Goodrick v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 07 November 1895 |
| Citation | 32 S.W. 661,130 Mo. 263 |
| Parties | Goodrick et al. v. Harrison et al., Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Bates Circuit Court. -- Hon. James H. Lay, Judge.
Affirmed.
Graves & Clark and John D. Parkinson for appellants.
(1) The evidence shows the existence of the relation of guardian and ward, parent and child, a double fiduciary relation. This relation did not cease with the mere fact that the defendant was one day over the age of eighteen, but the undue influence, which the law presumes to exist when such fiduciary relation is shown is still presumed to exist under the evidence in this case. Garvin's Administrator v Williams, 44 Mo. 465; Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo 147. (2) After proving the fiduciary relation, and proving it to have existed up to the very day of the so-called trade or exchange, the burden of proof then shifts to the parties claiming under the law from Minnie E. Goodrick to W. W Goodrick. 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 951; Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35; Street v. Goss, 62 Mo. 229; Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 467; Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250. (3) First. Under all the circumstances in this case, as shown by the evidence, the deed made by defendant Minnie, to her father and guardian, should have been set aside, at least upon some terms. Ranken v. Patton, 65 Mo. 378; Miller v. Simonds, 72 Mo. 669; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483; Holloway v. Holloway, 77 Mo. 392; Ford v. Hennessey, 70 Mo. 580; Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 221. Second. The plaintiffs should have shown that defendant had independent advice before executing the deed, but the evidence shows instead that the only advice she had was from the father and his attorney. This will not do. Miller v. Simonds, 72 Mo. 687; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483. (4) The evidence in this case does not show such laches as to debar defendant from equitable relief. No permanent improvements, to speak of, had been made. In fact nothing was done which would make the setting aside of this deed inequitable. The delay was in the interest of the deceased and his legal heirs and they can not complain in a court of equity. Bradshaw v. Yates, 67 Mo. 221.
T. W. Silvers for respondents.
(1) The supreme court will not set aside the finding of the circuit court on a question of fact, unless entirely satisfied that such finding is against the preponderance of the evidence. Taylor v. Cayce, 97 Mo. 243; Cox v. Esteb, 68 Mo. 114; Bank v. Murry, 88 Mo. 191. (2) Appellants claim that the deed from Minnie Goodrick to her father should have been set aside, at least on "some terms." (3) While we do not contend that there should have been a tender of an unascertained amount, still the maxim "He who seeks equity must do equity" would imply that before appellants could reasonably expect any decree in their favor they should have shown some offer to restore what they had gotten under the deed; and by their pleadings a willingness to do so as a condition for the relief prayed for. They do neither. Deichmann v. Deichmann, 49 Mo. 107; Kline v. Vogel, 90 Mo. 239; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Iowa 271; Foster v. Wightman, 123 Mass. 100; Evans v. Folsom, 5 Minn. 342; Mumford v. Company, 4 N.Y. 463; Campbell v. Campbell, 21 Mich. 438; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 N.J.Eq. 190; 1 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sec. 385. (4) Appellants can not repudiate the deed; and came into court empty handed, saying, "we want to keep all we get out of the transaction and want all you got, too." 1 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sec. 395; Railroad v. Mayer, 1 Hilton (N. Y.), 562; Campbell v. Campbell, 21 Mich. 438; McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 N.J.Eq. 190. (5) Appellants contend that the testimony of Mrs. Harrison as to conversations with third parties should have been admitted. These conversations related to the transaction in issue and were before the death of Goodrick. They were properly excluded under the following authorities. R. S. 1889, sec. 8918; Chapman v. Dougherty, 87 Mo. 617; Meier v. Thieman, 90 Mo. 433; Bank v. Hunt, 25 Mo.App. 170; Teats v. Flanders, 118 Mo. 670.
This action was brought in 1892 by the widow, and some of the children, of W. W. Goodrick against his married daughter, whose husband is joined with her as defendant.
The object of the action is to obtain partition of a tract of four hundred and eighty acres of land in Bates county. The defendant daughter resists partition on the general ground that she is equitably the sole owner of the entire property. That defense is set up by answer, which plaintiffs have put in issue by a reply.
The case was tried by the court, without objection from either party as to that mode of trial.
Many material facts are admitted by the pleadings and by the testimony of both parties. W. W. Goodrick died intestate, July 8, 1891. The land in dispute stood in his name as record owner at that time. He had been twice married. The defendant Mrs. Harrison is his daughter by the first marriage.
The first Mrs. Goodrick died in 1867, while this daughter, her only child, was a very young infant. The latter inherited from her mother a tract of six hundred and forty acres of land, of which the four hundred and eighty acres now in controversy formed part.
After some years Mr. Goodrick married the present Mrs. Goodrick, plaintiff. Thereafter the daughter of the former union lived with her father and stepmother, until her marriage to Mr. Harrison, December 29, 1883, shortly after she attained her majority.
Mr. Goodrick was duly appointed guardian of his daughter, and made final settlement of her estate in December, 1883, a few days before her marriage.
About the same time (and before defendant married) she conveyed the four hundred and eighty acres to her father by deed, duly recorded. A short time after her marriage, her father delivered to her a deed conveying to her the remaining one hundred and sixty acres of the six hundred and forty tract.
These deeds were made in accordance with an agreement between father and daughter to thus divide the land inherited by the latter from her mother, but which her father then held in possession as tenant by the curtesy.
The daughter's claim in the present action is that her deed to her father is void in equity because obtained by undue influence, etc., and as to that claim there is conflicting testimony.
The trial judge found against the claim, and decreed partition of the land between the widow and all the children (including defendant). The widow had elected to take a child's part.
Defendants appealed in the usual way.
No fuller statement of the case is necessary to an understanding of the rulings.
1. The proposition asserted by defendant is sound (as applied to this case) namely, that the burden of proof is on plaintiffs to show that the bargain between defendant and her father, Mr. Goodrick (then her guardian) was fair and just to her.
Dealings between guardian and ward, while that relation exists, or while the influence arising therefrom is yet operative, are considered by courts of equity proper subjects for investigation. Where the guardian claims a benefit from such dealings, it should be made to appear that they involve no injustice to the weaker party in the transaction, who thus is placed in some measure under the protection of the court of equity, even though, at the time, he may be of age and lawfully competent to contract.
2. The plaintiffs' reply to the claim of unfairness and undue influence (in...
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