Thorning v. Hollister School Dist.

Decision Date30 December 1992
Docket NumberNo. H009727,H009727
Citation11 Cal.App.4th 1598,15 Cal.Rptr.2d 91
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 79 Ed. Law Rep. 916 Zeph THORNING, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HOLLISTER SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.

Michael P. Masuda, Harray & Pierce, Monterey, Stephen W. Pearson, Noland, Hamerly, Etienne & Hoss, Salinas, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Nancy B. Bourne, Keith V. Breon, Breon, O'Donnell, Miller, Brown & Dannis, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

PREMO, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Zeph Thorning and Robbie Crump, retired board members of defendant Hollister School District (hereafter, District), sought a writ of mandate directing District to pay for post-retirement continuation of health benefits after District reversed an earlier authorization and suspended payment. The trial court sustained a demurrer to their second amended petition, and dismissed the action. Thorning and Crump appeal, contending that they had a vested right to the benefits, and that that right was secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. We agree and reverse.

FACTS

Appellants were first elected to the Hollister School District Board of Trustees in 1977, and won additional four-year terms in 1981 and 1985. Before the next election, consolidated in 1990, appellants decided to retire. Their successors were elected on November 6, 1990, to terms beginning that December.

The last regular meeting of the board during appellants' term was held on November 27, 1990. Crump was absent. The board with Thorning participating voted three to one to continue payment for health and welfare benefits for Thorning and Crump for the next ten years.

The new board held its first regular meeting on December 11, 1990. It reopened discussion of the continued benefits, and voted to suspend payment. Later, appellants submitted and District denied a claim for payment pursuant to Government Code section 905. 1

Appellants filed this action for a writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085) and for damages for violation of their civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983). The trial court sustained demurrers to the first amended complaint (with leave to amend) and to the second amended complaint (without leave to amend).

In ruling on the second demurrer, the trial court found that appellants "failed to state a cause of action sufficient for the issuance of a writ of mandate and have further failed to state a cause of action

based on a violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in that the retiree health benefits at issue in this action are not vested rights as a matter of the law...." The action was dismissed on March 4, 1992. This appeal ensued.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Appellants contend that the November 27 action of the board conferred upon them benefits which vested upon acquisition and which District could not unilaterally terminate. They further assert that since this right to continued health benefits is vested, it is constitutionally protected, and its deprivation under color of state law violates 42 United States Code section 1983.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The appellate court's "only task in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. Accordingly, we assume that the complaint's properly pleaded material allegations are true and give the complaint a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all its parts in their context. [Citations.]" (Garcia v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 728, 732, 268 Cal.Rptr. 779, 789 P.2d 960.)

The reviewing court may consider all documents which have been determined by the trial court as appropriate for judicial notice, including resolutions, reports and other official acts of a legislative body. (Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1024, 282 Cal.Rptr. 877.) Official minutes of meetings of a legislative body may be judicially noticed. (Social Services Union v. City and County of San Francisco (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1098, 285 Cal.Rptr. 905.)

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDATE

"Mandamus is issued 'to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins....' (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085.) Two requirements are essential: a clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the respondent, and a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to performance of that duty. [Citation.] Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the exercise of discretion by a government officer, but does not lie to control the exercise of discretion unless under the facts, discretion can be exercised in only one way. [Citations.]" (Pacific Bell v. California State & Consumer Services Agency (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 107, 118, 275 Cal.Rptr. 62.)

The act which appellants sought to compel District to perform was to approve payment of continued health benefits. If District had an official duty to pay the claim for continued benefits, the act authorizing payment is merely a ministerial act, and mandamus is an appropriate remedy. (A.B.C. Federation of Teachers v. A.B.C. Unified School Dist. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 332, 341-342, 142 Cal.Rptr. 111.)

The question whether District could discontinue the benefits is an issue of first impression. The only published authority is a 1984 opinion of the California Attorney General, which focusses on subdivision (b) of section 53201. 2 The opinion concludes: "A school district presently providing health and life insurance benefits to present and eligible former board members may not, in the absence of constitutional justification, discontinue such benefits (a) during the current terms of board members or (b) as to former board members who had already qualified for lifetime benefits, but may discontinue such benefits (c) upon the commencement of new terms of current board members or (d) as to future District began providing health and welfare benefits for its board members in 1978 pursuant to section 53201, subdivision (a), which then allowed legislative bodies of local agencies to provide such benefits for their officers, employees, and retired employees. In 1979, the Legislature added "and retired members of the legislative body" to the list of beneficiaries. (See Historical Note, 36A West's Ann.Gov.Code (1983 ed.) § 53201, p. 81.)

                new board members."  (67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 510 (1984).)   Although an official interpretation of statute by the Attorney General is not controlling, it is entitled to great respect.  (Sonoma County Bd. of Education v. Public Employment Relations Bd.  (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 689, 699, 163 Cal.Rptr. 464.)
                

Several amendments later, in 1985 subdivision (b) attained its present form: "The legislative body of a local agency may also provide for the continuation of any health and welfare benefits for the benefit of former elective members of the legislative body who (1) served in office after January 1, 1981, and whose total service at the time of termination is not less than 12 years, or (2) have completed one or more terms of office, but less than 12 years, and who agree to and do pay the full costs of the health and welfare benefits." 3 (See Stats.1985, ch. 141, § 1, p. 1011.)

District's policy on health benefits for retired board members was adopted on April 26, 1988. Policy No. 9250(a), "Bylaws of the Board," stated: "Any members retiring from the Board after at least one full term shall have the option to continue the health and welfare benefits program if coverage is in effect at time of retirement, except that Board members who have served less than twelve (12) years but at least one term shall pay the full cost of health and welfare benefits coverage."

In a revision adopted on July 17, 1990, the subsection covering retired board members became: "Any members retiring from the Board after at least one term may continue the health and welfare benefits program at their own expense if coverage is in effect at the time of retirement. [p] The Board may authorize payment of premiums for retired members who have served twelve (12) years or more." (Emphasis added.)

In their petition, appellants alleged a number of facts to establish that the right to the benefits had vested. Correctly, as we shall see, although inconsistently with their contention on appeal, they alleged that the action of the board on November 27 was "not the granting of the benefits" because the benefits had been "previously granted as official Board policy." That action was merely "a consent item authorizing payment for the benefits...." Appellants asserted that these benefits constituted both an inducement for their continued service on the board and deferred compensation. In addition, they alleged they relied on the promise both in continuing to serve and in deciding to retire from the board after serving for 12 years.

Respondent counters that appellants had no vested right to paid health benefits as a matter of law because public employees have a vested right to compensation only when it is offered as an inducement for continued public service. Respondent reasons that since the benefits were granted at the end of appellants' term of office, and were for services previously rendered, the benefits were not vested rights.

Terms and conditions relating to public employment are controlled by statute or ordinance rather than by ordinary contract standards. (Markman v. County of Los Angeles (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 132, 134-135, 110 Cal.Rptr. 610.) However, elements of compensation for an elected officer become contractually vested upon acceptance of employment. (Betts v. Board of Administration (1978) 21 Cal.3d 859, 863, 148 Cal.Rptr. 158, 582 P.2d 614.) "[S]alaries of elected state officers may not be reduced during their term of office." (Cal. Const., art. III, § 4.) School board While the policy authorizing the board to continue post-retirement health and welfare benefits for long-term board members was not in effect...

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