First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in U.S.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1984
• Citation: 62 N.Y.2d 110,476 N.Y.S.2d 86,464 N.E.2d 454
• Parties: , 464 N.E.2d 454 FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SCHENECTADY et al., Appellants, v. UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN the UNITED STATES of America et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 86

476 N.Y.S.2d 86

62 N.Y.2d 110, 464 N.E.2d 454

FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SCHENECTADY et al., Appellants, v. UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN the UNITED STATES of America et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 15, 1984.

W. Jack Williamson, Greenville, Ala., of the Alabama Bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Robert S. Trieble, Ballston Spa, for appellants

Duncan S. MacAffer, Albany, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SIMONS, Judge.

This action involves a dispute between plaintiff First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady (First Church), and its denominational church organization, defendant The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPCUSA). It arose when First Church withdrew from the denominational church because of a disagreement over UPCUSA's financial support of radical political groups and individuals. Plaintiffs seek a declaration of their independent status and a permanent injunction preventing defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of the local church property. The issue is whether the court may resolve the dispute between the parties as it would any other or must, consistent with the prohibition against church/State entanglement contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, defer to the determination of the denominational church. We hold that it may resolve the dispute and that plaintiffs are entitled to injunctive relief. We therefore reverse the order of the Appellate Division, 92 A.D.2d 164, 461 N.Y.S.2d 903, dismissing the complaint.

Prior to January 24, 1977, First Church was a member of defendant Presbytery of Albany and defendant UPCUSA. UPCUSA exhibits a hierarchical or connectional form of church government, as differentiated from a congregational form. Under the hierarchical system, authority is vested in the first instance in the governing body of the local church--the Session--but its actions are subject to review and control by higher church bodies, in ascending order of authority, the Presbytery, the Synod and the General Assembly. To contrast, a congregational type church is independent of higher church authority and is self-governing.

First Church was organized in 1760, during the colonial period, and first incorporated on January 14, 1803, pursuant to chapter 79 of the Laws of 1801. It became a member of the Presbytery of Albany in 1770 and UPCUSA's predecessor denomination in 1789. It retained that status until January, 1977. During the 1970's members of the church's 440 person congregation expressed discontent with UPCUSA and petitioned defendant Presbytery of Albany to be dismissed to another denomination. The request was denied. Instead, defendant Presbytery appointed an administrative commission to investigate the activities of the Session of First Church and to file a report containing its findings and recommendations. On January 24, 1977, at its annual meeting, First Church passed a resolution by a final vote of 334 to 4, severing its relations with defendants and retaining title to all real or personal property held by the church. Shortly thereafter, the commission submitted its report to the Presbytery advising removal of the Session of the First Church and appointment of another administrative commission with authority to function as a Session. The Presbytery attempted to exercise continued control over First Church by removing its ministers' names from the church rolls but plaintiffs disregarded the orders of the commission and functioned as an autonomous body.

On April 16, 1977, plaintiffs, the church, its ministers and its governing Session, commenced this action seeking a declaration that it was free to withdraw from defendants UPCUSA and Presbytery of Albany and a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from interfering with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of church property. In their answer, defendants opposed the action and asserted a counterclaim seeking to permanently enjoin plaintiffs from refusing to obey its directives, orders and mandates in the management and control of the church. ^* Following a nonjury trial, plaintiffs were granted an order permanently enjoining defendants from interfering with the property but denying declaratory relief on the withdrawal issue. Defendants' counterclaim was dismissed.

A divided Appellate Division modified the judgment of Trial Term by reversing the grant of injunctive relief, dismissing the complaint and granting defendants' counterclaim. The three-Judge majority of the court, in an opinion by Justice Kane, relied upon the principle of deference by civil authorities in ecclesiastical matters and held that the court should not adjudicate the claims (see Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall 679, 20 L.Ed. 666). Presiding Justice Mahoney, concurred in part. He applied the "neutral principles of law" rationale of Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 to the facts and after doing so he held for defendants on their counterclaim for injunctive relief. Dissenting Justice Casey also applied the "neutral principles of law" analysis but after analyzing the evidence he found that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief and he therefore voted to affirm Trial Term's judgment. Plaintiffs appeal only from that part of the Appellate Division order relating to injunctive relief.

Before this court, defendants characterize the present dispute as involving nothing more than a controversy over church policy and authority. To support their position they cite the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint objecting to UPCUSA's funding of various political and social groups and the refusal of plaintiffs to recognize the authority of the investigative commission. They contend that because this is a policy dispute the court must defer to the authority of the hierarchical church and avoid resolving the underlying question of property ownership; any other course would necessarily entangle it in church dogma and doctrine and thereby violate the First Amendment.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, view this as an action concerning only the question of property ownership, a matter which can be resolved without violating the prohibitions of the First Amendment by application of the neutral principles of law analysis. Applying neutral principles, plaintiffs conclude that they are entitled to ownership and control of the property because the deeds to the property are in the name of the local church or its trustees, the members of the local church provided all the funds for the purchase and maintenance of the church property, and the church constitution contained no express language granting a trust or proprietary right in favor of the UPCUSA.

Addressing these contentions, our analysis starts with a brief discussion of the general principles recognized by the courts in church-related disputes, then proceeds, in order, to a consideration of the deference rule, the neutral principles of law rule and the application of that rule to the facts of this case, and finally, to a consideration of implied trust principles.

I

The legal rules governing this dispute are derived from the Federal Constitution and have developed through a number of court decisions interpreting it.

The First Amendment, binding on the States through the Fourteenth, prohibits the making of "laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" (US Const, 1st Amdt, 14th Amdt; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 ). Consistent with these amendments civil courts are forbidden from interfering in or determining religious disputes. Such rulings violate the First Amendment because they simultaneously establish one religious belief as correct for the organization while interfering with the free exercise of the opposing faction's beliefs (Maryland & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369, 90 S.Ct. 499, 500, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 see Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law ch 19, § IV, pp 1071-1072; Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 14-12, pp 870-872). The Constitution directs that religious bodies are to be left free to decide church matters for themselves, uninhibited by State interference (Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154, 97 L.Ed. 120).

In Serbian Orthodox Diocese (supra), the issues concerned the identity of the lawful bishop of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and the validity of the division of the American-Canadian Diocese into three dioceses. A similar issue was presented in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (supra) when the court was asked to determine which of two competing church organizations, the Russian Orthodox Church in America or its Russian counterpart, had the power to appoint the prelate of the New York Diocese. The Supreme Court refused to resolve these questions notwithstanding that the control of church properties was incidentally affected by the determinations. The court deferred to the ecclesiastical bodies because to do otherwise in an attempt to settle the property disputes would require the court to interpret church doctrine and involve it in matters which were predominantly religious disagreements.

These rulings controlled the trial court's disposition of plaintiffs' first demand for relief. To the extent that their complaint sought a declaration of their right to withdraw from the Presbytery, it was beyond the power of the court to grant that relief because the determination required an examination and interpretation of the authority of the Presbytery to permit or prevent withdrawal of a local church. And this was so even though the court might have found support for First Church's claim from the facts that the church constitution is silent on the issue and there is...