Faircloth v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 03 July 2013
• Docket Number: 12cv1824
• Parties: ANDREA J. FAIRCLOTH, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

ANDREA J. FAIRCLOTH, Plaintiff,

v.CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

12cv1824

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Dated: July 3, 2013

ELECTRONICALLY FILED

Memorandum Opinion

I. INTRODUCTION

Andrea J. Faircloth ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 and 1381 - 1383f ("Act"). This matter comes before the Court upon motions for summary judgment. (Doc. Nos. 8 & 11). The record has been developed at the administrative level. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 8) will be DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 11) will be GRANTED.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI with the Social Security Administration on July 15 2011,¹ claiming an inability to work due to disability beginning September 21, 2010. (Transcript ("Tr.") at 201-12). Plaintiff was initially denied benefits on September 14, 2011. (Tr. 73-102). A hearing was scheduled for February 24, 2012. (Tr. 169-186). Plaintiff appeared to testify, and was represented by counsel. (Tr. 32-72). A vocational expert ("VE") also testified. (Id.). The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued his decision denying benefits to Plaintiff on April 3, 2012. (Tr. 14-31). Plaintiff filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, which request was denied on October 26, 2012, thereby making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-6).

Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this Court on December 14, 2012. (Doc. No. 1-3). Defendant filed her Answer on March 6, 2013. (Doc. No. 5). Motions for summary judgment followed. (Doc. Nos. 8 & 11).

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The ALJ made the following findings in denying Plaintiff's application for DIB and SSI:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2012. (Tr. 19);

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 21, 2010, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq. 416.971 et seq). (Id.);

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: breast cancer status post left breast mastectomy, cervical degenerative disc disease, major depressive disorder, panic disorder without agoraphobia, anxiety disorder, and alcohol abuse in early remission (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). (Id.);

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairment in 20 CFR 404,Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). (Tr. 20);

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, [] the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she has the need to avoid even moderate exposure to extreme heat and cold, wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation, is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, and is limited to occasional interaction with the public, requiring only simple work-related judgments. (Tr. 22);

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965). (Tr. 25);

7. The claimant was born on July 26, 1966 and was 44 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963). (Id.);

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). (Id.);

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). (Id.);

10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416,969 and 416.969(a)); (Id.); and

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from May 15, 2009, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)) (Tr. 26).

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court's review is plenary with respect to all questions of law. Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). With respect to factual issues, judicial review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is "supported by substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F. 3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). A United States District Court may not undertake a de novo review of the Commissioner's decision or re-weigh the evidence of record. Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F. 2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986). Congress has clearly expressed its intention that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner ofSocial Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). As long as the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be set aside even if this Court "would have decided the factual inquiry differently." Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F. 3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). "Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review." Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F. 3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).

In order to establish a disability under the Act, a claimant must demonstrate a "medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him [or her] from engaging in any 'substantial gainful activity' for a statutory twelve-month period." Newell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Stunkard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Serv., 841 F. 2d 57, 59 (3d Cir. 1988)); 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant is considered to be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity "only if his [or her] physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he [or she] is not only unable to do his [or her] previous work but cannot, considering his [or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To support his or her ultimate findings, an administrative law judge must do more than simply state factual conclusions. He or she must make specific findings of fact. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2011). The administrative law judge must consider allmedical evidence contained in the record and provide adequate explanations for disregarding or rejecting evidence. Jones, 364 F.3d at 504-05.

The Social Security Administration, acting pursuant to its legislatively delegated rule-making authority, has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation process for the purpose of determining whether a claimant is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act. The United States Supreme Court summarized this process as follows:

If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At the first step, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he is not working at a "substantial gainful activity."[20 C.F.R.] §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA will find nondisability unless the claimant shows that he has a "severe impairment," defined as "any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled; if so, the claimant qualifies. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be disabled. If the claimant survives the fourth stage, the fifth, and final, step requires the SSA to consider so-called "vocational factors" (the claimant's age, education, and past work experience), and to determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c), 416.920(f), 416.960(c).

Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 - 25 (2003) (footnotes omitted).

In an action in which review of an administrative determination is sought, the agency's decision cannot be affirmed on a ground other than that actually relied upon by the agency in making its decision. In Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Supreme Court explained:

When the case was first here, we emphasized a simple but fundamental rule of administrative law. That rule is to the effect that a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked bythe agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. To do so would propel the court into the

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