A. Federation of Teachers v. A. Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 November 1977
• Citation: 75 Cal.App.3d 332,142 Cal.Rptr. 111
• Parties: A.B.C. FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. A.B.C. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, etc., et al., Respondents and Appellants. Civ. 50574.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 111

142 Cal.Rptr. 111

75 Cal.App.3d 332

A.B.C. FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. A.B.C. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, etc., et al., Respondents and Appellants.

Civ. 50574.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 23, 1977.

John H. Larson, County Counsel, Donovan M. Main, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for appellants and respondents.

Levy, Koszdin, Goldschmid & Sroloff, and Henry R. Fenton, Los Angeles, for petitioners and respondents.

POTTER, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the A.B.C. Unified School District, the Governing Board of A.B.C. Unified School District, and Charles W. L. Hutchison, Superintendent of the A.B.C. Unified School District (hereinafter collectively referred to as District) from a judgment of the superior court granting a writ of mandate in favor of petitioners A.B.C. Federation of Teachers, American Federation of Teachers, Local # 2317, AFL-CIO; Patricia Alviso, Christine Colton, James England, Carol Large, Metha Morrison and Donald Teague (hereinafter collectively referred to as Teachers). The judgment ordered issuance of a writ of mandate commanding the District to pay each of the above six continuation high school teachers an additional sum of $515 plus 7 percent interest for the 1975-1976 school year and awarded costs and $1,500 in attorney's fees to petitioners pursuant to Government Code section 800.

The facts (as disclosed by the pleadings and the findings of the court) showed that the above Teachers were employed during the entire 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 school years as probationary or permanent certificated employees assigned to the El Dorado Continuation High School. Each of the teachers had the same assignment and duties during the 1975-1976 school year as he or she had during the previous school year 1974-1975. Before July 1, 1973, El Dorado Continuation High School teachers, including the petitioners, were required to perform "extra service" by making home calls to absentee students. This requirement was eliminated on or about July 1, 1973, and the extra monthly mileage allowance the teachers had been receiving for use of their cars in making such calls was discontinued.

For "several school years prior to the 1975-1976 school year, the salary schedule in effect in the . . . District . . . provided extra pay to those certificated employees employed within the El Dorado Continuation High School, in addition to the basic annual rate provided in the District's salary schedule. . . . " (Finding No. 10.) The District policy providing for this extra pay was Policy No. 4142. According to the District's Answer to Petition for Writ of Mandate, "(o)n or about December 3, 1973 the governing Board of the . . . District adopted Policy No. 4142 entitled 'Pay Schedule Extra Pay for Extra Service Assignments' which provided an annual rate of $515.00 for the El Dorado High School teachers to be added to their basic annual salary rate. The adoption of Policy No. 4142 . . . continued in effect existing policy and practice . . . ." In accordance with the District's policy provision, the Teachers received that increment of $515 during the 1974-1975 school year.

On March 18, 1975, the Teachers received letters from the District advising them of their election and employment as certificated employees for the 1975-1976 school year. The Teachers, as requested, notified the District of their acceptance of employment on or before May 9, 1975. The deadline for permanent teachers to notify their districts, according to state law, was July 1. (Ed.Code, § 13260.) ¹

On August 4, 1975, the Governing Board of the District amended Board Policy No. 4142 to delete the extra pay provided the continuation high school teachers. ² The Teachers filed a grievance in accordance with the District grievance procedure demanding payment of the $515 stipend. On December 8, 1975, the Teachers' counsel wrote a letter explaining their position. The Teachers claimed that the extra pay for extra services assignments policy, which was not revised until August 4, 1975, was binding upon the District and entitled the continuation high school teachers to the $515 additional stipend for 1975-1976 expressly provided for in that schedule. ³

On March 29, 1976, the Teachers received a letter from the District denying their grievance. On June 14, 1976, the Teachers filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court alleging that the District "arbitrarily and capriciously and in abuse of (its) discretion" refused to pay the Teachers the additional sum of $515 to which they became entitled on July 1, 1975, the beginning of the school year, pursuant to Board Policy No. 4142, as it then existed.

In its answer, the District claimed that mandamus was an inappropriate remedy; that the District's action was in effect a termination of an extra duty assignment, hence proper under Education Code section 13338; and was taken to avoid a violation of the uniformity requirements of Education Code section 13506. Both sides also filed declarations and points and authorities.

On August 10, 1976, the matter came to trial. The District's counsel submitted the case on the moving papers without personally appearing. Verified pleadings and declarations were received in evidence by stipulation. After the case was argued by the Teachers' counsel, Henry R. Fenton, he was sworn and testified with respect to the attorney's fees incurred by the Teachers, including the number of hours spent in preparation, the number of court appearances, the hourly fee scale, and the reasonable value of his services. The total exceeded $1,500.

After making findings of fact, the court concluded that the District had abused its discretion; that as of July 1, 1975, Board Policy No. 4142 became part of each teacher's employment contract for the 1975-1976 school year; that pursuant to those employment contracts, the Teachers became entitled to the $515 increment in compensation during the 1975-1976 school year, in addition to their regular salary; that the change in the Teachers' duties on or about July 1, 1973, did not justify the District's action and "does not constitute a defense." The court concluded that mandate was an appropriate remedy and granted the petition as prayed. It found the District's action to be arbitrary and capricious and awarded the Teachers attorney's fees of $1,500. This appeal followed.

Contentions

The District contends that (1) the $515 stipend was extra pay for extra service which could be terminated at any time; (2) mandamus was an inappropriate remedy; and (3) attorney's fees pursuant to Government Code section 800 should not have been granted. The Teachers respond that (1) they were entitled to the $515 stipend because the automatic renewal of their contracts included that compensation for the rendition of the same duties they had been performing; (2) mandamus was an appropriate remedy; and (3) the attorney's fees were properly granted. We have examined the record and conclude, for the reasons that follow, that the judgment should be affirmed.

The Teachers Were Entitled to the $515 Stipend

The District contends that the $515 stipend was not part of the Teachers' salaries but was extra pay for extra duty assignments which it could terminate at any time under the authority of Education Code section 13338. The Teachers respond, and we agree, that they were entitled to the extra pay as of July 1, 1975, as an integral part of their employment contracts, and the Board's action in deleting that pay on August 4, 1975, constituted improper reduction of their fixed compensation after the beginning of the school year.

As our Supreme Court recently noted in City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal.3d 898, 930, fn. 18, 120 Cal.Rptr. 707, 728, 534 P.2d 403, 424:

" . . . Past cases clearly indicate . . . that a school board may not lower salaries fixed by its salary schedule after the beginning of the school year. (See, e. g., Rible v. Hughes (1944) 24 Cal.2d 437, 444, 150 P.2d 455, 154 A.L.R. 137; Abraham v. Sims (1935) 2 Cal.2d 698, 711, 34 P.2d 790, 42 P.2d 1029; Aebli v. Board of Education (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 706, 748-751, 145 P.2d 601; cf. Ed.Code, § 13510.) This proposition follows from the fact that such salary schedules become an integral part of each teacher's employment contract. (See, e. g., Holbrook v. Board of Education (1951) 37 Cal.2d 316, 331-332, 231 P.2d 853; Rible v. Hughes, supra, 24 Cal.2d 437, 443, 150 P.2d 455."

1] This time limit within which school boards, by statutory authority, can fix the compensation to be paid to teachers ⁴ was expressed in Abraham v. Sims, 2 Cal.2d 698, 711, 42 P.2d 1029, 1034. Our Supreme Court said in this respect:

"The power of the trustees to raise or reduce the salaries of permanent teachers cannot be doubted, provided it is reasonably exercised and no attempt is made after the beginning of any particular school year to reduce the salaries for that year. . . . " (Emphasis added.)

In Rible v. Hughes, 24 Cal.2d 437, 150 P.2d 455, the court pointed out that although a school board "may exercise its discretion in adopting salary schedules fixing the compensation to be paid to permanent teachers . . . the schedule must be adopted prior to the beginning of the school year; . . . " (Id. at p. 444, 150 P.2d at p. 458.) Since the school year, as defined by statute, "begins on the first day of July and ends on the last day of June" (Ed.Code, § 5101), the compensation must be fixed by that date.

Such a limitation follows from the contractual and legal relationship of the individual teacher and the Board. As was stated in Fry v. Board of Education, 17 Cal.2d 753, 760, 112 P.2d 229, 234:

"While it is true that the relation between the Board and a teacher is that of employer and employee, and that this relationship is created by contract, the terms of that contract are to be found in the authority granted the...