Faunce v. Searles
| Decision Date | 03 July 1913 |
| Docket Number | 18,180 - (108) |
| Citation | 142 N.W. 816,122 Minn. 343 |
| Parties | CARROLL S. FAUNCE v. SCOTT SEARLES and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Jackson county against Scott Searles and Henry A. Rhodes to recover $10,000 for maliciously procuring the board of education of a certain school district to annul its contract with plaintiff. The case was tried before Quinn, J., who at the close of plaintiff's case denied defendants' motions to dismiss the action and at the close of the trial defendants' motions for a directed verdict in their favor. The jury returned a verdict for $5,750 in favor of plaintiff. Defendants' motions for judgment in their favor notwithstanding the verdict were denied and their motion for a new trial was granted, unless plaintiff consented to a reduction of the verdict to $2,500. Plaintiff consented. From the order denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting a new trial, unless plaintiff consented to a reduction of the verdict, defendants appealed. Affirmed.
Interference with contract relations a tort.
1. The malicious interference with the contract relations of others causing a breach of the contract by one of the parties, is a tort.
Verdict sustained by evidence.
2. The evidence is sufficient to justify the finding of the jury that the defendants maliciously procured the discharge of the plaintiff as superintendent of schools, while he and the school district were under a valid contract, and that they were joint tort-feasors.
Omission to charge.
3. The omission of the court to charge the jury upon the good faith of the defendants, and the effect which the fact that one was a member of the school board, and the other a patron of the schools, and both interested in their welfare, might have, is held not error, no request to charge having been made, and the attention of the court not having been called to the omission.
Language of court to counsel.
4. Certain language addressed by the court to one of counsel for the defendants held not to be such as to require a new trial upon the ground that it was prejudicial.
Reduction of verdict favorable to appellants.
5. The reduction of a verdict from $5,750 to $2,500, conditioned upon the granting of a new trial, is sustained on the appeal of the defendants upon the ground that, upon the facts of the case, the error of so great a reduction was in favor of the defendants.
Knox & Faber and Putnam & Carlson, for appellants.
Wilson Borst and J. A. Mansfield, for respondent.
This action was brought by the plaintiff against the defendants to recover damages for wrongfully and maliciously procuring a school district to break its contract with him. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $5,750. The defendants made an alternative motion for judgment or for a new trial. The court denied the motion for judgment, but granted the motion for a new trial, unless the plaintiff remitted all of the verdict in excess of $2,500. He remitted. The defendants appeal from the order made on the alternative motion.
1. The malicious interference with the contract relations of others resulting in a breach of the contract, constitutes a tort against the one injured. 1 Street, Found. Leg. Liab. 342-346; 2 Cooley, Torts, (3d ed.) 592-597; Joyce v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 100 Minn. 225, 110 N.W. 975, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 756; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 114 Iowa 358, 86 N.W. 377; Jones v. Stanly, 76 N.C. 355; Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125, 52 L.R.A. 115, 83 Am. St. 289; Martens v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N.W. 840; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166, 38 A. 96, 60 Am. St. 252; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475; Morehouse v. Terrill, 111 Ill.App. 460; Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 72 S.W. 580, 73 S.W. 800, 62 L.R.A. 962, 97 Am. St. 914; West Virginia v. Standard Oil, 50 W.Va. 611, 40 S.E. 591, 56 L.R.A. 804, 88 Am. St. 895; Heath v. American Book Co. 97 F. 533. If the two defendants, by concert of action, and with malice, procured the school board to break its contract with the plaintiff, they are liable as joint tort-feasors.
2. In February, 1911, the plaintiff was employed as superintendent of the schools of Lakefield, in Jackson county, for the school year of 1911-1912. On March 20, 1911, he entered into a written contract with the school district. In August, 1911, the school board disavowed the contract and employed another in plaintiff's stead. The defendant Searles was a member of the school board. The defendant Rhodes was a resident of the school district and a patron of the school.
Plaintiff claims that the defendants, working in concert, and actuated by malice, induced the school board to break his contract.
The evidence is of considerable length. We do not attempt to summarize it. It is sufficient to say that the jury could justifiably find from it that the defendants and others acted in concert, and were actuated by malice, and that the result of the joint effort was the breach of the plaintiff's contract by the school board.
The evidence was not such as to require a finding that the defendants were jointly engaged in the commission of a malicious tort. It supports it. A finding the other way would be sustained. The school was somewhat demoralized. There was some trouble between the plaintiff and the teachers. The local community was taking part in the trouble. The jury might have concluded, but did not, that the defendants were working in the interest of the schools and bore no malice.
3. The court did not instruct the jury relative to the good...
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