First National Bank of Fort Scott v. Simpson
| Decision Date | 12 December 1899 |
| Citation | 54 S.W. 506,152 Mo. 638 |
| Parties | First National Bank of Fort Scott, Appellant, v. Simpson et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. Ben T. Hardin, Special Judge.
Affirmed.
John Burgin and Shelley Grover for appellant.
(1) A demurrer to evidence in an equity case, as well as at law concedes every fact which the evidence tends to prove, and every inference fairly deducible from the evidence. Healey v. Simpson, 113 Mo. 340; Leeper v Bates, 85 Mo. 224; Baker v. Sutterfield, 43 Mo.App. 591; Patton v. Bragg, 113 Mo. 600; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U.S. 19. (2) When testimony presented on the record was excluded in the trial court, it may be admitted and considered by the Supreme Court. Hanna v South St. Jo. Land Co., 126 Mo. 1; Goodrich v. Harrison, 130 Mo. 263; Radley v. Neill, 134 Mo. 364; Baxter v. Donnell, 69 Mo.App. 588. (3) Transactions between husband and wife must be closely scrutinized when they come in conflict with the claims of creditors. Holloway v. Holloway, 103 Mo. 274; Benne v. Schnecko, 100 Mo. 250; New South B. & L. Ass'n Co. v. Reed, 31 S.E. 514. (4) Payments made by a debtor, of premiums upon a policy of life insurance upon his own life for the benefit of his wife, or for the benefit of wife and children, are voluntary gifts and conveyances to the beneficiary, and are conclusively, fraudulent and void as against creditors existing at the time of such payment. Merchants & Miners Co. v. Boreland, 52 N.J.Eq. 282; Tolcott v. Field, 24 Neb. 612; Houston v. Maddox, 73 Ill.App. 203; Pullis v. Robinson, 73 Mo. 201; s. c., 5 Mo.App. 508; Schondler v. Wace, 1 Camp. 487; Skarf v. Soulby, 1 Mecn. & G. 364; Jenkyn v. Vaughan, 3 Drew, 419; Stokes v. Cowan, 29 Beav. 637; Freeman v. Pope, 9 L. R. Eq. 206; Toylor v. Coenen, 1 Chan. Div. 636. (5) A voluntary conveyance by a debtor to his wife is, as against prior creditors, presumptively fraudulent. To render a voluntary conveyance by a husband to his wife valid as against prior creditors, the burden of proof is on the grantee to show that the debtor retained sufficient funds and property to pay his debts. A gift by a husband to his wife stands condemned as fraudulent unless the wife shows by clear evidence that the husband retained ample means to meet his debts. The wife must show that her husband was solvent. Hoffman v. Nolte, 127 Mo. 120; Crook v. Tull, 111 Mo. 289; Loehr v. Murphy, 45 Mo.App. 524; Sloan v. Torry, 78 Mo. 625; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U.S. 179; Jordan v. Buschmeyer, 97 Mo. 97; Patten v. Casey, 57 Mo. 118; Bradford's Appeal, 29 Pa. St. 515. (6) Where property is acquired in the name of a wife during coverture, the presumption of law is that it was paid for by the husband. The burden is on the wife to show clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt that she acquired it with her separate means. In the absence of such clear evidence the presumption that it was paid for with the husband's means (which is in all cases a violent presumption of fact, almost conclusive) must prevail. And the above rule of evidence has not been changed or altered or affected in any way by the passage of the Married Women's Act. Sloan v. Torry, 78 Mo. 625; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U.S. 179; Jordan v. Buschmeyer, 79 Mo. 79; McFerran v. McKinney, 22 Mo.App. 554; Patton v. Bragg, 113 Mo. 601; Bucks v. Moore, 36 Mo.App. 536; Hoffman v. Nolte, 127 Mo. 120; Gamber v. Gamber, 18 Pa. St. 366. (7) The possession of a married woman is the possession of the husband. Property or money in the possession of a married woman is presumptively the property and money of the husband, and this is a violent presumption, and the married woman must produce the clearest proof to overcome this presumption. Walker v. Reamy, 36 Pa. St. 410; Walker v. Walker, 25 Mo. 376; Loehr v. Murphy, 45 Mo.App. 524; McFerran v. Kinney, 22 Mo.App. 558. (8) It is not necessary to show that one is insolvent at the time of making a voluntary conveyance in order to render it void as to existing creditors. Potter v. McDonald, 31 Mo. 73; State to use v. Lourie, 1 Mo.App. 378; Bump on Fraud. Conv. (3 Ed.), p. 289; Hastings v. Crossland, 13 Mo.App. 597; R. S. 1889, sec. 5170; Gabriel v. Mullin, 111 Mo. 125; Keady v. White, 168 Ill. 82. (9) Under the Missouri statute, no more than $ 500 per annum in premiums on life insurance on the life of the husband for the benefit of the wife can be paid out of the means of the husband with impunity against the husband's creditors. When the premiums paid in any year out of the funds or property of the husband exceed $ 500, the excess of premiums over $ 500, with interest thereon, inure to the benefit of the husband's creditors. R. S. 1889, sec. 5851; Pullis v. Robison, 5 Mo.App. 548; s. c. 73 Mo. 201. (10) The Married Woman's Act of 1875, R. S. 1889, section 6869, giving to married women separate estates in certain personal property, does not apply to marriages which occurred prior to 1875. Leete v. Bank, 115 Mo. 184; Leete v. Bank, 141 Mo. 584.
Scarritt, Vaughan, Griffith & Jones and Johnson & Lucas for respondents.
(1) Where upon the whole record it is clearly manifest that the judgment is for the right party, it will not be reversed, though error was committed at the trial. State ex rel. v. Jones, 131 Mo. 194. (a) In the trial of an equity case, though it may appear that incompetent evidence was admitted in the hearing of issues submitted to a jury, yet if it can be seen from all the evidence that the decree rendered thereon by the court was right, it will be affirmed in the appellate court. Harlan v. Moore, 132 Mo. 489. (b) Though the court may have erred in the ground of its decision, still if the judgment was for the right party it should not be reversed. Wolfe v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 545; Bradford v. Emerson, 56 Mo.App. 379. (c) The decree will be affirmed if it appears from the entire record to have been correct, though errors may have been committed on the trial. Estes v. Fry, 94 Mo. 266. (d) Though evidence offered by the appellant was erroneously excluded, this would not justify a reversal unless, in the judgment of this court, if it had been admitted it would have changed the result even in a law case. Spiva v. Coal Co., 88 Mo. 68; Wilkerson v. Allen, 67 Mo. 502. (2) There can be no question that on the facts the trial court found that there was no evidence that George E. Simpson paid the premiums on the policies in question, and hence that the plaintiff failed to prove the issues tendered by the bill and the same were paid by the defendant, and rendered judgment because of such finding. (a) Much deference is given to the findings of the trial court on account of its superior advantage for weighing the evidence and judging of the credibility of the witnesses. Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 657; Snell v. Harrison, 83 Mo. 652. (3) Both at common law and under the statutes Mary E. Simpson was the owner of the property used in the payment of the premiums in controversy. (4) George E. Simpson waived any marital rights he might have had at common law in the property of his wife. White v. Clasby, 101 Mo. 162; Roberts v. Walker, 101 Mo. 597; Boynton v. Miller, 144 Mo. 687; Holthaus v. Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439; McCoy v. Hyatt, 80 Mo. 130; Botts v. Gooch, 97 Mo. 88. (5) And by such waiver invested her property with the character of a sole and separate estate which a court of equity will recognize and protect. Walker v. Walker, 25 Mo. 367; Holthaus v. Hornbostle, 60 Mo. 439; McCoy v. Hyatt, 80 Mo. 130. Long and uninterrupted control over it with the acquiescence of her husband is evidence thereof. Coughlin v. Ryan, 43 Mo. 99; Welch v. Welch, 63 Mo. 57; Botts v. Gooch, 97 Mo. 88. (6) If Simpson had borrowed the money from his wife with the understanding it was to be repaid, he will in equity be regarded as her debtor, and she is entitled to the same protection as any other creditor. Clark v. Clark, 86 Mo. 114; Seay v. Hesse, 123 Mo. 451; Bean v. Patterson, 122 U.S. 500. (7) The personal property under the statute was the separate estate of the defendant. R. S. 1889, sec. 6869; Laws 1875, p. 61; Winn v. Riley, 52 S.W. 27; Albridge v. Muirhead, 101 U.S. 397.
This is an equitable proceeding by plaintiff, a judgment creditor of George E. Simpson, deceased, who was the husband of the defendant, Mary E. Simpson, against her and her co-defendants, in the nature of a creditor's bill, to subject to the payment of its debt $ 4,848.48, being the amount of two judgments rendered in favor of plaintiff against the firm of Donnell, Lawson & Simpson in the circuit court of the city of New York, in October, 1886, and interest thereon, which were allowed by the probate court of Jackson county, Missouri, in favor of plaintiff against the estate of said George E. Simpson, deceased, on the fourth day of September, 1893, a sufficient amount of money for that purpose, out of $ 61,000, alleged to have been received by Mrs. Simpson on eight different policies of life insurance on the life of said George E. Simpson, issued in her favor, and turned over by her to her co-defendants as trustees for her, the premiums on all of which are alleged to have been paid by him, when he was insolvent, in fraud of his creditors, in which Mary E. participated.
The policies are of the dates, companies and amounts as follows:
September 1, 1863, Manhattan Life Insurance Company
$ 5,000
June 3, 1873, Equitable Life Assurance Society.
5,000
August, 1874, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company
10,000
December 10, 1883, Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company
10,000
April 30, 1881, Equitable Life Assurance Society
1,000
February 28, 1884, Providence Savings Life
10,000
Assurance Society of New York
December 7, 1886, New York...
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