exceptions are: (1) plain view; (2) consent; (3) incident to a lawful arrest; (4) hot pursuit or emergency; (5) probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances; (6) stop and frisk situations; and (7) inventory searches. Ex parte Hilley, 484 So.2d 485, 488 (Ala.1985); Chevere, supra, 607 So.2d at 368."' "State v. Mitchell, 722 So.2d 814

[, 820] (Ala.Cr.App.1998), quoting Rokitski v. State, 715 So.2d 859[, 861] (Ala.Cr.App. 1997)."

733 So.2d at 952.

"`When officers lawfully arrest an automobile occupant, they may search the passenger compartment of the automobile as a contemporaneous incident of the arrest, and they also may examine the contents of containers found in the automobile.' " State v. Otwell, 733 So.2d at 954, quoting United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir.1993). "This is so even though the appellant was already handcuffed and placed in the police officer's car when the appellant's car was searched." Mason v. State, 768 So.2d 981, 999 (Ala.Crim.App.1998), aff'd, 768 So.2d 1008 (Ala.2000), citing Gundrum v. State, 563 So.2d 27 (Ala.Crim.App.1990).

Because the deputy discovered the gun and prescription bottles during a search that was incident to a lawful arrest, there was no need for a warrant. The search was valid as an exception to the search warrant requirement, and the ruling of the trial judge on Baird's motion to suppress was correct. Because his claim is without merit, Baird is not entitled to any relief.

II.

Second, Baird argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the audiotaped and videotaped confession he gave police. Specifically, he contends that the confession was not voluntarily given because, he says, he was under the influence of Xanax and because, he says, Deputy James Edwards used prayer and religious counseling to coerce him to confess. We disagree.

Baird filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statement, and the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. After hearing evidence from Baird and the prosecution and viewing the videotaped statement and listening to the audiotaped version, the trial judge denied Baird's motion to suppress the statement. At trial, Baird preserved this claim for appeal with a timely objection when the prosecution offered and introduced the videotape into evidence.

In Flynn v. State, 745 So.2d 295 (Ala. Crim.App.1999), this Court stated:

"`The standard of review when there is conflicting evidence at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence of a confession is whether the trial court's decision was "manifestly contrary to the great weight of the evidence." Ex parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52, 54-55 (Ala.), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2996, 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992). We will not disturb the trial court's decision on the voluntariness of a confession unless it is clearly erroneous. Ex parte Youngblood, 656 So.2d 390, 392 (Ala.1995).'"

745 So.2d at 305-06, quoting Barnes v. State, 704 So.2d 487, 492 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997).

In Richardson v. State, 819 So.2d 91 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), this Court stated:

"`The fundamental requirements for voluntariness of confessions are that the court must conclude, in order to find a defendant's confession voluntary, that he made an independent and informed choice of his own free will, that he possessed the capacity to do so, and that his will was not overborne by pressures and circumstances swirling around him. Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc),cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981); Lewis v. State[,535 So.2d 228 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988)]. The test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement officials have overborne the will of the accused. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). The factual inquiry centers on the conduct of the law enforcement officials in creating pressure and the suspect's capacity to resist that pressure. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.1985); Jurek v. Estelle. The defendant's personal characteristics as well as his prior experience with the criminal justice system are factors to be considered in determining his susceptibility to police pressures. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953); Haley v. Ohio...