Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: CLARK; TOBRINER; NEWMAN; BIRD; MANUEL
• Citation: 157 Cal.Rptr. 855,599 P.2d 46,25 Cal.3d 33
• Parties: , 599 P.2d 46 FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADVOCATES et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 30904.
• Decision Date: 23 August 1979

Page 855

157 Cal.Rptr. 855 25 Cal.3d 33, 599 P.2d 46 FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION, Petitioner,
v.
The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent;
INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAL ADVOCATES et al., Real Parties in Interest. L.A. 30904. Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Aug. 23, 1979.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 1979.

[599 P.2d 47]

Page 856

[25 Cal.3d 36] Daniel H. Lowenstein, Robert M. Stern, Michael J. Baker and Lee C. Rosenthal, Sacramento, for petitioner.

Kenneth J. Guido, Jr., Washington, D.C., Roger Jon Diamond, Hecht, Diamond & Greenfield, Pacific Palisades, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Iver E. Skjeie, Asst. Atty. Gen., Floyd D. Shimomura, Deputy Atty. Gen., Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, John R. McDonough, Laurence F. Jay, Beverly Hills, and Allan E. Tebbetts, Long Beach, for real parties in interest.

Ruth M. Simon, Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser and Amitai Schwartz, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of real parties in interest.

[25 Cal.3d 37] CLARK, Justice.

The Fair Political Practices Commission petitions for writ of mandate to compel respondent court to vacate a judgment enjoining enforcement of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov.Code, § 81000 et seq.), an initiative measure.

We have stayed enforcement of the judgment except for paragraph 5, "That intervenor Fair Political Practices Commission . . . (is) permanently enjoined from commencing proceedings as civil prosecutor against any lobbyist based on the single act of advising or making a recommendation to the employer of the lobbyist with regard to the making of a political contribution where the advice or recommendation results in a contribution from the employer." This provision made permanent a preliminary injunction issued in 1975 by Judge Hupp of the superior court, and affirmed in Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 878, 139 Cal.Rptr. 233.

Respondent court declared the entire initiative invalid, holding it violates the one subject rule applicable to initiatives (Cal.Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d), formerly art. IV, § 22); section 86202 of chapter 6 (prohibiting lobbyist contributions to political campaigns) violates First Amendment and equal protection guarantees; and, with minor exceptions, the remainder of chapter 6 violates equal protection guarantees. Sections of chapter 6 declared invalid include limitations on lobbyist gifts to certain public officials, and disclosure requirements for certain persons and organizations involved with lobbying.

THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE

The initiative concerns elections and different methods for preventing corruption and undue influence in political campaigns and governmental activities. Chapters 1 and 2 contain general provisions and definitions, including a severability provision.

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Chapter 3 establishes the commission. Chapter 4 establishes disclosure requirements for candidates' significant financial supporters. Chapter 5 places limitations on campaign spending. Chapter 6 regulates [599 P.2d 48] lobbyist activities. Chapter 7 establishes rules relating to conflict of interest. Chapter 8 establishes rules relating to voter pamphlet summaries of arguments on proposed ballot measures. Chapter 9 regulates ballot position of candidates. Chapter 10 establishes auditing procedures to aid enforcement of the law, and Chapter 11 imposes penalties for violations of the act.

[25 Cal.3d 38] Several sections of the initiative have been held invalid in prior decisions. Under the compulsion of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, we held sections 85300-85305 limiting expenditures on statewide ballot propositions violated the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 671, 129 Cal.Rptr. 106, 547 P.2d 1396.) In Hardie v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 134 Cal.Rptr. 201, 556 P.2d 301, we concluded Government Code sections 85200-85202 limiting the amount to be expended for circulation of initiative petitions was in conflict with First Amendment guarantees, again relying on Buckley. In Institute of Governmental Advocates v. Younger, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 878, 139 Cal.Rptr. 233, the Court of Appeal held that a commission ruling precluding lobbyists from advising their employers to make political contributions violated First Amendment guarantees.

The California Constitution, article II, section 8, subdivision (d), states: "An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."

The single subject requirement for initiative measures was adopted in 1948 as article IV, section 1c. The next year this court in Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 92-93, 207 P.2d 47, 49-50, construed the provision as follows: "The problem of whether more than one subject is embraced within one legislative act is not new in this state. Although section 1c has been newly added extending the requirement to initiative constitutional amendments, the Constitution for many years has required that 'Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be expressed in its title.' (Cal.Const., art. IV, § 24.) The proper scope and application of that provision as to singleness of subject was elucidated, as the latest word on the subject, by this court in Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62, 8 P.2d 467, 469, upholding the adoption of the Probate Code in a single enactment: '. . . we are of the view that the provision is not to receive a narrow or technical construction in all cases, but is to be construed liberally to uphold proper legislation, all parts of which are reasonably germane. (Heron v. Riley, 209 Cal. 507, 510, 289 P. 160.) The provision was not enacted to provide means for the overthrow of legitimate legislation. McClure v. Riley, 198 Cal. 23, 26, 243 P. 429. * * * (P) Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicated in the title, may be united in one act. Provisions governing projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be properly included within a single act. Barber v. Galloway, 195 Cal. 1, 3, 231 P. [25 Cal.3d 39] 34. The Legislature may insert in a single act all legislation germane to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the field of legislation suggested thereby. Treat v. Los Angeles Gas Corp., 82 Cal.App. 610, 256 P. 447. Provisions which are logically germane to the title of the act, and are included within its scope, may be united. The general purpose of a statute being declared, the details provided for its accomplishment will be regarded as necessary incidents. Estate of Wellings, 192 Cal. 506, 519, 221 P. 628; Buelke v. Levenstadt, 190 Cal. 684, 687, 214 P. 42; and cases cited. The language of this court in Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 51, 90 P. 129, 121 Am.St.Rep. 90, 12 Ann.Cas. 829, is especially applicable to this case at this point. A provision which conduces to the act, or which is auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose, or has a necessary and natural connection with such purpose is germane within the rule. * * * Our conclusion,

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therefore, is that the newly enacted Probate Code does not embrace more than one subject. Its numerous provisions have one general object. The classification of these provisions, made by the Code Commission,[599 P.2d 49] and carried into the title of the act, is a "reasonably intelligent reference to the subject to which the legislation of the act is to be addressed", which is all that is requisite.' (See, also, cases collected in 23 Cal.Jur. 646-650; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 196-199.) When the scope and meaning of words or phrases in a statute have been repeatedly interpreted by the courts, there is some indication that the use of them in a subsequent statute in a similar setting carries with it a like construction. City of Long Beach v. Payne, 3 Cal.2d 184, 44 P.2d 305. There is nothing in the argument to the voters when section 1c of article IV was adopted contrary to such construction or the purposes underlying the 'one subject' limitation."

Relying upon Perry v. Jordan, this court applied the reasonably germane test and upheld the California Water Resources Development Bond Act in Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Marquardt (1963) 59 Cal.2d 159, 172-173, 28 Cal.Rptr. 724, 379 P.2d 28. The act provided for issuance of nearly $2 billion in bonds, the proceeds to be used for dams, levees, channel improvements, a water distribution system, drainage facilities, electrical energy generation and transmission systems, and local water development facilities.

Recently, we rejected a claim that the one subject requirement was violated by an initiative limiting real property tax rates, limiting real property assessments, restricting state taxes, and restricting local taxes. (Cal.Const., art. XIIIA; the Jarvis-Gann Initiative.) We held that all provisions were functionally related and reasonably germane to the [25 Cal.3d 40] subject of property tax relief. (Amador Valley Joint Union High Schl. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231, 149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281.) ¹

Real party in interest Institute of Governmental Advocates (Advocates) argues that a more restrictive test should be applied in determining compliance with the one subject requirement applicable to initiatives than to the same requirement applicable to legislation. Two reasons are offered for a more restrictive test: the lengthy ballot propositions, having numerous provisions, will mislead and confuse the voter, and danger exists that voters wanting one or more of the provisions offered might vote for the proposition even though they reject other provisions a danger of so-called "log rolling." (See Schmitz v. Younger (1978) 21 Cal.3d 90, 93, 97 et seq., 145...