Fields v. State, S90A0391
| Decision Date | 12 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. S90A0391,S90A0391 |
| Citation | 260 Ga. 331,393 S.E.2d 252 |
| Parties | FIELDS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John R. Calhoun, Malcolm Mackenzie, III, James C. Metts, III, Calhoun & Associates, P.C., Savannah, for Fields.
Dupont K. Cheney, Dist. Atty., Hinesville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Leonora Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for the State.
Sara Richburg Fields appeals her conviction of the malice murder of her husband, Mac A. Richburg. We reverse. 1
1. Considered most favorably to the verdict, the evidence showed appellant persuaded co-defendant Wilton Denison to murder the victim. On April 9, 1985, the victim was fatally shot by Wilton Denison and another co-conspirator, Allen Hall, while the victim was at a hunting club. The assailants fired a number of shots at the victim with a .308 rifle and another gun, although only one shot (from the rifle) struck the victim. We find the evidence sufficient to support the conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 2
2. In her fourth enumeration of error Fields argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant her challenge to the array of the grand jury. She contends the fact that four of the six jury commissioners were government employees (county school teacher; county building superintendent; bailiff for superior court; and postal worker) tainted the selection of a fair and impartial jury because, as government workers, the commissioners would be more likely to select potential jurors who were biased in favor of the state. Fields acknowledges that this issue is controlled adversely to her by Clark v. State, 255 Ga. 370, 371-374(2), 338 S.E.2d 269 (1986), but she asks us to re-examine and overrule Clark. We decline to do so, and find that the trial court properly denied Fields' challenge to the array of the grand jury.
3. The fifth enumeration of error is that the trial court erred by denying appellant's motion to quash the indictment under which she was convicted.
We find no error. The original indictment alleged the year in which the murder was committed, but not the day and month. The state later entered a nolle prosequi, and a second indictment was returned by the same grand jury that returned the original indictment. The second indictment specified the day, month, and year of the murder, and was the indictment under which appellant was convicted.
Appellant contends the second indictment should have been quashed because the prosecution did not present evidence to the grand jury on the occasion the prosecution sought the second indictment. We hold this contention has no merit, as the grand jury was entitled to rely on the evidence it had previously considered in returning the original indictment. 3
Appellant also contends her motion should have been granted because the manner in which the state entered a nolle prosequi allegedly violated the Unified Appeal Procedure. However, we conclude that the state's subsequent election not to seek the death penalty mooted this issue.
4. Appellant's third enumeration is that the court erred by allowing the state to elicit hearsay testimony from a prosecution witness, Everett Drawdy.
We conclude that the court erred by admitting the testimony. During Drawdy's testimony the prosecutor asked him whether he had received any threats concerning his coming to court and testifying, to which he replied that he had gotten a telephone call from a male he was unable to identify, who had said, "You son-of-a-bitch, if you go down there, it ain't going to be healthy for you." Drawdy's repetition of this threat was admitted over appellant's objection.
Appellee argues that this testimony was admissible to show a threat had been made against Drawdy, but we disagree, as the state's inability to link the threat to appellant prevented the testimony from being relevant to any material issues. See generally Payne v. State, 152 Ga.App. 471, 473(3), 263 S.E.2d 251 (1979) (); Quaid v. State, 132 Ga.App. 478, 488-489(7), 208 S.E.2d 336 (1974) (threats by co-defendant). Accordingly, we hold that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and that the trial court erred by allowing the state to adduce it. We also hold that the error was prejudicial, as the jury might have inferred that the unidentified caller was connected with appellant, and further might have inferred that the threat constituted an admission of guilt by appellant.
5. The ninth enumeration is that the trial court erred by allowing prosecution witness Thomas Cribbs to give hearsay testimony about the manner in which a co-conspirator of appellant, Allen Hall, died.
We find the court erred in admitting the testimony. Cribbs, a Hinesville, Georgia, police detective, testified that an investigation he conducted revealed Hall had died in Hinesville. Cribbs further testified, over appellant's hearsay objection, that in 1986 Hall died from a gunshot wound he received during an armed robbery of a Hinesville liquor store by Hall and an accomplice. Cribbs said that during the robbery the accomplice struck a victim with a gun, and the blow caused the gun to discharge accidentally, fatally wounding Hall. On cross-examination, Cribbs testified he had not witnessed the robbery, and that his testimony about how Hall died was based on hearsay.
Because police investigators are bound by the hearsay rule and must testify from their own first-hand knowledge alone, Jones v. State, 247 Ga. 268, 272-273(9), 275 S.E.2d 67 (1981), we find merit in appellant's contention that Cribbs' testimony concerning how Hall died was inadmissible hearsay. We therefore hold that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony in question. We also hold the error was prejudicial, as the jury could have inferred that appellant kept company with a person of bad character (Hall), and therefore that appellant herself had a bad character.
6. In her seventeenth enumeration of error Fields argues that the court erred in refusing to allow her to question Katie Darlene Denison about three letters she wrote to Wilton Denison when they were contemplating divorce. In the letters Katie threatened Wilton by telling him that, if he did not give her money in the divorce, she would testify against him at his murder trial. The trial court, on the state's objection, refused to allow questioning about the letters, ruling the letters did not have any relevance to Fields' trial.
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...to be relevant to any material issues." (citations and punctuation omitted) ).28 See supra note 27; see also Fields v. State , 260 Ga. 331, 333 (4), 393 S.E.2d 252 (1990) (holding that it was reversible error to permit witness to testify as to threat he received by phone, for the stated pur......
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