Finlan v. Dallas Independent School Dist.
| Decision Date | 24 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-00-00302-CV.,11-00-00302-CV. |
| Citation | 90 S.W.3d 395 |
| Parties | Richard E. FINLAN et al., Appellants, v. DALLAS INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ed Grant, pro se.
Richard Finlan, pro se.
Ronald D. Hinds, Reyna Hinds & Crandall, Dallas, for appellants.
Gary D. Elliston, DeHay & Blanchard, John Arnold, DeHay & Elliston, James E. Coleman, Jr., John Andrew Martin, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, L.L.P., Dallas, Melinda Burke, Joseph W. Spence, Shannon, Gracey, Ratliff & Miller, Fort Worth, Gary Zausmer, Adam Price, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Austin, for appellees.
Panel consists of: ARNOT, C.J., and McCALL, J., and McCLOUD, S.J.*
The trial court granted summary judgments and rendered a final judgment that Richard E. Finlan (Finlan), David L. Venable, and Don Venable take nothing on their claims against the Dallas Independent School District (DISD), the DISD superintendent and trustees (DISD Defendants),1 and the DISD attorneys (Lawyer Defendants).2 The trial court also granted summary judgment and rendered judgment that DISD trustee Ed Grant (Grant) take nothing on his cross-claim for indemnity against the Lawyer Defendants. In this appeal, Finlan, David Venable, and Grant assert that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment against them. Don Venable appealed but later withdrew his appeal. Because the DISD, the DISD Defendants, and the Lawyer Defendants established that they were entitled to summary judgment on Finlan's and David Venable's claims and because the Lawyer Defendants established that they were entitled to summary judgment on Grant's cross-claim for indemnity, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In 1992, the DISD, a governmental entity, filed a civil lawsuit for tortious interference and defamation against Finlan, David Venable, and Don Venable. Finlan and the Venable brothers counterclaimed, alleging that the DISD's suit was baseless and malicious and that the DISD filed the suit in retaliation for Finlan and Don Venable's exercise of First Amendment free speech rights to publicly criticize the DISD and oppose an upcoming DISD bond election. The core issue in this case is whether the DISD's filing of the 1992 civil suit deprived Finlan and David Venable of their constitutional rights and, therefore, subjected the DISD to liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Pamph. Supp.2002) for civil rights violations. This case is not the only case between Finlan and the DISD; Finlan and the DISD have a long history of litigation. Finlan and other parties involved in this case have raised virtually identical Section 1983 civil rights claims — that the DISD's filing of a civil suit or counterclaim against them violated their First Amendment rights — in at least three other cases: (1) Dallas Independent School District v. Finlan, 27 S.W.3d 220 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, pet'n den'd), cert. den'd, 534 U.S. 949, 122 S.Ct. 342, 151 L.Ed.2d 258 (2001); (2) Hinds v. Dallas Independent School District, 188 F.Supp.2d 664 (N.D.Tex.2002); and (3) Venable v. Keever, 61 F.Supp.2d 552 (N.D.Tex.1999), and subsequent opinion at 2000 WL 1281206 (N.D.Tex.2000). In each of these three cases, the courts held that the DISD's filing of the suit or counterclaim was not a constitutional violation and, therefore, did not give rise to Section 1983 liability. We discuss these cases below. Now, contrary to the holdings in each of these three cases, Finlan and David Venable again assert in this appeal that the filing of a civil suit against them violated their civil rights.
In 1991, Finlan and Don Venable sued the DISD for alleged fraud and misapplication of bond funds. In 1992, Goldman, Sachs & Co., an investment banker, agreed to underwrite the issuance of $60,000,000 in tax and revenue anticipation notes for the DISD. Finlan and Don Venable wrote a letter to Goldman, Sachs & Co. informing it of their pending litigation against the DISD. In the letter, they stated as follows:
Please be on notice that an Application for Temporary Injunction has been filed in the context of a law suit against the District that alleges fraud, misapplication of bond funds and for falsification of government documents .... As a defense against any claims of fraud that may arise and may present the possibility of irreparable harm to the taxpayers of this District, you are being made aware of the aforementioned "Application for Temporary Injunction" and of the pending litigation. Take due notice and proceed at your own risk.
In response to this letter, the DISD Defendants conferred with DISD attorney, Dennis J. Eichelbaum, and decided to file a lawsuit against Finlan, Don Venable, and David Venable for tortious interference with the DISD's relationship with Goldman, Sachs & Co. The DISD Defendants authorized the Lawyer Defendants to file suit.
On October 5, 1992, the DISD filed suit in the 192nd District Court of Dallas County against Finlan, David Venable, and Don Venable for tortious interference with its relationship with Goldman, Sachs & Co. and for defamation. In its original petition, the DISD sought to recover damages in excess of $10,000,000. The DISD alleged that, if the letter to Goldman, Sachs & Co. caused an upcoming $270,000,000 bond election to fail, its damages would exceed $270,000,000. Finlan and both Venables filed a counterclaim, asserting that the DISD's filing of the suit constituted a violation of their civil rights under Section 1983.
DISD's suit was transferred from the 192nd District Court of Dallas County to the 14th District Court of Dallas County. In 1993, Finlan filed a plea in bar to the DISD's suit against him. The trial court granted Finlan's plea in bar and dismissed the DISD's suit against Finlan with prejudice. DISD nonsuited its claims against the Venables. The trial court realigned the parties. Finlan and the Venables became the plaintiffs, and the DISD became the defendant. The suit was transferred to the 101st District Court of Dallas County.
In 1994, Finlan, pro se, and the Venables, represented by Ronald Hinds, filed suit against the DISD Defendants and the Lawyer Defendants in the 162nd District Court of Dallas County. They alleged that the DISD's filing of the 1992 tortious interference suit violated their First Amendment constitutional rights and, consequently, subjected the DISD Defendants and the Lawyer Defendants to liability for civil rights violations under Section 1983. They also alleged state law claims of malicious prosecution/abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Because DISD Trustee Grant took the position that the DISD's filing of the 1992 tortious interference suit violated Finlan's and the Venables' civil rights, the DISD elected not to provide Grant with a defense in the 162nd District Court suit. In his answer to the suit, Grant admitted Finlan's and the Venables' factual allegations and agreed that the DISD's filing of the 1992 tortious interference suit violated Finlan's and the Venables' civil rights. Grant, represented by David Venable's lawyer, Ronald Hinds, filed a cross-claim for indemnity against the Lawyer Defendants. Grant based his cross-claim on alleged malpractice committed by the Lawyer Defendants.
Grant entered into an agreed judgment in favor of Finlan for $300,000, and the trial court entered the judgment. Based upon the events surrounding the $300,000 agreed judgment, the DISD filed a conspiracy suit in 1995 against Finlan, Grant, and Hinds, alleging that they conspired to obtain the $300,000 judgment as a means to force the DISD to pay $300,000 to Finlan. See Dallas Independent School District v. Finlan, supra. Finlan filed a counterclaim for civil rights violations under Section 1983, alleging that the DISD filed the 1995 conspiracy suit in retaliation for his exercise of free speech rights. Finlan asserted that the DISD's filing of the suit violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the courts for redress of grievances. The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed with Finlan and held that the DISD's filing of the suit did not violate Finlan's constitutional rights. Dallas Independent School District v. Finlan, supra at 244-45. Hinds filed a Section 1983 civil rights suit against the DISD, the DISD Trustees, and the Lawyer Defendants in federal court alleging that the DISD's filing of the 1995 conspiracy suit violated his First Amendment rights to free speech and to access the courts. See Hinds v. Dallas Independent School District, supra. Hinds claimed, similar to David Venable's claims in the case now before this court, that the DISD's filing of the suit against him damaged his reputation and law practice. The federal district court held that Hinds failed to state a claim under Section 1983; the DISD's filing of the suit against Hinds did not violate Hinds' First Amendment rights. Hinds v. Dallas Independent School District, supra at 673-76.
In March 1999, Finlan's and the Venables' 162nd District Court suit against the DISD Defendants and the Lawyer Defendants was consolidated with their suit against the DISD in the 101st District Court. The 101st District Court cause is the cause currently before this court. Finlan's Section 1983 civil rights claims in this cause are virtually identical to the civil rights claims that he asserted unsuccessfully in Dallas Independent School District v. Finlan, supra. In this cause, Finlan claims that the DISD's filing of the 1992 tortious interference suit was malicious and retaliatory and violated his First Amendment rights of free speech and to petition the courts. In his latest petition, Finlan alleged six Section 1983 claims based upon the filing of the 1992 tortious interference suit: (1) violation of his civil...
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