Fischel v. TKPK, Ltd.
Decision Date | 05 April 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 12176,12176 |
Citation | 34 Conn.App. 22,640 A.2d 125 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Harold FISCHEL, et al. v. TKPK, LTD., et al. |
Theodore R. Tyma, Southport, for the appellants (defendant Michelle C. Minogue et al.).
Michael J. Lawrence, Norwalk, for the appellees (plaintiffs).
Before DUPONT, C.J., and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and FOTI, JJ.
The defendants Thomas E. Minogue and Michelle C. Minogue (hereinafter the defendants) appeal from the granting of a prejudgment remedy (PJR) of attachment of their real property. The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted the PJR because (1) the plaintiff 1 failed to show probable cause to sustain its claim, (2) the PJR statutes; General Statutes § 52-278a et seq.; are unconstitutional because they do not require the plaintiff to post a bond, and (3) the PJR statutes violate the due process clause of the United States constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This action arose out of a commercial real estate lease. In 1988, the plaintiff leased commercial real estate located at 37 Unquowa Road in Fairfield to the named defendant, TKPK, Ltd. Payment and performance of the subject lease was guaranteed by the defendants Thomas E. Minogue and Michelle C. Minogue. In January, 1991, TKPK, Ltd., defaulted on the lease payment and subsequently abandoned the property. TKPK, Ltd., is no longer a party to this action. After a demand by the plaintiff, the Minogues, as guarantors, failed to make the required rent payments on behalf of TKPK, Ltd. On May 17, 1991, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for nonpayment. After revising the complaint a number of times, the plaintiff filed a PJR application in June, 1992, seeking to secure $75,000. 2 Following a probable cause hearing, the trial court granted the application for attachment of the defendants' property in the amount of $60,000. This appeal followed.
General Statutes § 52-278d(a) provides that a trial court may issue a PJR if it determines that there is "probable cause to sustain the validity of [the plaintiff's] claim." It is firmly established that the trial court's hearing in probable cause is not intended to be a full scale trial on the merits of the plaintiff's claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Calfee v. Usman, 224 Conn. 29, 37, 616 A.2d 250 (1992). Probable cause for purposes of the PJR statutes is a flexible common sense standard that does not demand that a belief be correct or more likely true than false. Goodwin v. Pratt, 10 Conn.App. 618, 621, 524 A.2d 1168 (1987).
Appellate review of the granting of a PJR is extremely narrow and focused. In determining probable cause, the trial court is vested with wide discretion and our role in reviewing the trial court's action is limited to determining whether the court's conclusion was reasonable. Anderson v. Nedovich, 19 Conn.App. 85, 88, 561 A.2d 948 (1989). Accordingly, the trial court's determination in a PJR proceeding should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Mullai v. Mullai, 1 Conn.App. 93, 95-96, 468 A.2d 1240 (1983). Furthermore, we are (Citations omitted.) Solomon v. Aberman, 196 Conn. 359, 376, 493 A.2d 193 (1985).
" 'In the absence of clear error [the Appellate Court] should not overrule the thoughtful decision of the trial court, which has had an opportunity to assess the legal issues which may be raised and to weigh the credibility ... of the witnesses.' " Three S. Development Co. v. Santore, 193 Conn. 174, 176, 474 A.2d 795 (1984); New England Land Co. v. DeMarkey, 213 Conn. 612, 621, 569 A.2d 1098 (1990).
Our review of the trial court's conclusions of law is likewise severely limited. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Babiarz v. Hartford Special, Inc., 2 Conn.App. 388, 394, 480 A.2d 561 (1984).
In the present case, the trial court found that there is "a reasonable probability that [the plaintiff] will be able to prove [the validity of the transaction] at trial, so there is, consequently, the probability of validity of this action, this claim." Nothing more is required. Questions raised by the defendants concerning the power of an undisclosed principal to enforce the guaranty agreement require further examination of the facts and law and must be reserved for the full trial. The $60,000 amount of the PJR is not in dispute.
The trial court properly determined that there was probable cause to support the plaintiff's application.
The defendants next complain that the Connecticut PJR statutes are unconstitutional because they do not require that a plaintiff seeking a PJR post a bond or other security. Our attention has not been directed to a trial court ruling on this issue. Examination of the transcript discloses that the defendant raised the issue in argument. Following a colloquy between the court and defense counsel on this issue, however, they went off on a tangent involving other matters. Consequently, the trial court never ruled on the bond issue. We cannot pass on the correctness of a trial court ruling that was never made. To be entitled to review, a claim must be both raised and decided in the trial court. Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 828-29, 614 A.2d 414 (1992).
If the defendants intended to take up this issue on appeal, it was their obligation to move for articulation to create an adequate record for appellate...
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