Fickett v. Durham
| Decision Date | 19 November 1875 |
| Parties | Henry E. Fickett v. Joseph J. Durham |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Suffolk.
Exceptions sustained.
D. C Linscott, for the defendant.
E Merwin, for the plaintiff.
The only question presented in this case is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a special judgment "to enable him to proceed against the sureties upon the bond given to dissolve the attachment," under the St. of 1875, c. 68.
There is no controversy as to the facts. The plaintiff's writ is dated October 1, 1872. An attachment of the defendant's property was made thereon, which was dissolved by a bond given on November 21, 1872. On February 6, 1875, the defendant was adjudged a bankrupt and has since obtained his discharge.
The attachment, having been made more than four months before the filing of the petition, would have continued a subsisting lien notwithstanding the bankruptcy, if it had not been dissolved by the acts of the parties, and the plaintiff would have been entitled to a qualified judgment to enforce it. But the attachment having been dissolved by a bond given under our statutes, the plaintiff is not entitled to a special judgment to enable him to hold the sureties upon the bond, unless this right is conferred by the St. of 1875. Carpenter v. Turrell, 100 Mass. 450. Braley v. Boomer, 116 Mass. 527. The case therefore turns upon the question whether the St. of 1875 is retroactive in its operation, so as to apply to cases in which bonds to dissolve attachments had been given before the statute took effect.
It is the settled rule in the interpretation of statutes that they are to be construed as prospective in their operation, and are not to be held to affect the rights or enlarge the liabilities of the subject as to past contracts or transactions unless such intention is unequivocally expressed or clearly to be implied from their provisions. Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen 319. Garfield v. Bemis, 2 Allen 445. North Bridgewater Bank v. Copeland, 7 Allen 139. In the statute we are considering, there is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended it to have a retrospective operation. On the contrary it is clear that it was intended to apply only to cases where bonds to dissolve attachments were given after it went into operation. The statute provides that "whenever any defendant in a civil action dissolves an attachment made in said suit, by giving bond as provided by the statutes of this Commonwealth, and has already been or...
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Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gaslight Co.
...v. De Best, 120 Mass. 89; special judgment where the defendant has given bond to dissolve attachment, and becomes bankrupt, Fickett v. Durham, 119 Mass. 159; Barnstable Sav. Bank v. Higgins, 124 Mass. 115; Mosher v. Murphy, 121 Mass. 276; removal of defense in personal injury suits of trave......
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Jaynes v. Goepper
...cases pending at its passage, unless its terms or character indicate that it was so intended. Hill v. Duncan, 110 Mass. 238; Fickett v. Durham, 119 Mass. 159; Bucher v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 156, and cited. The terms of the statute, prescribing how actions may be commenced, etc., indicate......
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...Ray v. Norseworthy, 23 Wall. 128. Foster v. Ames, 1 Low. 313. Clifton v. Foster, 103 Mass. 233. Braley v. Boomer, 116 Mass. 527. Fickett v. Durham, 119 Mass. 159. report does not require us to consider what effect a judgment for the plaintiff may have, as a merger of his cause of action, or......
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Commonwealth v. Roberts
... ... violations which continue after its passage, or which then ... come into existence. Fickett v. Durham, 119 Mass ... 159; Com. v. Homer, 153 Mass. 343, 26 N.E. 872, and ... cases cited. The defendant, however, contends that, as her ... ...