Fairlie v. Scott

• Decision Date: 09 October 1924
• Parties: FAIRLIE et al. v. SCOTT et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

102 So. 247

88 Fla. 229

FAIRLIE et al. v. SCOTT et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

October 9, 1924

Rehearing Denied Nov. 16, 1924.

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.

Ejectment by Joseph W. Scott, Jr., and others against Margaret C Fairlie and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

All points adjudiciated become law of case and are no longer open for consideration. All the points adjudicated by an appellate court upon a writ of error become the law of the case and are no longer open for consideration.

When statute of limitations may divest title of remainderman and vest title in adverse claimant, stated. Where there is clear proof of actual knowledge brought home to a reversioner or remainderman of adandonment by a life tenant, as such, of his estate in the property and the acquisition and assertion of a different title thereto while in the actual possession thereof, adverse and hostile to that of the reversioner or remainderman, the statute of limitations may operate to divest the title of the reversioner or remainderman and vest title in the property to such adverse claimant.

Reversioner or remainderman may be equitably estopped from recovery after death of life tenant, against adverse claimants. A reversioner or remainderman, or his heirs, may, by their conduct and laches, under particular circumstances which warrant it, be equitably estopped from recovery in ejectment after the death of the life tenant, from those in possession under a claim of title in fee adverse to the reversioner or remainderman.

Mere failure of remainderman to assert rights during life of life tenant not sufficient to establish estoppel remaindermen's heir held estopped to recover remainder as against adverse claimant. Under the law of this state and the circumstances of this case, the mere failure of the four living remaindermen, during the life of the life tenant, to have their asserted rights, as remaindermen, in the property duly established in equity, is not sufficient as an equitable estoppel. But as to the senior plaintiff, who is the father and heir of four of the remaindermen, the circumstances are different, and he should be estopped from recovering any portion of the property as against the defendants.

COUNSEL Alston Cockrell, Nathan Cockrell, and Knight & Adair, all of Jacksonville, for plaintiffs in error.

L. S. Gaulden and R. E. Stillman, both of Jacksonville, for defendants in error.

OPINION

WEST J.

This is the second appearance of this case in this court. On the former writ of error the judgment for defendants was reversed. Scott v. Fairlie, 81 Fla. 438, 446, 89 So. 128. The issues are stated, the proof recited, and controlling principles of law are announced in the opinions filed. The general rule is recognized that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a reversioner or remainderman until his right of possession accrues. But it has been stated that where there is clear proof of actual knowledge brought home to a reversioner or remainderman of abandonment by a life tenant, as such, of his estate in the property and the acquisition and assertion of a different title thereto by one in the actual possession thereof adverse and hostile to that of the reversioner or remainderman, the statute of limitations may operate to divest the title of the reversioner or remainderman and vest title in the property to such adverse claimant. See Anderson v. Northrop, 30 Fla. 612, 12 So. 318; 21 C.J. p. 974. It is the law of this case. Wilson v. Fridenberg, 21 Fla. 386; Hoodless v. Jernigan, 51 Fla. 211, 41 So. 194; Valdosta Merc. Co. v. White, 56 Fla. 704, 47 So. 961. In other jurisdictions it has been held that possession by a life tenant, or by those acquiring title and possession through him, may be construed to be adverse to the title of the reversioner or remainderman, and, when continued for the statutory period after knowledge is clearly brought home to him that the person in possession claims the entire title in his own right adverse and hostile to the title of the reversioner or remainderman or others claiming through him, may operate to vest the title in such adverse occupant. But this holding is largely, if not wholly, the result of express statutory enactments extending to parties interested in land, including a reversioner or remainderman, the right to bring actions to have their interest and rights determined and their title quieted. Ward v. Meredith, 186 Iowa, 1108, 173 N.W. 246; Nevelier v. Foster, 186 Iowa, 1307, 173 N.W. 879; Criswell v. Criswell, 101 Neb. 349, 163 N.W. 302; Van Matre v. Swank, 147 Wis. 93, 131 N.W. 982, 132 N.W. 904; Crawford v. Meis, 123 Iowa, 610, 99 N.W. 186, 66 L. R. A. 154, 101 Am. St. Rep. 337. It is said to be analogous in principle to the rule which obtains where one joint tenant is in adverse possession of land owned in common with other joint tenants, with this difference, that a higher degree of proof of actual knowledge of such hostile claim is required against a reversioner or remainderman than is required in a case of joint tenants. Bates v. Adams, 182 Ky. 100, 206 S.W. 165.

But a remainderman takes as purchaser, and his right to possession after the death of the life tenant cannot in general be defeated by the possession of third parties claiming adversely under a mortgage or conveyance in fee by the life tenant. If, however, in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing it, the remainderman may, during the life of the life tenant, maintain a suit in equity to remove, as a cloud on his title, a claim of adverse title under a mortgage or conveyance in fee from the life tenant, such remainderman or his heirs may, by their conduct and laches and under particular circumstances warranting it, be equitably estopped from recovering in ejectment after the death of the life tenant from those in possession under a claim of title in fee adverse to the remainderman. See Woodstock Iron Co. v. Fullenwider, 87 Ala. 584, 6 So. 197, 13 Am. St. Rep. 73; Huey v. Brock, 207 Ala. 175, 92 So. 904. The application by the courts of the doctrine of equitable estoppel depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Terrell v. Weymouth, 32 Fla. 255, 13 So. 429, 37 Am. St. Rep. 94.

That the defendants below or their ancestors had improved and occupied the premises since 1882 was known to the plaintiffs and that the defendants in possession claimed adversely to them was, by J. W. Scott, Jr., their father, made known to the remainderman in 1892 or 1893. The title in fee claimed by the defendants was of record, as also was the deed conveying a life estate to the mother with remainder to her children, plaintiffs here, from which latter deed the rights of all the parties are derived. See Price v. Stratton, 45 Fla. 535, 33 So. 644. This action was begun August 26, 1916, more than 7 years after the youngest remainderman became of age in February, 1909, and nearly 15 months after the death of the life tenant on June 5, 1915. If the remaindermen, prior to the death of the life tenant, had a right in...