Fields v. State, 2001-CP-00880-COA.

• Decision Date: 18 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-CP-00880-COA.,2001-CP-00880-COA.
• Citation: 840 So.2d 796
• Parties: Cornelius FIELDS, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

840 So.2d 796

Cornelius FIELDS, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2001-CP-00880-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

March 18, 2003.

Cornelius Fields, appellant pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, for appellee.

Before McMILLIN, C.J., BRIDGES and GRIFFIS, JJ.

BRIDGES, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Cornelius Fields was indicted by the Bolivar County grand jury for the offense of sale of a controlled substance—marijuana in the amount of less than one ounce. He was charged with sale of cocaine in a separate indictment. In addition, he was also charged as an habitual offender. Fields entered an open plea of guilty to the charge of sale of marijuana, cause No. 8718, and to the charge of sale of cocaine, cause No. 8719. The habitual charges were dropped as part of the pleas. Fields filed a motion for post-conviction relief to vacate and set aside his plea of guilty sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, defective plea, and a denial of due process. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Fields perfected an appeal to this Court.

¶ 2. Fields argues that his plea of guilty was involuntary, as a matter of law, where the trial court failed to inform him of the minimum and maximum sentence for the crime charged, sale of marijuana. Fields also claims that the trial judge sentenced him to a term excessive to such charge. Fields claims that his plea was coerced because he was given incorrect information on the maximum sentence throughout the proceedings. Secondly, Fields argues that his sentence was an excessive sentence since the law only allows a three year sentence, whereas he was given a twenty-five year sentence for the offense of sale of less than one ounce of marijuana. Lastly, Fields claims that the trial court's actions in amending the judgment, three years after the entry of the initial judgment and without a hearing, was inappropriate and constituted plain and reversible error.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. WHETHER APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS INVOLUNTARY WHERE IT WAS ENTERED UPON THE ILL-ADVISE OF COUNSEL IN REGARDS AS TO THE APPLICABLE SENTENCE FOR A CHARGE OF SALES OF LESS THEN ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA?

II. WHETHER THE SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS FOR THE OFFENSE OF SALES OF LESS THAN ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA WAS AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE SINCE THE LAW ALLOWS ONLY A THREE YEAR SENTENCE FOR SUCH OFFENSE?

III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S ACTIONS OF ENTERING AN AMENDED JUDGMENT, THREE YEARS AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE INITIAL JUDGMENT, AND WITHOUT A HEARING, WITH SUCH AMENDED JUDGMENT BEING ENTERED BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE NOT PRESENT AT OR KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE GUILTY PLEA IN THIS CASE, WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND CONSTITUTED PLAIN AND REVERSIBLE ERROR?

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS INVOLUNTARY WHERE IT WAS ENTERED UPON THE ILL-ADVISE OF COUNSEL IN REGARDS AS TO THE APPLICABLE SENTENCE FOR A CHARGE OF SALES OF LESS THEN ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA?

¶ 3. The United States Supreme Court case of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), provides the standard for determining whether a guilty plea is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made by the defendant. Where the record is silent as to evidence showing that these rights were known and understood by the defendant, there can be no presumption of a waiver of such rights by him. Id. The record must provide explicit evidence of such a waiver and the admissibility of the waiver must be "based on a reliable determination on the voluntariness" of the waiver. Id. This determination of voluntariness may be evaluated by looking to see whether the defendant was advised of the nature of the charges against him, the rights which he would be waiving by pleading guilty, and the maximum sentences that he could receive for the crimes with which he was charged. Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992). See also Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243,

89 S.Ct. 1709; Wilson v. State, 577 So.2d 394, 396-97 (Miss.1991).

¶ 4. The burden of proving that a guilty plea was not made voluntarily is on the defendant. Gardner v. State, 531 So.2d 805, 810 (Miss.1988); Baker v. State, 358 So.2d 401, 401 (Miss.1978). If this burden is not met, the defendant's plea must be upheld as one that was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Gardner, 531 So.2d at 810. It should be noted that "solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Id.; Baker, 358 So.2d at 403

. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977).

¶ 5. In accordance with the aforementioned case law, we find that the lower court was correct in accepting Fields's guilty plea and denying him post-conviction relief. Because of the ample evidence provided to us in the record, we are convinced that Fields entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and it should therefore be upheld.

¶ 6. We must note that the transcript of the plea hearing speaks volumes to the issue of voluntariness. One argument made by Fields was that his plea was involuntary because the trial court never informed him of the minimum and maximum sentence for his crime of sale of marijuana. This simply is not true. The judge specifically asked the petitioner whether he understood the maximum sentence that could be imposed regarding the sale of marijuana would be a term of six years or a fine of six thousand dollars or both, and that the maximum sentence that could be imposed regarding the sale of cocaine would be a term of sixty years and a fine of not less than ten thousand dollars but no more than two million dollars. Fields announced clearly that he understood and that he still wanted to enter a plea of guilty. Fields was in no way misled as to the maximum sentences which the court could impose. The judge also asked Fields whether he was aware that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up certain constitutional rights, such as the right to a trial by jury. Fields clearly answered that he understood. In addition, the judge asked Fields a number of questions required of him under the law, including whether Fields had been coerced into pleading guilty; whether defense counsel explained the ramifications of the guilty plea; whether Fields was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the plea hearing or was otherwise impaired; and whether Fields understood the maximum and minimum penalties to which he could be sentenced for these crimes. See Alexander, 605 So.2d at 1172

(explaining the trial judge's duties to inquire of the defendant whether he fully understands what he is giving up and what may happen as a result of his guilty plea). According to the transcript, Fields further made it crystal clear to all listening that he understood that his guilty plea would serve as a waiver to all of those constitutional rights that the circuit judge had mentioned. Fields answered that he was aware of and accepted any possible statutory penalties he could receive for his crimes. Finally, he lucidly stated that he was not being coerced and that he was not under the influence of any form of impairing drug.

¶ 7. Fields has given this Court no plausible evidence on which we may rely to overturn the decision of the trial judge to accept Fields's plea. The credible evidence before us, including the transcript of the plea hearing, points to the inescapable fact that Fields made his decision to plead guilty on his own, without coercion and without misrepresentation. We do not believe that Fields has met his very heavy burden of proof to show that he did not understand what he was agreeing to or that he was pressured or intimidated into executing the petitions for guilty pleas.

II. WHETHER THE SENTENCE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS FOR THE OFFENSE OF SALES OF LESS THAN ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA WAS AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE SINCE THE LAW ALLOWS ONLY A THREE YEAR SENTENCE FOR SUCH OFFENSE?

¶ 8. The Mississippi Supreme Court in Johnson v. State addresses the issue of an excessive or disproportionate sentence in stating "that a trial court will not be held in error or held to have abused its judicial discretion if the sentence imposed is within the limits fixed by statute." Johnson v. State, 461 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss.1984). Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-139(b)(3) states that in the case of the sale of one ounce or less of marijuana, such person may, upon conviction,...