Ferguson v. Ferguson

Citation300 S.C. 1,386 S.E.2d 267
Decision Date20 September 1989
Docket NumberNo. 1397,1397
CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
PartiesMary Ann FERGUSON, Appellant-Respondent, v. Ira Herbert FERGUSON, Jr., Respondent-Appellant. . Heard

James E. Whittle, Jr., Aiken, for appellant-respondent.

Edgar S. Kneece, Irmo, for respondent-appellant.

CURETON, Judge:

In this domestic relations case, the wife appeals the equitable distribution and alimony awards. She also appeals the failure of the trial court to find the husband committed adultery and the failure to order him to pay her private investigator fees. The husband appeals the trial court's finding of fault on his part, the equitable distribution, and the alimony award. He also appeals the failure of the trial court to record the Rule 59(e) motion hearing and its failure to set forth salient facts to support the denial of his motion to modify the decree. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand in part.

This is a 33 year marriage. The wife was 56 years old at the time of the hearing and in good health. The husband was 58 and had undergone triple bypass surgery. The parties' four children are emancipated.

The parties began experiencing serious marital difficulties several years before the separation of the parties. There is some disagreement whether the parties agreed to separate and sell the marital home. The husband left the marital home in May 1987. After the husband left the wife hired a private investigator to determine if the husband was having an adulterous affair. The results of this investigation were inconclusive. The trial court concluded, however, the husband's conduct brought about the separation of the parties.

The husband began work at the DuPont Savannah River Plant three years prior to the marriage and worked there throughout the marriage. The wife worked outside the home at various jobs for approximately twenty years of the marriage. The husband's monetary contributions to the marriage were approximately four times more than the wife's. The husband's monthly gross income at the time of the hearing was $2,990.00 while the wife's was $1,075.00.

The marital estate consisted of the marital home which the parties agree has equity of $125,000.00. Additionally, the parties have substantial personal property consisting of furnishings, household equipment, a deferred income account, a savings account, and stocks. Both parties submitted lists valuing their home furnishings and other personal property. The parties agree the trial judge arrived at a value for the furnishings and other personal property by averaging the values placed on these items by the parties.

The husband has retirement benefits at DuPont which will enable him to receive monthly pension benefits ranging from $1,239.00 if he retires at age 58 to $1,524.00 if he waits until age 65 to retire. Additionally, the husband has two group life insurance policies through DuPont. It is not clear to us whether these policies have present cash values. The wife is the named beneficiary on both policies. The trial court did not include the present value of the retirement account or the cash value of the life insurance policies in the marital estate.

The trial court divided the marital estate equally by awarding specific items of personal property to each party and ordering a sale of the marital home. The wife was awarded $400.00 per month alimony, attorney fees, and costs. Both parties filed motions to amend the judgment on numerous grounds. The trial court essentially denied both motions but clarified its ruling in several regards. The court specifically corrected a mathematical error it had made in the personal property award by awarding the husband additional personal property valued at $3,000.00.

WIFE'S APPEAL

The wife first argues the court should have identified the husband's retirement pension as a marital asset. We agree. The husband's retirement benefits consist of a pension plan whereby he will be entitled to receive specified monthly payments depending on when he elects to retire. In prior decisions of this court, we have held that civil service and military retirement benefits were marital assets subject to equitable division. Noll v. Noll, 297 S.C. 190, 375 S.E.2d 338 (Ct.App.1988) (federal civil service); Martin v. Martin, 296 S.C. 436, 373 S.E.2d 706 (Ct.App.1988) (military retirement); Kneece v. Kneece, 296 S.C. 28, 370 S.E.2d 288 (Ct.App.1988) (federal civil service). Our analysis of the Equitable Distribution Act in those cases led us to conclude that because pensions are not excluded from the definition of marital property, they are marital property subject to division. We therefore hold the trial court erred in not including the husband's pension in the marital estate. This issue is remanded for redetermination.

The wife next argues the value of the husband's group life insurance policies should have been included in the marital estate. The trial court's order does not mention these policies. The wife offered no evidence of the present value of the policies. Additionally, it does not appear the wife raised this issue by proper exception or in her Rule 59(e) motion. According to the court's order, the wife raised only the issue of whether she should be continued as a beneficiary on one of the policies, not that the cash values should have been divided. We find no error.

The wife next argues the trial court should have required the husband to maintain her as beneficiary on the life insurance policies because special circumstances exist to require such a provision as an incident of support. The court held Hardin v. Hardin, 294 S.C. 402, 365 S.E.2d 34 (Ct.App.1987), controlled the issue. We agree. Hardin held that absent special circumstances or specific statutory authority the family court does not have the inherent power to require a supporting spouse to obtain or maintain a life insurance policy solely as an incident of periodic support. The wife has not convinced us that special circumstances exist to require the husband to maintain her as beneficiary on the policies.

The wife next complains about the valuation and the manner in which the court divided the personal property of the parties. As a matter of fact, both parties took exception to the court's valuation. Both parties assert that certain items of personal property were non-marital assets. Both parties also take exception to the averaging of the estimated values placed on the property by the parties without consideration of the individual values of the items. We recognize the parties were not as helpful to the court as they could have been in furnishing evidence of value. We sympathize with the family court judge as he grapples with the problem of valuing numerous items of personal property. Moreover, while it is appropriate for a family court...

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8 cases
  • Wooten v. Wooten
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 2, 2005
    ...reason requiring husband to secure child's future support and education expenses with life insurance); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 300 S.C. 1, 5, 386 S.E.2d 267, 269 (Ct.App.1989) (finding no special circumstances requiring husband to secure periodic alimony award with life insurance); Harlan v. ......
  • Thornton v. Thornton
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • October 23, 2019
    ...review, we find the value of $13,247.90 is appropriate and within the range of the evidence presented. See Ferguson v. Ferguson , 300 S.C. 1, 5, 386 S.E.2d 267, 269 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding it is inappropriate for the family court to average the property values testified to by the parties t......
  • Gilfillin v. Gilfillin
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • March 26, 2001
    ...family court orders attempting to secure periodic alimony payment beyond the life of the payor spouse. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ferguson, 300 S.C. 1, 386 S.E.2d 267 (Ct.App.1989); Hickman v. Hickman, 294 S.C. 486, 366 S.E.2d 21 In 1990, the Legislature amended S.C.Code Ann. § 20-3-130 (Supp.1......
  • Shorb v. Shorb
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • March 19, 2007
    ...by the [Code], retirement plans are therefore includable as marital property subject to division.'" (quoting Ferguson v. Ferguson, 300 S.C. 1, 386 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App.1989))); Hardwick v. Hardwick, 303 S.C. 256, 259-60, 399 S.E.2d 791, 793 (Ct. App.1990) (finding employer's contribution to ......
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